AUSTRALIA GROUP: RUSSIA SEEKS US SUPPORT FOR ITS

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000820 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PARM PREL RS SUBJECT: AUSTRALIA GROUP: RUSSIA SEEKS US SUPPORT FOR ITS CANDIDACY AT NEXT PLENARY ¶1. (SBU) Following is the text of a Russian non-paper FM Lavrov passed to the Secretary on the margins of recent 2 plus 2 talks. English text below is as presented by the GOR. ¶2. (SBU) Begin text: Pursuant to the instructions of the President of the Russian Federation, we have been working on Russia's admission to the Australia Group (AG) - an export control regime on CBW-related items - the only multilateral non-proliferation and export control mechanism to which Russia is not yet a party. Our primary motive is to make utmost possible contribution towards strengthening international counter-proliferation efforts aimed at preventing spread of WMD, i.a. from falling into hands of terrorists. The role of our two countries is of extreme importance. All AG participants were informed of our intention. Nobody except the US expressed disagreements with our candidacy. The State Department has compiled a lengthy list of preconditions not related to membership criteria in any way. We have already provided extensive responses to questions on how the Russian export control system on dual-use biological and chemical items functions. If there is a need, we stand ready to continue experts dialogue on this issue, e.g., on the margins of AG plenary in Paris next July. And, as far as we know, only the US is against. We feel that those who have raised the above-mentioned questions still live in the past and regard Russia as a main object for containment. It's difficult to understand how such approach may be consistent with the spirit of strategic partnership between our nations. How may it contribute to practical goals on preventing WMD-proliferation and counter-terrorism as set out by our Presidents? It's not clear in whose interest it is to keep Russia - a leading producer of chemical and biological goods - out of the AG, discouraging us from working our collective measures aimed at preventing the spread of hazardous chemical and biological technologies. This makes uncertain prospects for harmonizing joint efforts aimed at implementing UNSCR 1540 provisions, promoting PSI objectives and mutually beneficial cooperation on proliferation issues within the G8 framework. Keeping such an "irritator" in the US-Russian relations is not in our common interests. The time is high to make a decision to demonstrate the willingness of our two countries to join in efforts on non-proliferation and countering chemical and bio-terrorism. We need to stop running high on problems of the past. As regards the Russian side, we stand ready for constructive cooperation. We urge you to consider the Russian interest in AG membership once again. We hope that the US will support our candidacy at the AG next plenary. ¶3. (U) End Text Russian non-paper. BURNS