RUSSIA-UZBEKISTAN RELATIONSHIP COMPLEX BUT GROWING

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000833 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2018 TAGS: EIND ENRG EPET ETRD MARR MASS PGOV PINS PREL EINV SUBJECT: RUSSIA-UZBEKISTAN RELATIONSHIP COMPLEX BUT GROWING REF: A. MOSCOW 677 ¶B. 07 MOSCOW 5828 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In the wake of Karimov's February visit, MFA officials and outside experts agree that Uzbekistan remains a priority, if difficult, partner for Russia. MFA officials stress Russia does not oppose the U.S. use of the Termez airbase in Uzbekistan, given the shared goal of a stable Afghanistan. Highlighting Russia-Uzbekistan cooperation in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO),including efforts to aid Afghanistan, experts agreed that the regional organization served as a forum for Russia to pursue its goal of providing the Karimov regime with political support and discounted arms sales to maintain power and keep Islamic terrorists at bay. MFA officials and experts agreed that Karimov uses his political cooperation with the GOR to promote Russian investment in Uzbekistan, especially in the energy sector. Russia seeks increased investment in areas such as aircraft manufacturing, and is pushing the Uzbek government to stimulate greater interest in the Russian language. End Summary. -------------- Relationship Strong But Complicated -------------- ¶2. (C) In the wake of Uzbek President Karimov's February visit to Moscow, Head of the MFA Uzbekistan Desk Konstantin Alekseev said that Russia considers Uzbekistan to be a "priority partner" with whom Russia has no major disputes. Pointing to the many areas in which Russia and Uzbekistan cooperate, such as CSTO activities and energy investment, Alekseev said relations with Uzbekistan are strong and growing. During his visit, Karimov and Putin signed an agreement to merge Russia's United Aircraft Company and Uzbekistan's Chkalov Tashkent Aircraft Manufacturing Company. They also spent much of their time discussing how the Uzbekistan could provide aid to Afghanistan, both bilaterally and via the CSTO, as well as ways Russia could help develop Uzbekistan's energy infrastructure. ¶3. (C) Analysts with whom we spoke, however, argued that Uzbekistan is the Central Asia country with which Russia has the most complicated relationship. Vremya Novostiy journalist and Central Asia watcher Arkadiy Dubnov asserted that because Uzbekistan has the largest population of all the Central Asian states (26 million) and borders all other Central Asian states, it serves as the linchpin of the region. Analysts argued that Russia was under pressure to "cultivate" Uzbekistan, if it hoped to expand its influence in the region and counter-balance Kazakhstan's increasingly influential presence in the neighborhood. This was not always easy, they argued, as Karimov was known to pursue his own foreign policy, and reinforced Russia's preference for promoting stability over Uzbekistan's democratic development. -------------- U.S. Use Of Bases In Uzbekistan -------------- ¶4. (C) Alekseev told us the GOR did not perceive renewed U.S. use of the Termez air base in Uzbekistan as a threat to Russian interests (ref A). On the contrary, he said the GOR shared the U.S. goal of a stable and peaceful Afghanistan. Alekseev maintained that Russia did not consider the bases the U.S. previously had in Uzbekistan, and continues to have in Kyrgyzstan, a threat to Russian interests in Central Asia. -------------- CSTO Valuable to Both Sides -------------- ¶5. (C) Experts told us that the number of terrorist organizations operating in Uzbekistan, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and Islamic Jihad of Uzbekistan (IJU),made bilateral counterterrorism cooperation and increased collaboration through the CSTO a top priority for Russian officials. According to Aleksey Malashenko of the Carnegie Center, these Uzbek terrorist organizations pose a serious threat to the stability of Uzbekistan and the rest of Central Asia. Other experts have told us that, as a military alliance, the CSTO is the preferred instrument by which Russia seeks to combat the terrorist threat in Central Asia, including Uzbekistan. According to journalist Sanobar Shermatova, the CSTO can help Karimov combat terrorism and maintain stability in Uzbekistan by providing Tashkent with political support and materiel, including discounts on arms sales. ¶6. (C) MFA officials and experts maintain that the Karimov regime recognizes the benefits of CSTO membership, and fully supports CSTO actions such as the anti-narcotics interdiction Operation Channel (ref B). MFA officials informed us that the GOR is calling on Uzbekistan to play a greater role in CSTO counternarcotics and counterterrorism efforts to assist Afghanistan, highlighting the large number of ethnic Uzbeks in northern Afghanistan. According to Malashenko, "stability in Afghanistan is a priority for many states, including Russia and Uzbekistan." -------------- Energy Investment -------------- ¶7. (C) MFA officials and experts have told us that Karimov effectively parlays political cooperation with Moscow into greater economic investment in Uzbekistan. According to Alekseev, over 90 percent of Russia's USD 3 billion investment in Uzbekistan is in the energy sector, and the GOR and GOU are looking for ways to increase this. In turn, Uzbekistan exports most of its gas via Russia. (Note: Uzbekistan's official government figures put the total at over USD 4 billion because they include investment in services as well as goods. End Note.) ¶8. (C) Russia largely does not consume the oil and gas it buys from Uzbekistan, but rather sells it to other countries such as Ukraine. The recent decision by Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, in apparent agreement with Gazprom, to raise the prices of their gas exports to "European" levels in 2009, would therefore have limited impact on Russia. The price rise would, however, speed up the transition to market prices for Ukraine, which has been paying prices well below its western neighbors. Some see this move as giving Russia more leverage over Ukraine, while others have argued that this price rise would amount to a wealth transfer to the Central Asian states, for which the GOR may expect preferential treatment in the future. -------------- Aircraft Construction -------------- ¶9. (U) During Karimov's visit to Moscow on February 6, he and Putin signed a deal to merge Russia's United Aircraft Company and Uzbekistan's Chkalov Tashkent Aircraft Manufacturing Company. Alekseev told us that Russia expects the merger to lead to a mutually beneficial partnership, as it will streamline the costs of producing Ilyushin aircraft in Tashkent. Presently Ilyushin produces fuselages and wings for many of its IL-76 and IL-114 aircraft, and their numerous modifications, at the Chkalov Aircraft Factory in Tashkent. Experts predict that the market capacity of IL-76s produced in Tashkent will total about 90 to 100 planes per year until at least 2015, with up to 70 planes per year exported to China, India, Jordan, and other countries. Each plane costs USD 25 to 30 million. -------------- Cultural Diplomacy -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Calling the Russian language a "lingua franca" and a "gateway to the rest of the world," Alekseev stressed that the GOR is pressing the GOU to take necessary measures to deepen interest in the study of the Russian language in Uzbekistan. Lamenting that not many Uzbeks outside of Tashkent learn Russian, he said that Russian Centers For Science and Culture have been built in Uzbekistan's regional centers such as Samarkand and Bukhara to fill this perceived void. The GOR also works with the Uzbek Ministry of Education and Science to train Uzbek teachers. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) Uzbekistan's size and strategic location are not lost on the GOR. Russia will continue to push closer economic, military, and cultural cooperation, while emphasizing stability over Uzbekistan's democratic development. BURNS