KAZAN REMAINS TIED TO MOSCOW DESPITE TATARSTAN'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000687

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM RS
SUBJECT: KAZAN REMAINS TIED TO MOSCOW DESPITE TATARSTAN'S
"MODEL" FEDERALISM

Classified By: Political M/C Alice Wells for reason 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: Despite its unique status within the
Russian Federation negotiated with the central government
under Yeltsin in 1994 and again with Putin in 2007, Tatarstan
is firmly part of Russia and seems set to remain so under
Medvedev. President Mintimer Shamiyev is currently very much
in favor both in Moscow and with the local population, and is
likely to hold onto power for as long as he wants. End
Summary.


2. (SBU) During a pre-election visit to Kazan we met with
government and religious leaders (septel) as well as analysts
of local politics and representatives of civil society.
Tatarstan has a unique place in the Russian Federation.
Tatarstan enjoyed its own statehood prior to its annexation
by Russia in 1552. In 1937 it lost its autonomy after the
adoption of Stalin's constitution. In August 1990 Tatarstan
proclaimed the "declaration of state sovereignty of the
Republic of Tatarstan" because it wanted to sign the proposed
Union Treaty as an independent subject and not as a
constituent part of the Russian Federation. In August 1991
Moscow and Kazan began negotiations resulting in the signing
on February 15, 1994 of the "Russia-Tatarstan Treaty." The
two sides agreed upon a second ten-year treaty in June 2007.
According to our interlocutors, Tatarstan's population
consists of two main ethnic groups, Tatars (53 percent) and
Russians (47 percent),although most with whom we spoke
explained that these numbers are misleading since there are
so many mixed marriages in Tatarstan and the children are
left to self-select to which ethnic group they wish to
belong. The Constitution of Tatarstan provides for both
Tatar and Russian as official languages and the president of
Tatarstan must know both languages.

Kazan firmly in Moscow's embrace
--------------


3. (C) Nail Mukharyamov, Director of the Institute of
Economy and Social Technologies and Chair of the Politics and
Law Department at the Kazan University of Power Engineering,
said that President Shamiyev is firmly in the United Russia
camp. Shamiyev was one of the four original founders of
United Russia (along with Boris Gryzlov, Sergey Shoygu and
Yuriy Luzhkov) and the only non-Russian and non-Moscovite.
During our visit it did not appear that many in Kazan had
given much thought as to who might replace Shamiyev (or that
he would be leaving the presidency anytime soon),although
Mukharyamov thought likely candidates included Kamil Ishakov,
former Kazan mayor and current Deputy Minister of Regional
Development, and Ilshat Fardiyev, Shamiyev's nephew and
currently the head of Tatenergo, one of several state-owned
companies involved in the republic's energy sector.
Tatarstan has 11 members in the current Russian Duma.


4. (SBU) In the March 2 presidential elections turnout in
Tatarstan was high -- but even at over 80 percent it was
still bested by perennial turnout champions from the North
Caucasus. President-elect Dmitriy Medvedev, who had visited
Tatarstan twice in 2007 and again in late February 2008 just
before the elections stressing education and youth
development issues, received a very respectable 79.24 percent
of the vote there (although again Tatarstan was behind the
North Caucasus, Bashkortostan and several regions that
over-fulfilled the Kremlin's directive for votes for Medvedev
in order to make up for their lackluster showing for
pro-Kremlin parties in the December 2007 Russian Duma
elections).


5. (C) Edward Khabibullin, Head of the America, Europe and
CIS Section of the Department of Foreign Affairs within
President Shamiyev's administration, believed that federalism
(its relations with the center) is the biggest issue facing
Tatarstan. Rafael Khakimov, Advisor to President Shamiyev
and Tatarstan's chief specialist on federalism and relations
with Russia, confirmed that the federal government pays for
activities of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the
Federal Security Service (FSB) in Tatarstan, but he and
others complained that the republic pays more to Moscow in
taxes (by a two to one margin) than it receives back in
social welfare or other benefits. Both Khakimov and
Khabibullin stressed that laws promulgated by the Russian
State Duma may not violate the constitution of Tatarstan.

Housing and Transport Biggest Problems
--------------


6. (C) Khakimov downplayed the importance of Medvedev's
"national priorities" saying that, as had been its right
under its agreements with Moscow, Tatarstan has long been
involved in the "national priorities" on its own long before

the federal government. Khakimov and others agreed that
housing (one of the foremost "national priorities" championed
by Medvedev) was a big problem throughout Tatarstan, but
especially in Kazan. According to recent statistics
published in a Moscow-based newspaper, Tatarstan ranks high
(behind Moscow, St. Petersburg and Krasnodar) in the
construction of new housing and numerous cranes hovered over
parts of the city during our visit. Representatives from
Ekho Moskvy in Kazan (a locally-owned radio station that
rebroadcasts Moscow-generated programming, with local
advertising and 15 minutes per hour of local news) also
agreed that affordable housing, particularly for people whose
houses in the center of Kazan have been destroyed as part of
urban renewal projects, is a big problem. They added that
from 5,000-6,000 people in Tatarstan were also involved in
the kind of real estate scams that plagued Russia during the
1990s. To make matters worse, after a recent tender for
mini-bus services tainted by corruption, there is not
sufficient public transport for the 30 percent of residents
dependent on it.

Civil Society Weak
--------------


7. (C) Like the rest of Russia, civil society is
underdeveloped in Tatarstan. Dmitriy Kolbasin, a media
freedom specialist formerly with the Kazan Human Rights
Center and now with the human rights organization AGORA, said
that although over 1,000 NGOs have been formed in Tatarstan,
only a few dozen are active and have complied with the new
registration requirements. He stated that AGORA has not had
much of a problem, although a meeting several months ago with
a British diplomat at a local cafe did result in an FSB visit
to his office. Kolbasin said there was little active
political opposition in Tatarstan and could not imagine a
dissenters' march in Kazan.

Limited Practical Use of Tatarstan's Sovereignty
-------------- --


8. (C) Both Khakimov and Khabibullin stated that Tatarstan's
sovereignty could become a model for other regions in Russia.
Khabibullin noted that there are many ethnic Tatars spread
throughout Russia, giving Kazan's agreement with Moscow added
resonance. When pressed, however, both admitted that other
regions had not been as active in their negotiations with
Moscow and at this stage probably could not use the
Russia-Tatarstan Treaty as a model. According to
Khabibullin, Tatarstan has made some limited diplomatic use
of its sovereignty. He stated that Tatarstan plans to ask
for observer status to the Jeddah-based Organization of the
Islamic Conference. He proudly noted that there are Turkish
and Iranian consulates in Kazan as well as
cultural/educational centers from the United States, Germany,
Japan and France. He added that Tatarstan's representative
office in Moscow employs 60 people and that Tatarstan has its
own representatives in Russian diplomatic missions in the
U.S., Turkey, France, the Czech Republic, Finland, Vietnam
and Cuba.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) For now, Moscow and Kazan have developed a mutually
beneficial relationship based on Tatarstan's unique place in
Russian history and its ability to drive a hard bargain
originally with a weakened center under Yeltsin. Its
uniqueness may have protected Tatarstan during Putin's drive
to retake power devolved to the regions (Tatneft remains
owned by the government, providing Chechen president Ramzan
Kadyrov reason enough to dream of the same deal for
Chechnya's own smaller indigenous oil industry). Although
some in the republic may continue to complain about the
inequity of tax payments to Moscow, we see no reason for the
relationship to change under Medvedev, especially while
Shamiyev remains Tatarstan's loyal president.
BURNS