GOR PULLOUT FROM CIS SANCTIONS AGAINST ABKHAZIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000655

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: GOR PULLOUT FROM CIS SANCTIONS AGAINST ABKHAZIA

REF: MOSCOW 566

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (B/D)


1. (C) Summary: In a March 6 statement, the MFA announced
that the GOR would no longer honor the CIS sanctions against
Abkhazia. The statement justified the move by detailing the
changed situation in Abkhazia since signing of the sanctions
agreement in 1996. Consequently, the sanctions regime "lost
its meaning, while only keeping Abkhazia in isolation and
preventing its economic recovery." GOR officials insisted
that the change in policy was a "humanitarian" measure, which
does not challenge Georgia's territorial integrity. They
also stressed that it had been planned for some time,
following the Group of Friends' recommendation for the
lifting of the sanctions in Geneva in February 2007, and was
not a counter-measure to the Kosovo UDI. The officials
claimed that Putin previewed the GOR plan with Saakashvili
during their February 21 meeting on the margins of the CIS
informal summit in Moscow. With the Abkhaz March 6 release
of detained journalists, MFA officials told us it was now the
GOG's turn to take positive steps for reconciliation.
Russia's steps to normalize relations with Abkhazia are part
of an all-but recognition policy that GOR officials signaled
was coming in the wake of Kosovo's recognition. End summary.


2. (C) As the GOR had earlier warned, the MFA issued a
statement on March 6, announcing Russia's decision to pull
out from the 1996 CIS agreement on sanctions against
Abkhazia. The statement, detailing the change in/around
Abkhazia, said that the GOR signed the agreement to motivate
the Abkhaz to promote the speedy return of refugees. The
statement maintained that the Abkhaz have done their part
both for the repatriation of refugees and the negotiation
process, while the Georgians have obstructed both paths with
their difficult refugee registration procedures and refusal
to implement UN and Friends' recommendations for the
resumption of the negotiation process. In response to our
concerns, MFA Fourth CIS Department Deputy Director and the
main author of the MFA statement Dmitriy Tarabrin insisted
that the situation in Abkhazia required such a move,
underscoring the following points:

-- "Dramatic changes" in the situation necessitated the GOR
move;

-- The GOR plan to pull out from the CIS sanctions regime
should not be a surprise; the plan had been known and shared
with Saakashvili during the February 21 bilateral meeting on
the margins of the CIS Informal Summit (ref);

-- The intent is "humanitarian" as the sanctions regime keeps
Abkhazia in isolation, while preventing it from economic
recovery;

-- The pullout does not challenge Georgia's territorial
integrity and should not be linked with the Kosovo UDI;

-- The GOR is not canceling the agreement, thus is in no way
in violation of international laws; other CIS countries have
a right to decide whether they would stay with the sanctions
regime or pull out (the MFA statement, however, encourages
other CIS countries to take a similar step).

Tarabrin reaffirmed that the GOR is studying many different
models including Taiwan, with which the U.S. has a full range
of relations, while keeping its relationship with China
intact.


3. (C) GOR Special Envoy to the Abkhazia conflict Vladislav
Chernov told us March 7 that the GOR announcement should not
be news to anyone because it was an "old story." Per
Chernov, the GOR started the process to pull out from the
sanctions regime following the February 2007 Group of Friends
meeting in Geneva, where the lifting of the sanctions was
recommended as part of confidence-building measures. He
said, "As you know, the GOR bureaucracy does not move that
fast, with little demonstrated tendency to make a quick
decision." Chernov echoed Tarabrin's position, saying that
despite the timing, which may lend itself to the linkage with
the Kosovo UDI, the decision was in the making for over a
year.


4. (C) Chernov argued that the suggestion for the abolition
of the sanctions regime should have come from the Georgian
side. Instead, the GOG has made no positive step toward
reconciliation, while insisting on calling the Abkhaz
"separatists." Chernov thought that the Abkhaz side had done
its part, including the March 6 release of the detained
Georgian journalists. In contrast, the Georgians
strengthened forces along the "border," and reinforced the
"youth camp" (located 700 meters from the "border") with
over-30-year-old, armed men, while Saakashvili called UNSYG's
recommendation to disband the camp, "amoral and stupid."
Chernov requested that the USG advise the GOG to exercise
more restraint and less provocation.


5. (C) Comment: Notwithstanding GOR statements, its move to
lift sanctions is very much in line with Russian efforts to
recalibrate its relations with the frozen conflict
territories in the wake of Western recognition of Kosovo. As
forewarned, the Russians have moved closes to - but stopped
short of - recognition of Abkhazia, and we expect further
refinements of its all-but recognition of Abkhazia in the
months to come.
RUSSELL