RUSSIAN DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL NAZAROV ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 000859 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP RS IR SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DEPUTY SECURITY COUNCIL NAZAROV ON IRAN AND "123" Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a March 21 meeting with SFRC Staff Member Puneet Talwar and DCM, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Nazarov praised P5 1 unity on Iran, but argued that SIPDIS a lack of a roadmap, the failure to lay out positive inducements for Iranian action, over-reliance on sanctions, and the absence of a trusted intermediary complicated progress. Nazarov said it was "incorrect" to expect Iran to completely halt its enrichment activity, and argued for full transparency, adherence to the Additional Protocol, and a full accounting of past activities as the basis for Iran's reemergence as a "normal state." Nazarov urged the U.S. to address Iranian concerns over regime change, and to engage more broadly on Iran's role in the region. Nazarov conceded that different threat perceptions made Iran a lower priority for the GOR than U.S. Nazarov expressed concerns over congressional legislation that could block a future "123" and underscored the importance Russia attached to its relations with the U.S. End Summary Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) In a two-hour meeting on March 21 with Senate Foreign Relations Committee Senior Staff Member Puneet Talwar and DCM, Russian Security Council Deputy Secretary Vladimir Nazarov stressed that the most significant accomplishment of the P5 1 was maintaining a common front in demanding Iranian compliance with UN and IAEA demands. Noting that he could speak freely as a non-diplomat (hailing from the security services),Nazarov added that the greatest failure of the P5 1 was in failing to craft a roadmap that charted a clear path towards its strategic goals. Nazarov argued that, unlike the Six Party process, the P5 1 lacked an effective intermediary with Iran. While China brought energy and initiative in its behind-the-scenes encouragement of North Korea, no P5 1 interlocutor enjoyed both the trust of Iran and the confidence of its P5 1 partners. Noting that EU Solana lacked the authority and "weight" to engage successfully with Iran and explicitly ruling Russia out as an alternate, Nazarov saw few opportunities for a near-term breakthrough, but speculated that new EU structural reforms might bring forth a new personality. ¶3. (C) Continuing his comparison of the P5 1 to the Six Party format, Nazarov argued that Iran needed a positive vision of its reintegration into the international community laid out in explicit terms. Nazarov said it would be "incorrect" to think that Iran will give up its enrichment activities entirely. In return for "utter transparency," adherence to the Additional Protocol, and a full accounting of its past activities, Iran needed to understand that it will be treated as an "absolutely normal" state, with the full rights of any other NPT member. Nazarov sidestepped a detailed discussion of which Iranian nuclear activities would cross Russian red-lines. Stressing that this was his personal view, Nazarov maintained that Iran would insist on a level of enrichment activity commensurate with its existing centrifuges, and that transparency would be critical to assuaging international community concerns. ¶4. (C) Nazarov recapped Putin's failed effort to convince Ahmedinejad and the Supreme Leader to "declare victory" in demonstrating to the world its mastery of enrichment technology, while accepting Russia's offer of reprocessing services. While Putin had argued that this would create the diplomatic space for a direct dialogue, Iran "turned a deaf ear" to the presentation. "We see no evidence," Nazarov concluded, that Iran is ready to forego enrichment in favor of the services of international fuel centers. Nazarov attributed former National Security Adviser Larijani's departure to his unhappiness over this decision. ¶5. (C) Reiterating the need for a positive agenda with Iran, Nazarov argued that Ahmedinejad had mastered how to use international sticks to rally internal support. The more the international community wielded sanctions, he maintained, the greater the likelihood of Ahmedinejad's reelection. While threats and drastic actions sounded better to the average voter, Nazarov commented, "all responsible politicians" understood that inducements would be required to change Iranian behavior. Nazarov maintained that the U.S. should seek to engage Iran more broadly on regional security, since "chasing Iran into the corner" had exacerbated its bad behavior. In Afghanistan, Lebanon, and Iraq, more responsible Iranian behavior could be induced, particularly if Iran's disquiet over its own security was assuaged. In an aside, Nazarov noted that Iran's anti-narcotics policy was more effective than that of the EU, Pakistan, or U.S./NATO when it came to Afghanistan. MOSCOW 00000859 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Up to now, Nazarov insisted, Iran remained suspicious of U.S. efforts to engineer regime change, with nonproliferation concerns interpreted as a euphemism for a broader political agenda. Iran needed to believe that its security interests were being taken into account, which -- over time -- would lead to changes in the calculus of its regional policy. Just as Iran had to earn the trust of the U.S. (and international community, writ large),the U.S. needed to gain the confidence of the Iranians. Only then, Nazarov maintained, would a roadmap defining the parameters of Iranian nuclear activity, transparency, and regional behavior be possible. Conceding that the difficulty of working with Iran made bilateral relations a low priority for the GOR, Nazarov again attributed some of Iran's unpredictability to an exaggerated sense of insecurity fueled by U.S. threats of military action. ¶7. (C) Nazarov agreed that Russia gave a lower priority to Iran than the U.S., due to substantially different threat perceptions. Tapping the table sharply for emphasis, Nazarov twice repeated that "no one knows that Iran has made a political decision to acquire nuclear weapons," adding that it was "unlikely" that such a decision had been taken. Citing Russian and other international experts, Nazarov maintained that Iran faced broad technological challenges, not limited to its enrichment activities. In a best case scenario, he said, Iran could develop a nuclear device in five years, but realistically that accomplishment was "much further down the road." In any event, he stressed, Iran's nuclear advance would not come as a "bolt from the blue," but would be presaged by increasing evidence of nuclear activity, a withdrawal from the NPT, and abrogation of its IAEA commitments. Strict sanctions would only embolden Iranian radicals, who argue for a preemptive withdrawal from both international regimes. ¶8. (C) Pushed on whether Russia would support additional sanctions at the same time that inducements were proffered, Nazarov insisted that there already was an "imbalance" in the P5 1 strategy. Rather than the EU3 and Russia playing good cop to America's bad, Nazarov argued, the U.S. should adopt a more constructive tone, redress Iranian concerns over security, and align its strategy to reflect more of its approach to North Korea. Reiterating that sanctions were ineffective, if popular electorally, Nazarov said that U.S. unilateral steps (and the possibility of additional EU measures) could jeopardize the unity of the P5 1 and weaken international resolve towards Iran. Congress and "123" -------------- ¶9. (C) Nazarov expressed concern over draft U.S. legislation that, among other things, called for rejection of a "123" agreement with Russia, in the event of its continued cooperation with Iran on Bushehr. Noting that the Administration had praised Russia's approach to the delivery of Bushehr fuel, which the Kremlin had consulted on in advance, Nazarov questioned congressional motivations. Keeping Bilateral Relations on Even Keel -------------- ¶10. (C) Nazarov began and concluded his comments by emphasizing the importance that Russia attached to its relations with the U.S. and characterizing the recently concluded 2 2 dialogue as an important mechanism for ensuring stability and continuity during a time of political transitions. He urged that the accomplishments of the last eight years be preserved and emphasized that Russia viewed its relations with the U.S. as a key tool in maintaining international stability. Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Under former Secretary Igor Ivanov, the Security Council played an important role in managing Iran policy, due to Ivanov's personal relations with many in the Iranian leadership. With Ivanov's departure, the Security Council's role on Iran has diminished; nevertheless, Nazarov's personal comments that achieving a complete suspension is unrealistic probably reflect the consensus of Russian senior officials, even as Russia adheres to the P5 1 goal of full suspension. ¶12. (U) This cable was cleared by Puneet Talwar. BURNS