ENCOURAGING RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 MOSCOW 000520 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/25/2018 TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV PINS PREL MASS RU AF SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING RUSSIAN ASSISTANCE TO AFGHANISTAN REF: A. 07 MOSCOW 5208 ¶B. 07 MOSCOW 5828 ¶C. 07 MOSCOW 4929 ¶D. 07 MOSCOW 5098 ¶E. 07 MOSCOW 5735 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (c) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Russia is ready to do more to assist in stabilizing and rebuilding Afghanistan - a key area of overlapping Russian, U.S. and NATO interests. Absent concerted U.S. effort, however, Russian attempts to constructively engage with the Karzai government likely will continue to founder on historical neuralgia and bureaucratic difficulties, reinforcing the predispositions of those here with less constructive instincts. At the same time, a willingness by the U.S. and NATO to engage practically with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) could provide the key to unlocking more productive Russian assistance on counternarcotics, military equipment grants/sales, counterterrorism, transport, terrorist finance, and border security. We believe that a broad high-level discussion, perhaps in the March 2 Plus 2 consultations between Secretary Rice and Gates and their Russian counterparts, should set the stage for expert level understandings on how best to achieve shared goals in Afghanistan, which are acceptable to the Afghan government. The weakness of the still-evolving CSTO, the lack of trust between Russia and Afghanistan, and equipment interoperability are among the factors that will determine the ultimate level of success. End Summary. -------------- Congruent Interests Drive Russian Cooperation -------------- ¶2. (C) Russian officials at the highest levels tell us that they want to cooperate on Afghanistan, bilaterally and multilaterally. At the 2007 CSTO summit in Bishkek, Putin stated Russia supports greater cooperation between the CSTO and NATO in Afghanistan. First Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov, speaking at Wehrkunde this year, underscored Russia's position that on Afghanistan, the U.S. and Russia should be partners and not competitors. According to Ivanov, Russia viewed U.S. and NATO efforts in the areas of counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and POLITICAL stability in Afghanistan as somewhat positive but insufficient. Ivanov's public argument, which he has underscored in private with the Ambassador, is that the U.S. and NATO have yet to recognize that Russia's contribution in these areas was essential. In a February 12 speech in Geneva, FM Lavrov reiterated Russia's willingness to help NATO fight the threats posed by terrorists and narcotics in Afghanistan, and underscored how real these threats were to Russia. Russia's new Ambassador to NATO, Dmitriy Rogozin - who hails from the U.S. baiting, Russian nationalist camp -- told us before departing that he was focused on finding more areas for NATO and Russia to work jointly (ref A). ¶3. (C) GOR officials acknowledge that the U.S. is the main player in Afghanistan, but stress they share our strategic goal: a peaceful and stable Afghanistan that is not a Taliban safe haven and narcotics exporter. Ali Mustafabeily, Deputy Director of the MFA Second Asia Department, went so far as to say that by working together in Afghanistan the U.S. and Russia could form a collective "fist" to face down our common enemies. This sentiment is shared by officials from the GOR-backed CSTO, including Secretary General Nikolai Bordyuzha, as well as by the Russian expert community, who identify an unstable Afghanistan, and not the U.S. or NATO, as the only major threat to CSTO member states. Along with GOR officials, they note that there are no major areas of dispute with the U.S. regarding goals for Afghanistan. Anatoly Chuntulov, Counselor of the CSTO's Department of Political Cooperation and Valery Dergachev, Deputy Head, repeatedly stressed to us that the CSTO, the main vehicle for which the GOR has chosen to funnel its aid to Afghanistan (ref B),poses no threat to U.S. interests, and urged the U.S. and NATO to engage with the organization, despite the fact that its member-states are also members of the Partnership For Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. ¶4. (C) We assess that Russia is ready to do more in Afghanistan, recognizing that there are a host of other motivations at work as well. Russia seeks to maintain MOSCOW 00000520 002 OF 005 influence in Central Asia, make inroads into potential commercial and energy markets, check Chinese influence, and demonstrate that Russia has not ceded strategic space permanently to the U.S. and NATO. What Russia does not seek is a military presence in Afghanistan, which still conjures painful memories of imperial defeat and the degradation of the Soviet forces. The GOR recognizes that Russian translates into Soviet in Afghanistan, where Soviets killed and maimed over one million Afghan civilians. -------------- Talking Past One Another -------------- ¶5. (C) Russia's inability to donate weapons to the Afghan government is a case-study in why greater U.S. engagement could help to lock in constructive Russian offers of bilateral assistance. In March 2007, the GOR told the Karzai government it was prepared to provide hundreds of millions of dollars in donated weapons, which could be packaged with additional sales on concessional terms, but requested a visit by Defense Minister Wardak to work out the details. Eleven months after the initial offer and amid mounting MFA frustration, we called on Afghanistan's Ambassador to Russia, the former Deputy Foreign Minister Zalmay Aziz, who acknowledged that Wardak had rebuffed the Russian invitation. Aziz attributed Wardak's refusal alternately to bureaucratic infighting within the Afghan Defense Ministry or uncertainty over the extent and composition of U.S.-origin military aid. ¶6. (C) Aziz stressed that because of the animosity and lack of trust between Afghanistan and Russia, GOR aid is not something many Afghans seek or desire; similarly, Russian popular and business disinterest in Afghanistan is illustrated in the scant "six or seven" visas the Embassy processes weekly. Earlier GOR attempts to aid Afghanistan have faltered, contributing to understandable Afghan cynicism about Russia's effectiveness as a partner. For example, Russia's 2002-2005 Afghan military assistance program ended before the entire USD 200 million could be delivered (ref C), and it took over two years for Moscow to dispatch a long-promised official from its drug enforcement agency to Kabul. While acknowledging Russia's commitment to rebuild the Solang tunnel and road leading north, Aziz downplayed Russian assistance and criticized Russia's refusal to turn over Soviet-era feasibility studies for industrial and mining projects. From Aziz's comments, it appears his Moscow posting is a purgatory of sorts, with the Ambassador not operating under any writ to capitalize on Russian concerns over Afghanistan's stability. Aziz confirmed that he is not brokering a solution to the Wardak-MFA standoff and has not paid a call on CSTO headquarters. -------------- Possible Areas of Cooperation -------------- ¶7. (C) In addition to the U.S. taking steps to facilitate better communication and cooperation between Russian and Afghan authorities, officials and experts here have identified the following areas for Russia and the CSTO to cooperate with the U.S. and NATO in Afghanistan. In so doing, they have made clear that increased cooperation with the U.S. and NATO to a large degree will hinge on our willingness to work with the CSTO. Counter-Narcotics -------------- ¶8. (C) Reducing the influx of narcotics from Afghanistan into Russia (estimated at 60 metric tons of heroin, which is equivalent to 600 MT of opium, per year),with its devastating societal and economic consequences, is a key Russian priority. The most obvious place to begin expanding cooperation with Russia on halting the flow of Afghanistan-origin narcotics is to support the CSTO's counter-narcotics efforts, including Operation Channel, in which the U.S. has had observer status for two years. This consists of two week-long interdiction blitzes each year in September and December, during which extra personnel are stationed at critical junctures along Afghan drug routes through Central Asian states to search for drugs and precursor chemicals. While the CSTO agreed in March 2007 to make Operation Channel a year-round operation, it is unclear when this will actually happen. CSTO officials have suggested that ISAF forces could coordinate with the CSTO to MOSCOW 00000520 003 OF 005 patrol both sides of Afghanistan's border to aid Operation Channel. The CSTO also announced on January 29 that it will coordinate border guard activities in an attempt to create anti-narcotics belts around Afghanistan. ¶9. (C) We could use a U.S./NATO offer of engagement with CSTO to expand Operation Channel year-round, addressing its major weakness of not being comprehensive. CSTO counter-narcotics officers traditionally have been interested only in seizing drugs, rather than in recruiting informants, allowing "controlled deliveries" to track supply routes, or adopting other tactics Western police departments use to catch "big fish." NATO-CSTO cooperation potentially could improve CSTO tactics. ¶10. (C) Given Operation Channel's current limitations, some view the Central Asian Regional Intelligence Coordination Center (CARICC) in Almaty, Kazakhstan, and Russian involvement therein, as a more promising alternative to combating narcotics trafficking along the "northern" drug routes. CARICC is a USD 6.5 million UNODC project with funding from multiple donors, including the U.S., which works to develop and promote counter-narcotics efforts among Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Russia has indicated its intention to participate, but thus far has not, despite the benefits Russian membership would bring. Military Assistance and Counter-Terrorism -------------- ¶11. (C) Director of the MFA Second Asia Department Director Aleksandr Maryasov and other GOR officials have reiterated Russia is ready to work with the Afghan army, either bilaterally or via the CSTO, to provide it weapons it needs (ref D). This would include Kalashnikov rifles, T-55 and T-62 tanks. The GOR and CSTO are also willing to train Afghan soldiers and patrol along the Afghan border (but not in Afghanistan). ¶12. (C) Mustafabeily pointed out to us that Afghans are familiar with Russian weapons because they fought the Soviet Army using mostly Soviet-made weapons, such as Kalashnikov rifles. He said, however, Russia has yet to receive information regarding what kinds of assistance would be useful for the Karzai government, and no meeting between defense ministers for Afghanistan to provide a list of concrete requests seems likely anytime soon. Ambassador Aziz told us that the Afghan MoD is waiting to see what military kit it will receive from NATO before it contemplates taking Russian equipment. The U.S. could encourage the Karzai government to follow up on Russia's offer or perhaps propose multilateral consultations on arms donations. ¶13. (C) Russia also offers training to the Afghan security forces in both Moscow and Tajikistan. The All-Russia Institute for Raising Qualifications for Employees of the Ministry of Interior (MOI) at Domodedevo Airport in Moscow is a Russian MoI facility, but is used to provide counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics training to Afghan police and border guards (ref E). This training is done under the auspices of the Nato-Russia Council, but because Russia is a CSTO member, the CSTO also tries to claim credit for this. The CSTO has already secured the support of the OSCE and Finland to train Afghan border guards in Tajikistan. While CSTO members are invited to participate in this training, so far this is a Russia-only affair. Russia is also seeking German support for training at both locations. Transportation Assistance -------------- ¶14. (C) Counselor of the CSTO's Department of POLITICAL Cooperation Anatoly Chuntulov and the Deputy Head Valery Dergachev told us the CSTO is willing to assist in transporting nonlethal goods for NATO forces in Afghanistan from as far as Western Europe to the Afghan border via rail. They told us rail would be cheaper than airlifting supplies or sending them by ship. They asserted that, while negotiations in the NATO-Russia Council and NATO POLITICAL Committee are still ongoing, this was a promising prospect for cooperation and hoped that negotiations would be wrapped up prior to the Bucharest summit. While Russia dropped its demand that such a deal be coordinated through the CSTO, it's not clear whether the GOR will ultimately bend in allowing military goods to also be included. The CSTO would also like MOSCOW 00000520 004 OF 005 to help improve the very limited rail infrastructure in Afghanistan. Terrorist Finance -------------- ¶15. (C) Russia could use its leadership in the Eurasia Group on Money Laundering, which includes China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikstan, to help build Afghanistan's anti-money laundering and anti-terrorist financing capacity. We should encourage greater collaboration between U.S. law enforcement officials and Russia's SVR to help identify and interdict potential terrorist flows to and from Afghanistan. Opportunities to enhance cooperation between the U.S. and Russia on UNSCR 1267 related issues should also be explored. Border Security/Illegal Migration -------------- ¶16. (C) In addition to enhancing border security through efforts such as Operation Channel, CSTO Section Chief of the MFA First CIS Department Andrey Shugurov told us, and experts agree, that the GOR would like to expand efforts to halt illegal migration throughout Central Asia, including Afghanistan. The GOR and CSTO would like to strengthen border protection through increased patrols and training of Afghan border guards. -------------- Obstacles To Cooperation -------------- ¶17. (C) Obstacles, however, stand in the way of Russian cooperation in Afghanistan, which would need to be addressed to effectively cooperate: Contact With the CSTO -------------- ¶18. (C) Most GOR aid to Afghanistan is funneled through the CSTO, an organization with which the U.S. and NATO have been reluctant to engage, given the organization's ambiguous aims and relative inactivity. By Shugurov's own admission, the CSTO is a relatively new and under-funded organization, but is expected to become more robust. In March 2007, the CSTO established a working group on Afghanistan and set up a formal channel of communication with the GOA at the deputy foreign minister level. Since this mechanism has been established, the CSTO has implemented programs such as the training of Afghan counter-narcotics officers in Russia. The U.S. and NATO would have to be patient and deliberate in its initial engagement with the organization, while underscoring that working with the CSTO would not replace our bilateral engagement with Central Asia, or our cooperation with these countries through NATO programs. Interoperability and Compatibility With NATO Efforts -------------- -------------- ¶19. (C) It will require significant coordination to ensure large-scale training and equipment provided by the CSTO and Russia would complement, rather than duplicate or complicate, NATO efforts in Afghanistan. Afghan police and military units trained by the CSTO and NATO should be able to work effectively together. Military kit such as radios provided by the CSTO and NATO should ideally be interoperable. One further caveat is that Russian counter-terrorist operations in Beslan and the Nordost assault have demonstrated the limits of Russian counter-terrorist training. How Successful Does Russia Want Us to Be? -------------- ¶20. (C) While the weight of official statements and views of the expert community support U.S.-Russian cooperation on Afghanistan, there are naysayers. Some experts such as Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the World Security Institute, argue that Russia neither wants the U.S. to succeed nor fail in Afghanistan. Safranchuk argued that the GOR is concerned that, if we succeed in Afghanistan, the U.S. will seek greater control over trade and energy routes from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean. If the U.S. fails, Afghanistan will once again be a haven for the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and instability and extremism could spread throughout the rest of Central Asia. Similarly, Alexander Shumilin, Director of the Center for Analysis of Greater Middle East Conflicts, said MOSCOW 00000520 005 OF 005 that Russia weighed its interest in cooperation with its need to be seen as a counterbalance to the United States and would not want to be too closely linked with American activities. -------------- Comment/Action -------------- ¶21. (C) Given apparent Russian and CSTO interest in cooperating constructively with the U.S. and NATO to strengthen the Afghanistan government, we should consider the benefits and scope for such engagement. An additional virtue in drawing Russia and the CSTO more closely into our efforts will be to reduce the temptation of Russia to go it alone with its traditional partners in the North - which is the direction that the MFA indicated the GOR was headed in the wake of their inability to coordinate with Kabul over military assistance. While we defer to Embassy Kabul on how an enhanced Russian and CSTO assistance program might be greeted by the Karzai government, a side-effect of creative cooperation on Afghanistan could be a strengthening of U.S.-Russian relations, at a time of significant strain. The upcoming 2 Plus 2 discussions by the Secretary and Secretary Gates would tee up more extensive expert level agreements on how best to achieve shared goals in Afghanistan, which are acceptable to the Afghan government. BURNS