GOR ON GEORGIAN ELECTIONS AND BILATERAL TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000061 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: GOR ON GEORGIAN ELECTIONS AND BILATERAL TIES Classified By: Acting Political M/C Bob Patterson. Reasons 1.4 (B/D). ¶1. (C) Summary. The GOR is watching closely the events in Georgia, and has been critical of the "hasty" stamp of approval given to the January 5 election by international organizations. It will continue to demand clarification of alleged election irregularities. Russian MFA officials stressed that unless Saakashvili proves his sincerity with concrete measures, his January 6 extension of an olive branch to Russia, in the form of an expressed desire to improve bilateral relations, will not be taken seriously. The GOG's campaign for NATO membership will remain a major irritant. End summary. ¶2. (U) In a January 6 statement, the MFA backed the opposition's claim that the election was rigged, and criticized the GOG's "numerous violations" of election laws. The MFA scoffed at U.S. Congressman Hasting's "hasty" declaration of the "the triumph of Georgian democracy" and maintained that the election results had been skewed by Saakashvili's superior administrative resources, undisguised pressure on opposition candidates, and restrictions on the media. ¶3. (C) On January 11, MFA Georgia Desk Chief Aleksandr Letoshnev told us that pre-election campaign irregularities were a good indicator of the GOG's general approach to domestic politics. Intimidation tactics against the opposition and voters and the liberal use of government money to fund Saakashvili's election campaign were all documented. Letoshnev warned that unexplained election irregularities would continue to plague Georgian internal politics and negatively affect Russia - Georgia relations. Russia did not send its own official observer team, although there were eleven Russian observers in the ODIHR mission. It was not the GOR but "NGOs and international groups" that had reported violations, Letoshnev stressed. The planned January 13 opposition demonstration, which Letoshnev claimed could draw as many as 200,000 participants, would be only one sign that many Georgians are not satisfied with the conduct of the election. ¶4. (C) Letoshnev cited in support of his comments remarks (taken out of context) made by the head of the OSCE long-term observer mission Dieter Boden to the effect that the administration of the election was full of errors, mistakes, and imperfections. The OSCE, NATO, Department of State, and European Parliament all had "hastily" declared that the election was free and fair days before the official counts were completed, he claimed. ¶5. (C) Echoing DFM Karasin's January 9 statement to the press, Letoshnev said that Saakashvili should match his words of reconciliation with concrete measures, instead of "using these words to cover up his hostility toward Russia." (In the wake of the election, the Georgian President had expressed a willingness to improve bilateral relations with Russia.) Letoshnev, however, welcomed Saakashvili's "apparent" new efforts to coordinate better with opposition political factions in Georgia. Although the GOR has not received an official invitation, the press had reported Saakashvili's plan to invite Putin to his January 23 inauguration ceremony. Letoshnev doubted that Putin would accept the invitation from Saakashvili, who had "actively engaged in anti-Russian tactics during his election campaign." Letoshnev predicted that the GOG's push to join NATO would continue to complicate its already difficult relationship with Russia. RUSSELL