A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MUNICH 000062 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/AGS, SECDEF FOR OSD RICHARD DOTSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/13/2018 TAGS: MARR NATO PARM PREL GM MW SUBJECT: A/S FRIED'S MEETING WITH MONTENEGRIN FOREIGN MINISTER ROCEN REF: MUNICH 52 Classified By: CONSUL GENERAL ERIC G. NELSON FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D ) ¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Dan Fried met February 9 with Montenegrin Foreign Minister Milan Rocen. Rocen said Montenegro was ready for Kosovo,s independence and would control unwanted or destabilizing movement (e.g., paramilitaries) across the border while keeping it open for legitimate traffic. In the longer run, Montenegro wanted to move forward on recognition in coordination with the other former Yugoslav republics: Croatia and Macedonia. Rocen said Montenegro would be ready for Intensified Dialogue at the April NATO Summit in Bucharest. End summary. Kosovo and Serbia -------------- ¶2. (C) A/S Fried met with Montenegrin Foreign Minister Rocen at the latter's request, on the margins of the Munich Security Conference. Fried noted that Kosovo would become independent very soon, and Rocen asked if the rumor was accurate that a declaration of independence would occur February 17. Fried said it was likely in February, but did not enter into speculation about the exact date. Fried underscored that the U.S. did not plan to press Montenegro to recognize Kosovo immediately, for which Rocen said he was grateful. Fried said that the U.S. did, however, want Montenegro to keep the shared border open, while ensuring that no radical Serbs or other troublemakers of whatever type crossed through Montenegro into Kosovo. Further, we needed to embrace and help pro-Western forces in Serbia. It would be a difficult time, but the U.S. wanted to move NATO relations with all the countries in the region forward. ¶3. (C) Rocen said Montenegrin authorities were ready and he was confident upheaval could be averted. With respect to recognition, Montenegro would proceed deliberately, consult with the U.S. and European partners, and take a decision in line with its desire to strengthen its partnership with the Euro-Atlantic community. Rocen expressed the hope that Croatia, Macedonia, and Montenegro would be able to move forward together. ¶4. (C) He had spoken February 8 with Serbian President Tadic and Foreign Minister Jeremic -- they realized Kosovo independence would happen. It was possible that Kosovo Serbs in the north would declare their unification with Serbia. Tadic and Jeremic would not recognize such a declaration, using the justification that all of Kosovo remained part of Serbia. ¶5. (C) Rocen said there was likely to be a de facto partition of Kosovo and asked Fried whether Kosovo would be prevented from joining international organizations. Fried said the Russians could block UN membership for Kosovo, but they did not have the power to keep Kosovo out of the World Bank and IMF. The international community would not recognize separatist moves by Kosovo Serbs. Fried noted that the U.S. and Europe would neither recognize nor tolerate Kosovo Serb separatism. The border crossings would remain in international hands, and hindrances to movement, such as Kosovo Serb checkpoints, would be taken down. It might be hard to prevent parallel Kosovo Serb institutions from arising, but the international community would be ready to prevent violence and respond robustly if necessary. ¶6. (C) Rocen highlighted the "arrogant" Serbian stance and said Tadic had told him he would organize a referendum on reunification of Montenegro with Serbia. Rocen agreed with Fried that it was an outrageous idea and described it as an expression of Serb weakness. Serbia might also encourage separatism among Bosnian Serbs. Euro-Atlantic Integration -------------- MUNICH 00000062 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) Rocen said Montenegro hoped the three Membership Action Plan (MAP) countries (Albania, Croatia, and Macedonia) would be invited to join NATO together at Bucharest. This would have a stabilizing impact at a critical time and would be encouraging for the aspirations of other countries in the region. Montenegro was working hard with NATO on its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). Rocen joked that Montenegro really wanted a membership invitation at Bucharest, too, but said Montenegro also would be ready for Intensified Dialogue (ID). He said he wanted to ensure Montenegro was not forgotten by NATO; this happened at times (especially with some Europeans) because Montenegro was small and did not have any pressing international problems. Fried assured him that the U.S. would not forget Montenegro. Intensified Dialogue for Montenegro would have an additional benefit of demonstrating to Serbia that all the other countries in the region were moving in the same direction. This was integral to U.S. efforts to help Kosovo and western-oriented Serbs move toward NATO and European integration. ¶8. (C) Fried said a major problem related to NATO enlargement was the Macedonian name dispute with Greece. Rocen thought the U.S. would be able to influence Greece. Fried said there was no guarantee - the Macedonians must work with UN Special Envoy Nimetz The Macedonians had made some mistakes, especilly on the airport name. Rocen agreed, commenting that some Macedonians had told him that given achoice between the name of their airport and NATO embership, they would choose the airport, an allor-nothing view he considered short-sighted. . (U) This cable was cleared by A/S Fried and coordinated with Embassy Berlin. NELSON