RUSSIAN VIEWS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000956

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/04/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL IR IZ RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH IRAQ AND IRAN

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Present and former Russian officials
welcomed the message from the Senior Advisor to the Secretary
and Coordinator for Iraq, Ambassador Satterfield, that the
U.S. encouraged increased Russian engagement in Iraq during a
round of April 2-3 meetings, and pressed the U.S. to broaden
its dialogue with Iran. Officials assured Ambassador
Satterfield that the GOR would not take advantage of U.S.
difficulty in Iraq and hoped the U.S. could stabilize the
country. The GOR continued to call for a timetable for
withdrawing coalition troops, arguing this would further
national reconciliation. Officials expressed pessimism over
the potential engagement of Iraqi neighbors, predicting that
Iran would continue to be most involved. Fearing the
increasing influence of Iran in Iraq and throughout the
Middle East, they stressed the need for engaging Iran rather
than isolating and antagonizing it. Citing their own
experiences with Tehran, the officials acknowledged the
difficulty in dealing with the regime, but advised that
failure to do so would only increase the chances that Tehran
would go nuclear and continue to pursue its ambitions by
destabilizing the region. End summary.

Russia Takes No Advantage of Situation in Iraq
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2. (C) Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov was
explicit that Russia would not "take advantage" of U.S.
difficulties in Iraq, and wished the U.S. success in
stabilizing the country. The GOR supported national
reconciliation and believed that all Iraqi neighbors should
facilitate this process, a message reinforced during the
recent Baghdad visit of DFM Saltanov. Ambassador Satterfield
expressed appreciation for Saltanov's visit as a welcome
symbol of Russia's positive engagement with Iraq. Nazarov
and Ambassador Satterfield agreed that Russia and the U.S.
had mutual interests in Iraqi stability, which would prevent
it becoming a base for international Jihadists and counter
Iranian regional ambitions. Ambassador Satterfield told
Nazarov the U.S. hoped Russia would urge Arab states to
become more engaged in Iraq.


3. (C) Nazarov said that Russia's ability to help Iraq was
limited, but the GOR would take what positive steps it could,
such as its decision to write off Iraqi debt in February.
Since then, there had been movement on Iraq possibly
recognizing previous oil contracts with Lukoil, which the GOR
saw as an important indication of Iraqi intentions and their
future relationship. Nazarov hoped Iraqi security services
would be more cooperative in providing the GOR with
information on those suspected of murdering Russian
diplomats. Ambassador Satterfield assured him the U.S. would
look into ways to assist the GOR in this regard.


4. (C) Nazarov reiterated that the GOR believed setting a
timetable for withdrawing coalition troops would further
Iraqi national reconciliation and stability, but recognized
that any withdrawal had to be carried out in a responsible
and realistic fashion. He said Russia placed great
importance upon maintaining Iraqi unity and expressed concern
over the long-term consequences of "violating" the country's
ethnic and religious status quo.

Pessimism on Iraqi Neighbors' Engagement
--------------


5. (C) Former Security Council Secretary Igor Ivanov offered
a message similar to Nazarov regarding Russian interests in
Iraqi stability. He gave a pessimistic assessment of the
Iraqi neighbors' potential engagement, saying that Iran,
unfortunately, would be the most engaged. Turkey continued
to be constrained by the Kurdish issue, while the Arab states
remained focused on the Middle East peace process (MEPP)
rather than Iraq. Ambassador Satterfield agreed, and said
that the Arab states remained "spectators" when it came to
Iraq. Ivanov thought Russian oil companies could become more
involved in Iraq, although he did not want to exaggerate the
possibilities. He was surprised by Ambassador Satterfield's
explanation that the Iraqi oil ministry wanted to maintain
state control of the energy industry and sign only service
agreements with international companies. Ivanov thought
Lukoil was prepared to invest $30 million in Iraq, but only
through a production sharing agreement. Other companies
would want the same, which bode poorly for Iraqi oil
development Ambassador Satterfield explained that the U.S.
had made some progress getting the Iraqis to understand this
fact, but it would help if other countries and foreign
companies would send the same message.

Federalism Exacerbates Ethnic/Regional Tensions

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6. (C) Former PM Yevgeniy Primakov provided a pessimistic
assessment of developments in Iraq, argued that stabilization
had not yet occurred, and concluded that U.S. success in
calming Sunni regions was only tactical. He argued that U.S.
emphasis on federalism tended to exacerbate tensions over
territorial control and domination of oil. Primakov listened
skeptically to Ambassador Satterfield's explanation that
aggressive demand for federalism had been tempered by
willingness to compromise on maximalist goals and growing
advocacy among Iraqi leaders of national interests, even
among the Kurds. Ambassador Satterfield countered Primakov's
suspicions that the U.S. sought permanent basing in Iraq in
the wake of a December 2008 end to the UN Chapter 7 mandate.
Primakov welcomed admissions by U.S. officials that mistakes
had been made, but questioned whether the situation was
salvageable "after so many."

Russians Call for Dialogue With Iran
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7. (C) Iran's increasing role in Iraq was an important topic
for Ambassador Satterfield's interlocutors, who stressed the
need for the U.S. to have a genuine dialogue with Tehran.
Ivanov argued that Iran was truly interested in an active
dialogue with the U.S.; dialogue with Russia and Europe,
neither of which Iran perceived as a threat, were of lesser
importance. He conveyed a familiar message that the GOR
found Iran more reasonable, and even useful at times, such as
when it helped prevent a civil war in Tajikistan. Ivanov did
not exaggerate the possibilities of dialogue with Iran, and
agreed with Ambassador Satterfield's assessment that Iran was
different than North Korea, which had specific security and
regime-survival goals that could be met through dialogue;
Iran sought not simply security but recognition of its
regional ambitions. Ivanov warned that Iran sought to take
advantage of what it perceived as the U.S.'s weakened
position vis-a-vis Iraq, Afghanistan, and the growth of
anti-Americanism. Iran wanted to "push" the U.S. out of
those areas where Tehran wanted to increase its influence,
including Iraq, Lebanon and Palestine. Ivanov counseled
taking "small steps" to draw Iran away from its rogue status
and into the international community.


8. (C) Ivanov drew on his long experience with Russia's
"complicated" relationship with Iran to convey the difficulty
in dealing with members of the regime, with whom he could
negotiate for hours with no results. He observed that the
Iranians appeared to live in the "last century" and once
proposed that Russia and Iran form an alliance against the
U.S. Russia tried, but failed, to explain that times had
changed. Ivanov thought Russia and the U.S. should engage
Iran in a "coordinated way" that could bring Iran "into the
present." Failure to do so allowed an unstable situation to
drag on, during which Iran would not "sit idle," but would
further its nuclear ambitions. Ivanov conceded the
difficulty in identifying a leader in the Iranian power
structure, but settled upon Khamenei as having "real"
authority.

U.S. Must Have Patience Dealing With Iran
--------------


9. (C) Nazarov appreciated the difficulty the U.S.
encountered in its limited dialogue with Iran on Iraq, but
stressed that a broader dialogue was necessary as Iran's
ultimate target was not Iraq but regional influence.
Although American politics might not allow the U.S. to expand
its dialogue, Nazarov thought the threat of an increased
Iranian role in Iraq might. Nazarov argued against a narrow
focus on Iraq or Iran's nuclear program, which stemmed from
Iranian security concerns. A broader dialogue that took in
Iran's regional interests, including Afghanistan, Lebanon and
Palestine, would make Iran feel more secure and could dampen
its nuclear aspirations. Nazarov added that Russian
interests in these areas was more limited than the U.S., as
was GOR ability to influence Tehran, yet Russia was the "only
one" engaged with Iran. Nazarov advised patience in dealing
with Iran, as time was necessary to overcome "layers of
mutual mistrust." Ambassador Satterfield acknowledged the
lack of trust and explained the current, limited dialogue
with Iran on Iraq offered the potential to begin building
trust, although Iranian negotiating behavior suggested
otherwise.

Pressure on Iran is Counterproductive
--------------


10. (C) Primakov assessed the Iranian regime as intent on
developing the capacity to develop a nuclear weapon without

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actually acquiring one. Citing the diversity of opinion on
the nuclear issue within the Iranian regime, Primakov argued
for more extensive U.S. engagement and against pressure that
only produced a more radicalized and united elite. Primakov
thought the greatest challenge for the U.S. in the ME was the
rise of Iranian regional ambition, adding that Iran saw a
role for itself in the MEPP where it could use its "trump"
cards, Hezbollah and Hamas. Primakov argued that the best
defense against Iranian influence was a successful peace
process, and added that Israeli fear of a nuclear Iran should
be an incentive to move toward a comprehensive solution.


11. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable.
BURNS