Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW914
2008-04-03 13:02:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:  

LIBERALS ON LIFE UNDER MEDVEDEV, THE NATO SUMMIT,

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMO #0914/01 0941302
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031302Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7463
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000914 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: LIBERALS ON LIFE UNDER MEDVEDEV, THE NATO SUMMIT,
POSSIBLE PERSONNEL CHANGES


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000914

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/03/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM PINR SOCI RS
SUBJECT: LIBERALS ON LIFE UNDER MEDVEDEV, THE NATO SUMMIT,
POSSIBLE PERSONNEL CHANGES


Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons: 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In a series of recent meetings, traditional
SPS patron and UES Chairman Chubais, beleaguered Yabloko
Chairman Yavlinskiy, and radio station Ekho Moskvy Editor
Venediktov described a MAP for Ukraine as a "major strategic
mistake," but thought that Putin's intention in Bucharest
remained to turn the page on his 2007 Munich speech. None
knew what the future held in store for potential cabinet
re-shuffles and the operation of the Medvedev - Putin tandem,
but were cautiously optimistic about a Medvedev presidency,
as well as about the medium-term prospects for a somewhat
improved climate for freedom of speech and assembly now that
the Kremlin had accomplished its succession scenario.
Yavlinskiy was defiant in the fact of an open schism in his
party and the backlash, among traditionally western-leaning
commentators, to his March 11, two-hour meeting with Putin.
End summary.

Ukraine MAP A "Mistake"
--------------


2. (C) In a series of recent meetings with the Ambassador and
Embassy officials, RAO UES Chairman Anatoliy Chubais, UES
colleague and Union of Right Forces Deputy Chairman Leonid
Gozman, and Yaboloko President Grigoriy Yavlinskiy argued
that a NATO offer of MAP to Ukraine would, in the Russian
estimation, be a "major strategic mistake." Chubais, with
Gozman nodding agreement, thought that a MAP for Georgia
would be a mistake, as well, but saved most of his
unhappiness for a possible offer to Ukraine. Yavlinskiy
reiterated concerns that by frontloading its agenda with
President-elect Medvedev with issues such as Kosovo and MAP,
the U.S. was poisoning a strategic relationship, whose
strength was paramount on a host of international challenges.


3. (C) Chubais had been heartened by what he had heard and
read of the recent Moscow 2 plus 2 talks, which he described
as "qualitatively different" from previous rounds. He hoped
that the positive momentum established would continue through

further rounds. Chubais told the Ambassador that Putin's
intention at Bucharest was "not to replay (his 2007 speech
at) Munich," but to turn the page for incoming President
Medvedev. Of course, if Ukraine is offered MAP, then Putin's
speech would undoubtedly be more strident, and that would
trigger "huge problems in our relationship."

The Putin - Medvedev Tandem
--------------


4. (C) Chubais told the Ambassador that he had a high opinion
of President-elect Medvedev, and that it would be a "mistake"
to underestimate him as he begins his presidency. Chubais
did not pretend to know what form the Putin - Medvedev
power-sharing arrangement would take, but he doubted that
anyone did. Putin was more of a tactician, and Chubais
described Putin's treatment of the succession as
characteristic. In his telling, Putin initially had been
serious about Prime Minister Zubkov as a potential successor,
but when the elites had reacted poorly to Zubkov's candidacy,
Putin had been agile enough to adjust. If it were a "yes"
man he wanted, Chubais pointed out, Putin could have picked
Zubkov, but he was clearly after something more. Chubais did
not claim to know what Putin's endgame was in this instance.
He cautioned against attaching too much importance to
statements by leading politicians about cloudless prospects
for the Putin - Medvedev tandem. For his part, Yavlinskiy
stated flatly that "Medvedev is a third term for Putin," and
refused to be drawn out on the policy differences that could
emerge on Medvedev's watch.

Government Re-shuffle
--------------


5. (C) Although Chubais, again, said that he had no inside
knowledge. he told the Ambassador that he expected no major
changes in the Cabinet or Presidential Administration. He
thought that Minister of Finance Kudrin and Presidential
Administration Deputy Igor Shuvalov would stay, as would
Presidential Administration expert Arkadiy Dvorkovich.
Chubais had less light to shed on the political and siloviki
side of the Cabinet, although he joined others in telling the
Ambassador that Aleksandr Voloshin hoped to return to the
Presidential Administration under Medvedev. Ekho Moskviy
Editor Aleksey Venediktov disagreed, arguing that Voloshin
would remain outside the government framework, while
retaining significant influence with both Medvedev and Putin.
Voloshin's one-on-one, two-hour meeting with Putin,
Venediktov said, was focused on how to construct a "tandem"
government but, like Chubais, Venediktov said that no one yet
knew the outcome. Venediktov predicted the splitting of the

energy ministries, the creation of more deputy prime minister
slots, and the potential elevation of Sergey Ivanov to a
"state secretary" position that would have greater
responsibilities than his current First Deputy Prime Minister
role. Any re-shuffling, Venediktov stressed, would be a
"package deal" and the permutations were endless.

A More Liberal Political Climate?
--------------


6. (C) Chubais ascribed the recent crackdowns on the likes of
St. Petersburg Yabloko's Maksim Reznik to the local
administration's slowness in getting out of electoral gear.
He thought that would change, and saw in the decision to
re-open St. Petersburg's European University a sign that
common sense was prevailing. Chubais and Gozman professed
not to know the cause for the recent decision by St.
Petersburg authorities to inspect local SPS headquarters,
although they suspected that local conflicts, and the
decision of some in SPS, like Chairman Nikita Belykh and
former Deputy Chairman Boris Nemtsov, to harden their
opposition to the GOR. As another, very slight glimmer of
positive change, Venediktov acknowledged nighttime television
programming was becoming more interesting and lively, the
overt pressure against Ekho of three months ago had receded
significantly, and technology continued to outstrip the
authoritarian impulse of the government: internet, blogging,
satellite television were moving faster than the authorities.
The fact that Medvedev read the internet first thing in the
morning sent a powerful signal of change, compared to Putin's
reliance on security services-drafted "folders," and
indicated that the new president would seek alternate sources
of information. Establishment supporter and Public Chamber
member Vyacheslav Nikonov separately agreed, telling a USAID
delegation that the Kremlin would keep its two "weapons of
mass destruction" -- the federal television channels -- while
ignoring internet and newspapers.


7. (C) Yavlinskiy, whose March 11 meeting with Putin
generated a backlash among opposition politicians and
editorial writers, argued that there was a useful role to be
played by liberal forces during a period of authoritarian
rule, but that did not include "useless" street protests that
left the Russian public unmoved. Yavlinskiy, whose rejection
of the St. Petersburg Yabloko branch's participation in Other
Russia and other pan-opposition protests has lead to an open
schism in the party, maintained that it was not enough to
simply criticize the government. The opposition needed to
generate ideas and find entree into decisionmaking channels.
Every "noisy" opposition movement had failed, he noted,
either because of the inadequacy of their leaders (some of
whom, he stressed, were or should be ideologically odious to
any liberal) or the paucity of their ideology. Yavlinskiy
attributed Putin's invitation to meet to the Russian
President's implicit acknowledgment that the ten percent of
Russian society represented by liberal parties was "the most
important" in society. While Putin had "stolen" Yavlinskiy's
votes and stripped his party of registration in key regions,
he could not afford to ignore the constituents that
Yavlinskiy and others represented. Yavlinskiy concluded that
"I can 'speak truth to power' in the newspapers and on the
internet, but if I want to have an effect and to influence
policy, then I need to find a language to communicate with
the government."
BURNS