RUSSIAN EXPERTS SAY U.S. MUST REMAIN IN IRAQ AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000957 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN EXPERTS SAY U.S. MUST REMAIN IN IRAQ AND ENGAGE IRAN Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Prominent Russian analysts told Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador Satterfield, SIPDIS and Ambassador Burns, during an April 3 gathering, that preventing the fragmentation and radicalization of Iraq was a key Russian concern, and urged that direct, long-term engagement with Iran was the best means to prevent it from becoming a nuclear state and to deal with its aspirations to acquire more influence in Iraq. They questioned the approach taken by the U.S. in stabilizing Iraq, which compared unfavorably with Russia's "more successful approach to pacifying Chechnya." They warned against further antagonizing and radicalizing the Iranian regime. Finally, the analysts advised the U.S. to take into account the interests of countries that could help it deal with Tehran, and pointed to Russian concern over potential U.S. actions against Iran. End summary. Iraq -------------- ¶2. (C) Russian analysts expressed their concern that the U.S. might withdraw from Iraq, the stability of which remained a Russian priority. Aleksandr Belkin of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy said that he "feared to think about the moment" the U.S. withdrew from Iraq, adding that the greatest problem appeared to be the inability of the Iraqis to form a sustainable government. He explained that military analysts were concerned the U.S. had not applied the lessons of the USSR in Afghanistan to the current situation in either Iraq or Afghanistan, where continued difficulties could lead to a "new Vietnam syndrome" and U.S. withdrawal. Yevgeniy Satanovskiy of the Institute of Middle East Studies said it was clearly dangerous for the U.S. to withdraw from an Iraq that had ineffective security forces, and counseled more time to let the situation stabilize. ¶3. (C) Aleksey Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center predicted that Iraq would remain a single, but increasingly fragmented country, and asked if another Saddam was needed to keep the country together. Fedor Lukyanov, Editor of "Russia in Global Affairs," compared the American attempt at political settlement in Iraq to the Russian settlement in Chechnya. Following the successful Iraqi parliamentary elections in 2005, it appeared that the U.S. effort to develop democracy would work, but now, with the continued violence, it appeared that the Russian approach to stabilizing Chechnya by "pacifying" the region and installing a strongman might be best. ¶4. (C) Dmitriy Trenin of the Moscow Carnegie Center posited that the U.S. was not a "classical imperialistic power," but a "modernizing, democratizing power." Its approach to occupying and remaking a defeated country worked in modern Japan and Germany, but not in Iraq. He recommended that the U.S. adopt some of the tools of a classical imperialist and seek to further its interests as it once did in the region via the "tripod" that included Israel, moderate Arab states, and the Shah of Iran. Now, with Iran "gone over to the mullahs," Trenin argued that the long-term solution to Iraq and Afghanistan was to "do Iran right" and adopt a policy of engagement that could help pacify Tehran and impact positively on other aspects of the ME. Iran -------------- ¶5. (C) Trenin argued that the U.S. needed to approach Iran more like it did the USSR, with a long-term strategy. The nuclear issue was just the "tip of the iceberg," a reflection of what was happening in Iran's dynamic society. Because Iran was more modern and democratic than other ME countries, it was more predictable. By comparison, it was unclear what would happen in Egypt or Saudi Arabia after their current, aged leaders departed. Having a pragmatic relationship with Iran would better serve U.S. interests than only basing ME policy on these traditional allies. ¶6. (C) Ambassador Satterfield responded by pointing to the failure of Russian attempts at dialogue with Iran. He argued the USSR analogy did not apply; during the Cold War, the U.S. dealt with an ideological adversary that was also a "responsible" power, which was not the case with Iran. The U.S. could negotiate with Iran, but this required accepting Iranian conditions: expansionism, hostility to Israel, and alliances with radical elements. The dilemma was how to deal with Iran under these circumstances. ¶7. (C) For Trenin, it was crucial that the U.S. looked at the MOSCOW 00000957 002 OF 002 real motives behind Iranian policies that sought to expand influence to Iraq, Afghanistan and the Gulf. A level of Iranian influence was "inevitable," and the country would become a growing factor in regional affairs. He argued that the Soviet analogy was correct in terms of taking a long-term approach to dealing with a major, hostile power that may not become a friend but could be a country the U.S. worked with, just as the USSR went from adversary to the "difficult partner" Russia was today. ¶8. (C) Malashenko did not think Iran wanted to acquire a bomb but preferred to "talk about it" to increase its regional stature. The danger was that the current approach based upon sanctions and isolating Iran antagonized the leadership and populace. Malashenko warned this could result in Ahmadinejad being replaced by someone more radical. ¶9. (C) Lukyanov asked if a new U.S. administration would be willing to talk to Iran, considering that U.S. policy makers depicted the Iranian leadership as fanatical. He said there was a "conceptual difference" in how the U.S. and Russia viewed Iran: the majority of Russian experts considered Iran an "emerging" regional power that should be dealt with accordingly. Ambassador Satterfield responded that while the tone of a new administration might change, the substance of concerns regarding Iran was unlikely to alter. He asked why Iran rejected offers for greater dialogue if it halted its nuclear program, prompting Satanovskiy's response that Iran saw itself as a regional power entitled to a bomb. ¶10. (C) Trenin said that Iran could build a bomb if it wanted, and the only way to stop it was to form a real international coalition with the U.S. as its most important member; "everyone else is just an auxiliary" when it came to Iran. Success, however, required the U.S. to be "creative and forward looking" and recognize the interests of other coalition members, which it had not done previously. Belkin said it was a "mistake" for the U.S. to think it could dictate the international community's approach to Iran, and argued that the U.S. and Russia needed to act "more in concert" with one another. The problem was that as a result of the U.S. claims of WMD in Iraq, Moscow could not "trust" the U.S. and thought potential American actions against Iran were unpredictable. ¶11. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable. BURNS