RUSSIAN VIEWS ON KOSOVO IN LEAD-UP TO BUCHAREST

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000910

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/02/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID RU
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN VIEWS ON KOSOVO IN LEAD-UP TO BUCHAREST

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: MFA Special Envoy for Kosovo
Botsan-Kharchenko told us that Putin will reiterate Russian
opposition to Kosovo's independence in Bucharest, but the
issue is not expected to feature prominently, including
during the President's visit April 5-6 visit to Sochi. The
GOR will continue to adhere to a strict interpretation of
UNSCR 1244, condemning the possibility of U.S. military
supplies to Kosovo, urging UNMIK to ignore Serbian staging of
parliamentary elections on May 11 (as was the case two years
ago),and using the mid-April UNSC UNMIK review to criticize
SRSG Rucker and UNMIK Deputy Rosin's planning for a EULEX
transition. Russia does not support partition
(notwithstanding former PM Primakov's statements in
Belgrade),nor a territorial division between UNMIK and
EULEX, but believes attitudes on the ground will limit
EULEX's writ. Russia is contemplating participation in a
Kosovo donor's conference, in the wake of its aid to Serb
enclaves. Acknowledging the restrained actions of the
Pristina government, Botsan-Kharchenko said Russia could not
condemn Serb violence triggered by Kosovo's independence and
did not see Belgrade's hand in the Mitrovica violence. With
elections too close to call, Botsan-Kharchenko said there
were no plans for senior Serbian visitors to Moscow, although
the Serbian Embassy speculates that Radical leader Nikolic
may visit.

Kosovo Not in Bucharest or Sochi Limelight
--------------


2. (C) In an April 1 meeting, Russian Special Envoy for
Kosovo Aleksandr Botsan-Kharchenko played down prospects that
Putin would refocus international attention on Russian
rejection of Kosovo's independence at the NATO Summit in
Bucharest, or during the subsequent April 5-6 visit of the
President to Sochi. Acknowledging that there could be no
"fruitful discussion" of Kosovo, Botsan-Kharchenko -- who had
just finished drafting briefing materials for Putin's visit
to Bucharest -- predicted a reiteration of well known
positions, rather than a "sharp" revisiting of policy
differences.

GOR Legal Focus on 1244; Rejects Mil-Mil
--------------


3. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko explained that Russian policy
disputes with the U.S. over Kosovo would continue to be
demarcated by Russia's strict interpretation of the limits of
UNSCR 1244. Acknowledging that Russian press reports had
hyped incorrectly U.S. sales of advanced military equipment
to Kosovo, Botsan-Kharchenko pointed to statements on March
20 by FM Lavrov and Russian Ambassador to NATO Rogozin that
UNSCR 1244 does not permit creation of a Kosovo army and does
not allow any kind of weaponry to be supplied to Kosovo,
except to international forces operating under a UN mandate.
Any other supplies were "illegitimate," with Lavrov focusing
on the possibility that arms would be taken up against Serbs
and other minorities to compel their acceptance of Kosovo's
independence. The U.S. announcement, he said, constituted a
"provocation."


4. (C) Russia will not accept the unsanctioned parameters
of the Ahtisaari Plan, Botsan-Kharchenko reiterated, but will
hold the international community accountable to UNSCR 1244.
In this context, Russia believed that the international
presence should remain "neutral" during the May 11 Serb
elections, since UNMIK did not interfere in their conduct in
Kosovo two years ago. The GOR would use the visit of Serb FM
Jeremic to New York mid-April to focus discussions of the
UNMIK report on the "unacceptable" efforts by SRSG Rucker and
UNMIK Deputy Rosin to prepare for a hand-off to EULEX,
following the mid-June end of the Ahtisaari-envisioned
120-day transition period. The GOR position will continue to
be that UNMIK must remain as the legal, international
civilian presence throughout Kosovo.

GOR Practical Focus on Serb Rejectionism
--------------


5. (C) At a practical level, Botsan-Kharchenko maintained
that the March 17 events in Mitrovica proved the necessity of
a continued UNMIK presence. In Mitrovica and other Serb
enclaves, EULEX was not recognized and Russia saw "no chance"
for cooperation with EULEX to emerge. Describing as
"legitimate and understandable" the Serb position to reject
Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence,
Botsan-Kharchenko said that it necessarily followed that
Belgrade and Kosovar Serbs would differentiate between the
internationally sanctioned civilian presence (UNMIK) and
EULEX personnel. Rejecting Russian designs in using UNSCR
1244 to create a "new Abkhazia," Botsan-Kharchenko said UNMIK

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should operate throughout Kosovo and that Russia opposed
territorial demarcations between UNMIK and EULEX personnel.
However, the reality confronting the international community
was that Kosovar Albanians would not cooperate with UNMIK,
and Kosovar Serbs would not work with EULEX.

Russia Rejects Partition, Targets Aid
--------------


6. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko pushed back strongly against
speculation that former PM Primakov's advocacy of partition
during a late March visit to Belgrade was driven by official
Russian support for the initiative. Primakov's views were
his own, and there was no official Russian encouragement of
Belgrade to consider partition as an option.
Botsan-Kharchenko stressed that formal and informal Troika
discussions of partition had foundered on Serbian opposition.
Russia saw no change in Serb positions, with Belgrade
incapable of ceding its claim to the whole of Kosovo. While
Botsan-Kharchenko acknowledged the carrots and sticks
deployed by Belgrade to harden ties with Kosovar Serbs, he
took issue with the recent assessment by the International
Crisis Group that a de facto policy of partition was being
pursued. The Serbs have no such strategy, he insisted.


7. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko continued to depict Russian policy
as dictated by Belgrade. If Serbia were to endorse Kosovo's
independence, embrace working with EULEX, or seek partition,
Botsan-Kharchenko maintained, Russia would fall in line.
"Russia has no allergy to EULEX," he said, but the legal
argument over UNSCR 1244 and Belgrade rejection of Kosovo's
independence would set Russia's agenda. Botsan-Kharchenko
repeatedly denied that Russia was opposed to Serbia's
integration into European institutions, pointing to Russia's
strong and mature relations with Slovakia and Slovenia as
evidence that European cooperation did not run counter to
Russian interests.


8. (C) Clearly uncomfortable with questions over Russia's
decision to announce humanitarian assistance to Serb enclaves
(which the Serbian Embassy learned about through press
reports),Botsan-Kharchenko stuck close to Putin's language
that the aid was not targeted at one ethnic group, but to
specific regions that had requested Russian help. Conceding
that the aid would de facto benefit one ethnic group, the
Serbs, Botsan-Kharchenko stressed that Russia was still
considering participation in the next Kosovo donor's
conference (since it had been agreed upon prior to Kosovo's
declaration of independence) and clarified that Russian
humanitarian assistance would be distributed in coordination
with international organizations and Belgrade. The "previous
procedures," involving UNMIK and KFOR, would be used.

No Condemnation of Serb Violence
--------------


9. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko conceded the absence of Kosovar
Albanian-instigated violence and agreed that Pristina
authorities had behaved responsibly to date, which he
attributed to concerted U.S. and EU efforts. Nevertheless,
the potential for violence remained. Mitrovica was a
reaction to UDI, and Russia could not condemn the actions of
Kosovar Serbs, who rejected efforts to undermine Serbia's
sovereignty. Botsan-Kharchenko took issue with charges of
Belgrade's complicity in provoking violence, responding that
Russia's examination of events in Mitrovica concluded that
spontaneous demonstrations had led to the death and injuries.

Elections Too Close to Call
--------------


10. (C) Russia believed the political situation in Serbia
was too fluid to predict the outcome of the May 11 elections,
and Botsan-Kharchenko said there were no plans at present for
senior Belgrade officials to visit Moscow. Serbian Embassy
contacts told us that Radical leader Nikolic could visit
Russia the second half of April at the initiative of the
Russian Ambassador to Serbia. Botsan-Kharchenko disavowed
knowledge of any such plans, but noted that the previous
visit of Nikolic had come at the "initiative" of the Duma and
was not official.

BURNS