CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT

UNCLAS MOSCOW 000502 SIPDIS SENSITIVE SIPDIS S/CT FOR S. GAIL ROBERTSON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL ASEC ECON PTER PGOV ETTC EAID EFIN RS SUBJECT: CI/KR RESPONSE FOR S/CT REF: A. STATE 6461 ¶B. ROBERTSON-HAWTHORNE 2/13 E-MAIL ¶1. (SBU) Embassy Moscow has proposed the following information on critical infrastructure and key resources (CI/KR) in Russia which, "if destroyed, disrupted, or exploited, might have an immediate and deleterious effect on the United States" (ref A). As requested, this message also provides information on host government efforts to secure and protect these sites/resources. Some of these items may not have an immediate physical impact on the U.S., but would have significant consequences for U.S. security and/or policy, including significant impact on U.S. allies in Europe and/or Asia. Nuclear Arsenal and Infrastructure -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Russian Federation has the world's second-largest nuclear arsenal, and a well-developed nuclear industry, both military and civilian, with hundreds of sites holding radioactive materials. Russia has a large military, capable intelligence and security forces, and extensive security infrastructure to protect its nuclear sites. Russia, under the START Treaty, has no more than 1600 delivery vehicles (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, and long-range heavy bombers),and, under the Moscow Treaty is in the process of meeting its requirements to reduce the number of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 1700-2200 by 2012. ¶3. (SBU) The 37th Air Army, Pacific and Northern Fleets, Strategic Rocket Forces, and 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense all exercise direct control over Russia's nuclear arsenal. An attack or exploitation of any one of these could leave elements of the arsenal vulnerable. While the impact on the U.S. might not be immediate, the danger of such elements falling into terrorists' or extremists' hands could pose a serious threat to the national security of the United States. ¶4. (SBU) To counter this threat, the U.S. Department of Defense is assisting the Russian Ministry of Defense with upgrading the security at sites where nuclear weapons are stored and enhancing the security of nuclear weapons during shipment. Under the Nuclear Weapons Storage Security program, DOD is installing state-of-the-art fencing and intrusion detection systems at 24 MOD nuclear weapons storage sites, and is also providing an Automated Inventory Control and Management System which allows the MOD to effectively track nuclear warheads as they are removed from the Russian arsenal and shipped for dismantlement. Under the Nuclear Weapons Transportation Security program, DOD provides the MOD with armored transport vehicles and modern railcars to ensure a secure means of transporting nuclear warheads between national stockpiles and elimination facilities. ¶5. (SBU) Russia has recently embarked on a massive restructuring and reorganization of the entire nuclear industry. A serious attack or incident at one of Russia's Nuclear Power Plants or Plutonium Production Reactors (NPP/PPR) could cause significant radiation release, immediately affecting adjacent populations. Depending on weather and wind conditions, radiation could be carried significant distances, impacting neighboring countries, including EU members and NATO Allies such as Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and Poland. Only Biblinskaia Nuclear Power Plant, located in Bilibino, Chukotka, the Far Eastern Russian region that borders Alaska, would be close enough to have an immediate physical impact on the U.S. The capacity of the plant, however, is low (100 times less than Chernobyl). ¶6. (SBU) List of major NPP/PPR's: Kola NPP - 4 units VVER 440 - Murmansk region Leningrad NPP - 4 units RBMK 1000 - Leningrad region Kalininskaia NPP - 3 units VVER 1000 - Tver region Smolenskaia NPP - 3 units RBMK 1000 - Smolensk region Kurskaia NPP - 4 units RBMK 1000 - Kursk region Nononoronej NPP - 2 units VVER 440, 1 unit VVER 1000, 2 units in decommissioning stage - Voroneg region Volgodonskaia NPP - 1 unit VVER 1000 - Rostov region Balakovskaia NPP - 4 units VVER 1000 - Saratov region Beloiarskaia NPP - 1 unit BN 600, 2 units in decommissioning stage - Sverdlovsk region Bilibinskaia NPP - 4 units EGP 6 - Chukotka region (the capacity of each unit is 12 Mvt) There are three PPR's located in Siberia. Two near Tomsk, and one near Krasnoyarsk. ¶7. (SBU) Since the early 1990's, the National Nuclear Security Administration, under the Department of Energy, has worked in cooperation with Russia to secure and protect sites containing nuclear materials, as well as to assist in the training of personnel. Among the achievements are: -- securing hundreds of nuclear warheads at more than 75 percent of the Russian warhead sites of concern, and 160 buildings containing hundreds of metric tons of weapons-usable nuclear material with work underway at the balance of sites to be completed by 2008; -- providing nearly 600 security-enhanced trucks, railcars, and "over pack" cases for nuclear material shipments; -- adopting a Joint Sustainability Plan with Rosatom outlining specific requirements (e.g., regulatory, training, maintenance, inspections) to ensure the long-term viability of nuclear security upgrades; -- equipping over 100 sites with radiation detection equipment at Russian borders, airports and seaports, and reaching an agreement to share the cost and work load for the balance of the 350 official international border crossings; -- training over 2,000 individuals at 40 workshops for state-controlled and private enterprises and institutes on export control compliance of nuclear dual-use technologies; -- assisting Rosatom in the establishment of two laboratories designed to provide export control technical support, including training and commodities identification; -- engaging over 16,000 weapons scientists and engineers and helping to create over 5,000 sustainable civilian jobs for former weapons personnel; helping to create or expand 60 businesses in closed Russian cities, and commercializing over 32 technologies that generated over USD 52 million in commercial sales; -- transferring all highly-enriched uranium from the Krylov Shipbuilding Research Institute in St. Petersburg to the Research Institute of Advanced Reactors in Dimitrovgrad for secure storage and downblending; -- converting hundreds of tons of highly-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium, thereby eliminating it as a proliferation threat. This includes 10 metric tons (roughly 400 nuclear weapons) for use in Russian nuclear power reactors, and monitoring the conversion of over 300 metric tons (roughly 12,000 nuclear weapons) of Russian weapons-origin highly-enriched uranium for use in U.S. nuclear power reactors; -- removing, returning, and securing Russian-origin nuclear material from nine countries in 13 shipments of "fresh" fuel and four shipments of "spent" fuel, and 130 radioisotopic thermoelectric generators that contain large quantities of dirty bomb materials, totaling more than 500 kilograms (over 1,000 pounds) of highly-enriched uranium, enough to make approximately 20 nuclear weapons; -- refurbishing and building heat and electricity plants in closed nuclear cities to ensure the shutdown of the last three weapons-grade PPR's, which produce approximately 1.2 metric tons of plutonium annually; -- recovering approximately 400,000 Curies of radiological sources at 12 Russian storage facilities (enough material for over 6,000 dirty bombs). Energy Resources -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Russia is the world's largest producer of hydrocarbons with an expansive network of oil and gas production, processing, and transportation facilities. Russia has the world's second largest number of individual oil wells after the U.S., so the impact of loss of individual wells or oilfields is quite low. Oil pipelines and oil product pipelines are under the control of the monopoly oil pipeline company, Transneft, and are thus vulnerable to attacks on control facilities operated by Transneft. Transneft has a very large security force that it has claimed in the past is very well prepared to prevent and respond to accidents or sabotage. Gas production facilities are largely controlled by de-facto gas monopoly Gazprom, and more vulnerable than oil production facilities because they are more concentrated. Gas pipelines are almost completely controlled by Gazprom and pass through a number of concentrated hubs. ¶9. (SBU) Information on how energy infrastructure is protected is not easily available. However, given the centrality of the oil and gas sector to Russia's economy, Russia's capable and active security and intelligence services, and Russia's experience with terrorist threats, we believe Russia is likely able to manage the security threats posed to its energy infrastructure. For more routine damage, Transneft and Gazprom have proven very capable of rapid repair. A massive attack against, for example, a main gas or oil pipeline critical for exports to Europe would cause a significant spike in commodity prices and would have a direct effect on the European economy and cascading effects on the U.S. economy. Financial Systems and Cyberstructure -------------- ¶10. (SBU) The U.S.-Russia economic relationship is growing. Russian investors are, and have been, active participants in U.S. equity and debt trading markets. Likewise, U.S. institutional and individual investors are becoming more active in Russian markets. Despite the upward trend in bilateral trade and investment flows, the overall volume of financial transactions remains modest when compared to either country's economic ties to (the rest of) Europe. In view of this, an attack disabling Russia's financial infrastructure could pose significant and lasting concerns for the U.S., such as general unrest, bank runs, and defaulted loans. These potential effects, however, would be unlikely to present a direct or debilitating threat to our national security. ¶11. (SBU) Russia's financial architecture is considered a subset of the country's overall cyberstructure. The Finance Ministry and the Central Bank have established Federal Treasury offices and Regional Central Bank offices in most of Russia's sub-federal territories. This network provides redundancy to minimize disruptions in the disbursement of budget funds or in supplying liquidity to banks. Russia's major securities exchanges have also told us that they maintain redundant systems so that trading, and the various accounting transactions associated with market activity, can continue in the event of a disruption. Maintaining the integrity and functionality of the computer systems of the various participants in Russia's economy -- banks, merchants, service providers, manufacturers, etc. -- is a basic preoccupation for regulators at all levels. However, we do not know what action plans the GOR or various industry associations have implemented to meet this goal. NASA -------------- ¶12. (SBU) NASA will be reliant upon Russia for crew and cargo launch services to the International Space Station (ISS) after the Space Shuttle retires in 2010 and before the new U.S. crew vehicle in on-line in 2015. NASA has an IT infrastructure in place to enable and support communications in support of space operations, including from Mission Control Center-Moscow (MCC-M) to Mission Control Center-Houston, as well as ground-to-space operations from MCC-M to ISS. An attack on Russia's space launch capability would be unlikely to have a major immediate physcial impact on the U.S., but would affect the U.S.'s abilities to use the ISS between 2010 and 2015. BURNS