MEDVEDEV MENDS BELGRADE FENCES, AFFIRMS CONTINUITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 000539 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018 TAGS: PREL SR KV RS SUBJECT: MEDVEDEV MENDS BELGRADE FENCES, AFFIRMS CONTINUITY ON KOSOVO REF: A. MOSCOW 50 ¶B. MOSCOW 251 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In the wake of scandalous comments by a Russian TV commentator calling the assassination of former Serbian PM Djindjic "well-deserved," First Deputy PM Dmitriy Medvedev and FM Lavrov traveled to Belgrade on February 25 to mend fences, reiterate Russia's support for Serbian territorial integrity, and affirm the continuation of Russian foreign policy in the Balkans during Medvedev's (presumed) presidency. The MFA insisted that Medvedev's brief meeting with Republika Srpska PM Dodik in Belgrade focused on support for Dayton. During the visit, Gazprom signed an agreement with Serbian gas company Srbijagas to start performing studies for the South Stream route. Analysts viewed this as an easy foreign policy "solo" for Medvedev, given the Russian political consensus on the illegitimacy of Kosovo's independence. Russian officials and press remained hostile to U.S. policy towards Kosovo, harshly criticizing U.S. characterizations of Russian policy and predicting an increase in separatist movemen ts and related terrorism. Russian NATO envoy clarified that SIPDIS Russia would not use force in Kosovo. End Summary. Medvedev and Lavrov Mend Fences in Belgrade -------------- ¶2. (C) On February 25, First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitriy Medvedev and FM Lavrov visited Belgrade, in the first "solo" foreign policy outing by the Russian presidential heir apparent. Serbian Embassy Political Counselor Boris Sekulic described the visit to us as hastily arranged, coming in response to scandalous comments by Russian reporter Konstantin Semin during a February 21 broadcast on a state-owned television station, to the effect that the Western-leaning Serbian former PM Djindjic's assassination was a "well-earned bullet" for "selling heroes of the Serbian Resistance to the Hague." Calling Djindjic a "Western puppet," who dismembered the Serbian Army, Semin went on to insinuate that Tadic was following Djindjic's legacy of selling out to the West. ¶3. (C) The Serbian Foreign Ministry demanded a formal apology from the state television channel, calling Semin's comments "offensive" and "justifying the murder of a democratically elected leader." MFA Serbia Desk Chief Denis 
Kuznedelev told us that Serbian FM Jeremic called Lavrov to complain and received an apology, as well as Lavrov's public statement that Semin's comments were "nonsense and his own opinion." (Note: Semin is also author of several attacks on the U.S., including the documentary "Empire of Good," which equated the promotion of democracy with the extension of U.S. hegemony.) Sekulic told us that Serbian officials were skeptical that Semin's comments could air on a state-owned channel and not be "someone's" position, if not the official government line. He told us that the Serbian Embassy has submitted a formal note of complaint to the television station asking for an apology, but had not received an answer and that no action had been taken against Semin. Russian media widely reported th e outrage in Serbia provoked by Semin's comments. Medvedev Burnishes Foreign Policy Credentials -------------- ¶4. (C) According to reports from the Kremlin press pool, Medvedev faced a frosty first session with President Tadic, who was not on hand at the airport for Medvedev's arrival and who kept Putin's successor waiting for his first meeting. Medvedev did the needful, apologizing for Semin's comments and reaffirming Russian support for Serbian territorial integrity. Kuznedelev told us the Medvedev reassured both Tadic and PM Kostunica that Russia would continue to recognize Serbia's "internationally recognized borders," obstruct Kosovo's entry into international organizations such as the OSCE and Council of Europe, and support stability in northern Kosovo. He told us that Medvedev's visit signaled that Russian foreign policy towards Serbia would remain consistent under his presumed presidency. Kuznedelev confirmed that Medvedev met with Republika Srpska PM Dodik as well, but said only that they "talked about upholding the Dayton Accords." Russian press reports contrasted Tadic's aloofness with PM Kostunica's effusive welcome of Medvedev. ¶5. (SBU) During the visit, Gazprom chief Alexey Miller and his counterpart from Serbia's state-owned gas company Srbijagas signed an agreement to start the process of performing feasibility studies for a proposed extension of the South Stream gas pipeline through Serbia. The agreement MOSCOW 00000539 002 OF 003 follows up on an "Umbrella Intergovernmental Agreement" on the same project, signed during Tadic and Kostunica's visit to Moscow last month, but does not yet establish the company, to be 51% owned by Gazprom, that would own and operate the pipeline on Serbian territory. The deal is related to a separate agreement paving the way for Gazprom Neft to acquire 51% of Serbia's national oil and gas monopoly, NIS. Visiting Hungary after Serbia, Russian officials reportedly reached agreement on the transit through Hungarian territory of the South Stream pipeline, which is expected to be signed in Moscow in the coming week. Both agreements, however, still appear very preliminary in nature, and the Serbian Embassy here has taken pains to emphasize to us that the terms of the deal can be revisited. ¶6. (C) Analysts we spoke to emphasized that, notwithstanding the alleged frosty atmosphere with Tadic, this was an easy foreign policy venture for the president presumptive, given the unanimous Russian official and public support for Putin's rejection of Kosovo's independence. Director of the Kremlin-friendly Center for Political Technology Igor Bunin reiterated that Medvedev's visit answered the Russian public's demand for continuity on this foreign policy issue. The liberal editor of "Russia in Global Affairs" Fyodor Lukyanov dismissed the notion that the visit reflected Medvedev's status as a "puppet" of Putin, arguing that "the trip does not tell you anything about Medvedev's future strength as president, but tells you everything about Russia's views on Kosovo." Russia Accuses U.S. of Cynicism -------------- ¶7. (U) Russian commentary on western recognition of Kosovo remains harsh. In a February 24 press statement, the MFA responded harshly to U.S. criticism of Russia's stance, labeling the U.S. policy "cynical." The statement charged that the U.S. "openly humiliates the Serbian people," tied "Belgrade's Euro-Atlantic prospects...to Serbia's dismemberment," and resulted in 100,000 Serbs being driven into modern-day ghettoes. It denied that Russia was isolated on Kosovo, noting that "most countries" would prefer a legal solution based on compromise. The statement also rebutted doubts on Russia's contributions to Kosovo's settlement, noting that Russia withdrew peacekeepers in 2004 because of "principled disagreement with the unilateral tilt in Kosovo affairs." Russian Officials Foresee More Separatism -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Presidential Envoy for Counterterrorism Safronov stated that Kosovo's independence had the potential for "setting in motion dangerous trends" and foresaw an increase in separatist movements and terrorist acts. Likening the West's support of Kosovo to the 1938 Munich Agreement, Safronov warned that Kosovo could "unleash a powerful force of destruction" with unforeseen consequences. He said that "the trigger has been cocked, and nobody knows what kind of short will be fired and when." MFA Special Envoy for the Balkins Botsan-Kharchenko said that the current situation in Kosovo "may lead to the isolation of the Kosovar Serbs" which "could lead to the actual division of Kosovo." ¶9. (SBU) Russian media continues to worry about the opening of "Pandora's box." News listed some of the "200" possible trouble spots, ranging from Republika Srpska to Scotland, and some presenters have posited that "world order may be collapsing." Commentators argue that fewer countries have recognized Kosovo than the U.S. planned, noting specifically that no CIS country, including allies such as Georgia, have recognized Kosovo. Even liberal publications continue to refer to Kosovo as the "mutinous region." ¶10. (SBU) Liberal Democratic Party leader Zhirinovskiy, known for his hyperbolic statements, said on February 25 that the "U.S. will try to separate Russia," using the precedent of Kosovo. As reported in Russian press, Zhirinovskiy said that the U.S. will "urge" Russia to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and then support the independence of the North Caucasus republics of Russia. Zhirinovskiy supported Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but worried that would cause retaliation in the form of Western recognition of Chechnya and Kabardino-Balkaria. Rogozin Clarifies: No Force in Kosovo -------------- ¶11. (C) Russian envoy to NATO Rogozin "clarified" his comments from a February 22 press conference, stating that Russia "would never use force" to solve the Kosovo problem. MOSCOW 00000539 003 OF 003 Rogozin's statements had been widely interpreted in the press as advocating the use of force to restore international law. Sekulic told us that Kostunica asked Putin last year, at a meeting in St. Petersburg, if Putin would provide peacekeeping forces "if the situation in Kosovo grew violent." While Sekulic said that he did not know Putin's reply, MFA officials have previously ruled out the possibility in meetings with us. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) While Russia's stance towards the frozen conflicts in the wake of Kosovo's independence remains shrouded in ambiguity, its support for Serbia's territorial integrity is unambiguous. This was an easy foreign policy turn for Medvedev, designed to show that he can fill Putin's shoes on the international stage and operate beyond his Gazprom brief. BURNS