RUSSIA'S REACTION TO SAAKASHVILI'S NEW ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000962 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S REACTION TO SAAKASHVILI'S NEW ABKHAZIA PROPOSAL REF: TBILISI 536 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. The Russians have taken a dim view of Saakashvili's new Abkhazia proposal, dismissing it as a political maneuver designed to make Georgia look better in Bucharest. In their view, the rollout to the international community rather than to the Abkhaz speaks for itself about the intended audience. While noting that the plan had a few good elements, the Russians view the overall approach as unrealistic absent efforts to restore confidence between the two sides. Despite recent improvements in Russian - Georgian relations, like the restoration of direct flights and other transportation links, Moscow continues to keep the pressure on the Georgian government vis-a-vis Abkhazia and South Ossetia short of recognition. On April 4, an MFA public statement detailed Putin's pledge of economic assistance to Abkhazia in his reply to the February request for recognition from the leaders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Earlier in the week in an appearance before the Duma, Lavrov had claimed that Georgia was not reciprocating Russia's attempts to normalize bilateral relations and delivered tough talk on the frozen conflicts. End summary. Putin's Pledge for More Assistance -------------- ¶2. (U) On April 4, the MFA released a statement detailing Putin's reply to February 2008 letters by Abkhazian "president" Bagapsh and South Ossetian "president" Kokoity that requested that Russia recognize their independence. The MFA quoted Putin's response as stating that "Russia could not but take into consideration Georgia's politics of destabilization, including an attempt to appeal to countries and organizations outside the region." Putin warned that political, economic, and particularly, military pressure on Abkhazia and South Ossetia would be pointless and counter-productive. Putin pledged assistance to Abkhazia in the trade, financial, transport and other sectors. Lavrov on Georgia -------------- ¶3. (U) Earlier in the week on April 2, FM Lavrov, in an address to the Duma, warned against attempts by Georgia to resolve regional conflicts by force or via accession to NATO. Lavrov maintained that the GOG was not reciprocating the GOR's readiness to "normalize" the bilateral relationship, and was attempting to use ongoing WTO-related, bilateral negotiations to his advantage. He urged Georgia to withdraw its troops from the Kodori Gorge, and to stop staging "provocations" against Russian peacekeepers as the first steps to resuming negotiations. Lavrov said that the MFA would use Kosovo as a precedent in examining a Duma proposal to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. He stressed that Putin had not promised not to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. MFA Joins In -------------- ¶4. (C) MFA Fourth CIS Deputy Director Dmitriy Tarabrin told us April 4 that NATO's decision not to offer MAP to Georgia did not remove the essential problem that would continue to dog Russia-Georgia relations because it only postponed the offer. ¶5. (C) GOR Special Envoy for the Abkhazia Conflict Vladislav Chernov told us in a separate meeting that Saakashvili, mindful of the Bucharest NATO Summit, had announced his new proposal to the international community rather than to the partner to the conflict, the Abkhaz. Instead of small steps to restore confidence between the Georgians and the Abkhaz, the new proposal failed to take into account the reality on the ground, he added. Chernov said he was not surprised that Abkhaz officials rejected the initiative. Per Chernov, Saakashvili failed to follow normal diplomatic practice where an important proposal should have been discussed with partners in order to gain momentum for its acceptance rather than announced "out of the blue." Chernov said that the proposal had a few good elements, similar to those in the Boden document, but in the absence of an "appropriate" environment, it won no sympathy from the Abkhaz. (Note: Chernov is resigning after next week's UN session on Abkhazia to join a state nanotech company: his replacement has not yet been named.) ¶6. (C) MFA Fourth CIS Deputy Director Aleksey Pavlovskiy echoed Chernov, saying that Saakashivili was "putting the cart before the horse." He thought that the talk of status could come only after establishing confidence and securing demilitarization, not before. With the negotiation process completely stalled, the new peace proposal could only be interpreted as a "political" move to put Georgia in a more attractive light in front of NATO members. Pavlovskiy affirmed a positive trend in Russia - Georgia relations with the resumption of direct flights, shipping and postal links. He blamed Saakashvili for "lying" by misrepresenting Putin's frank discussions on Kosovo's implications for the Caucasus during the February 21 bilateral meeting on the margins of the CIS Informal Summit. Pavlovskiy argued that the GOG's push for NATO MAP left the Abkhaz feeling that their voice was not considered and that the GOG planned to rely on NATO to safeguard Georgia's territorial integrity with force. BURNS