RUSSIA'S EXPECTATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT DEPEND ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000806 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018 TAGS: PREL NATO MARR PARM KCFE UP GG RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S EXPECTATIONS FOR NATO SUMMIT DEPEND ON MAP FOR UKRAINE AND GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 265 Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Daniel A. Russell, reasons 1.4 ( b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. According to the head of the NATO section at the MFA, Putin's swan song at the NATO Summit in Bucharest was envisioned to be "constructive" and to call for more NATO-Russia cooperation, but recent U.S. statements of support for a Membership Action Plan offer for Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest have put not just the nature of Putin's statement at Bucharest, but his attendance, in question. Underscoring that the Kremlin would make the final decision on Putin's attendance and tone of his remarks, the official told us that if MAP were offered, it was very unlikely that Putin would attend the Summit, and Russia could cut off cooperation in the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). Assuming Putin does attend the summit, Russia is working to have the transit agreement for Afghanistan ready to be signed; believes the tax and compensation issues may prevent adoption of the Air Transport Agreement in time; contends the Public Forum idea is not yet ready; is enthusiastic about continuing the Domodedovo Center counternarcotics training for Afghan officials, but would like to see it expanded to include counterterrorism and border security training; and would like to have a Joint Declaration, but not if the language is not right. Defense Experts concur that MAP is key to Bucharest. End Summary. "Positive Tone" at Bucharest in Jeopardy Over MAP -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) Andrey Rudenko, head of the NATO section at the MFA's Department of European Cooperation, told us March 21 that President Putin "had intended" to go to Bucharest and to be constructive and "give a positive signal" that NATO and Russia should cooperate further. His speech, which the MFA was drafting, was not going to be "another Munich," Rudenko said, because Putin did not want to leave a "legacy of confrontation," but to show that Russia would look outward and work with NATO to "face global risks together." Rudenko added that Russia wanted to "break the current impasse" between Russia and NATO and between Russia and the U.S. and, while not avoiding the difficult aspects of the relationship, focus instead on what we have done together in a positive way. ¶3. (C) However, the mid-level official said, all this has been put in jeopardy by recent statements by the U.S. signaling U.S. support for a MAP offer for Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest. Stressing that the Kremlin would make the final decision on Putin's participation and speech, Rudenko reiterated Russia's strong opposition to MAP, saying that it was seen as ignoring Russian security and strategic concerns. Despite U.S. arguments that MAP was not membership, the GOR, he said, viewed MAP as "a point of no return," which would have very negative consequences for relations between Russia and NATO and the U.S., as well as seriously affecting Russia's relations with Georgia and Ukraine. What point would there be for Putin to go to Bucharest to discuss issues, he said, if Russia's "most important issue" was decided against Russia. He added that the GOR had asked the NATO Secretariat to let it know if MAP would be offered, so as "not to embarrass Putin." Deliverables: Some on Track, Some Not Quite Ready -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) "Assuming that all goes well," Rudenko said, the GOR was hoping to finalize the transit agreement for ISAF, and continuation of the Domodedovo counternarcotics training for Afghan officials in time for Bucharest. He said Russia recognized the ball was in its court on the transit agreement, and Russia was working hard to get it approved. He expressed confidence that it would be done in time for Bucharest. Rudenko envisioned no problems with finalizing the agreement on continuation of the Domodedovo training, noting that the French had told him March 20 they had dropped their insistence on keeping the word "pilot" in referring to the project. He added that Russia was interested in expanding cooperation with NATO on Afghanistan, including possibly expanding the Domodedovo training to encompass counterterrorism and border security training for ANA and law enforcement officers. ¶5. (C) Rudenko was less sanguine about the Air Transport Agreement being completed in time for Bucharest, noting that the issue over taxes would require the GOR to present a request to the Duma to be exempt from the legislation requiring the taxes be paid, and that would slow down the process. But, he added that he hoped that if the Agreement was not ready by Bucharest, it could be mentioned in the NRC Joint Statement, if there was one. ¶6. (C) Russia supported the idea of issuing an NRC Joint Statement "in principle," Rudenko said, provided we could find mutually-acceptable language. But, if the language "separates us," it would be better not to have a Statement at all. This would not be a tragedy, he added, though Russia would prefer to have a "good Statement." Interest in Expanding Mil-Mil Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (C) Rudenko said the Defense Ministry was continuing to plan to participate in Operation Active Endeavor, though he could not say how many ships they would provide. He said Russia believed the Search and Rescue and emergency planning exercises had been very successful, and the GOR wanted to continue -- and even expand on -- such cooperation. Experts Say MAP is the Key to Bucharest -------------- ¶8. (C) Defense and security experts note that NATO enlargement is one of the few security areas where there is almost complete consensus among Russian policymakers, experts and the informed population: they are strongly against NATO's enlargement eastward, particularly to Ukraine and Georgia. Aleksandr Belkin, Deputy Executive Director of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, said Ukraine was the "line of last resort." If Ukraine becomes a member of NATO, "Russia's encirclement will be complete." He said there was almost universal agreement among Russia's political elite that NATO's attempt to bring in Ukraine was an "unfriendly act." While NATO was no longer perceived an open adversary, it was still seen as a potential threat. Echoing FM Lavrov's comments after the 2 2, he said Russia had to look not at intentions, but at potential. He anticipated that if MAP were offered to Ukraine and Georgia at Bucharest, the GOR would feel obligated to cut off cooperation with NATO. Putin did not want this, he added, because Putin did not want to leave a negative heritage to his successor or leave his post "as a loser." He added, however, that the situation was not the same as in the late 1990's during the first round of NATO enlargement. Russia was in a much stronger position to oppose NATO membership now, and Russia would not "get over it." ¶9. (C) Vitaliy Shlykov, Founding Member of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, argued that Russia was much less concerned about Georgian membership in NATO, but that Putin would be forced to respond to Russian nationalist feelings opposing membership. He argued NATO could offer MAP to Georgia, but should hold off on Ukraine. Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the World Security Institute, said the Russian military was interested in deepening cooperation with NATO and believed it could learn a great deal from such cooperation. Safranchuk concurred that such cooperation would likely be cut back or out if MAP were offered to Ukraine and Georgia. BURNS