RUSSIA'S MILITARY MUSCLE-FLEXING

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000475

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/21/2018
TAGS: PREL MARR NATO PARM RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S MILITARY MUSCLE-FLEXING

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Russia's recent steps to flex its military
muscles are designed both to impress the Russian public in an
election year that Putin has reestablished Russia as a major
player on the world stage, and to underscore that Russia will
no longer engage NATO and the West from a position of
weakness. Putin's "2020" speech to Russia's State Council
February 8 accused the "most developed countries" of starting
a new arms race, and claimed Russia would invest the
necessary resources to begin production of new weapons.
While analysts are convinced that most of the Russian elite
does not really view the U.S. or the West as enemies, the GOR
is determined to show the public that it can back up its
threatened reaction to U.S. missile defense deployments,
failure to reach agreement on arms control issues, or
crossing of Russia's NATO enlargement redlines. While Russia
has quadrupled defense spending since 2001, to USD 31 billion
per year, it still is only 2.7 percent of GDP. Moreover,
inflation, inefficiency, corruption and, above all, Russia's
lack of a modern strategic military doctrine and leaders to
implement it continue to erode efforts to realize Putin's
goal of modern, effective armed forces. End Summary.


2. (C) Russia has taken steps in recent months to "flex its
military muscles," including resumption of heavy bomber
flights, creation of a new "vacuum-bomb," fleet exercises in
the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, and other
demonstrations of military "might." Many experts, such as
Aleksandr Golts, Deputy Editor-In-Chief of the Weekly
Journal, Aleksandr Konovalov, Director of the Institute for
Strategic Assessment, and Vladimir Mukhin of the Academy of
Military Sciences, say these public efforts are mostly
"PR-driven," designed to impress the Russian people that
Putin has reestablished Russia as a major player on the
global stage, and intended to highlight to the rest of the
world that Russia will no longer let NATO and the West pursue
their strategic efforts closer and closer to Russia's borders
without Russian involvement or objection.


3. (C) Alexander Piekaiov of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Institute of World Economy and International Relations noted
that these activities were merely a return to much-needed
training now that Russia's strong economy enables it to spend
the necessary money on equipment, spare parts, and fuel.
Prior to the resumption of these activities, the aging
TU-95's ("Bear") had not flown regular bomber patrols in 15
years; Air Force pilots logged only 40 hours per month in
flight training; and Naval seamen spent only 2-3 days per
month at sea.

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Putin: "Russia Can Stand up for Itself"
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4. (U) In his February 8 "2020" speech, Putin said "finally,
Russia has returned to the world stage as a strong state, a
country that others heed and that can stand up for itself."
He stressed that in response to "new challenges," Russia
would begin production of new types of weapons, the quality
of which would be "as good and in some cases even surpass
those of other countries." He also emphasized that Russia
would rethink its strategy on how the Armed Forces were
organized, and work to improve the quality and reputation of
military service.


5. (U) In early 2007, then-Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov
announced an ambitious plan for 2007-2015 to spend USD 240
billion) to replace 45 percent of Russia's arsenal. Among the
materiel to be procured or upgraded were:
-- 31 ships for the Navy, including new aircraft carriers;
-- arms for 40 tanks, 97 infantry and 50 airborne battalions;
-- new TOPOL-M (SS-27) ICBMs;
-- the Yarts land-based ballistic missile;
-- the Bulava sea-launched ballistic missile;
-- the X-102 airborne missile;
-- a new version of the Iskander-M ballistic missile, capable
of carrying multiple warheads;
-- a fourth Borey-class strategic nuclear submarine (the
first is scheduled to go into service after 2008);
-- a new TU-160 Blackjack bomber, and modernization of
existing TU-160 and TU-95 Bear bombers;
-- a full fleet of new generation fighters by 2012-2015 (the
SU-34 Fullback which is in production and scheduled to
replace the SU-24 Fencer frontline bombers).
-- deployment of a second S-400 air defense system near
Moscow in 2008.

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The U.S. is Not the Enemy, but...
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6. (C) Experts, such as Piekaiov and Ivan Safranchuk,
Director of the World Security Institute, stress that,
despite the strong public rhetoric and military
muscle-flexing, most Russian leaders really do not view the
United States as an enemy, but rather as a foil against which
Russia can prove its status as a strategically important
country. Safranchuk told us Russia's recent demonstrations
of military power were rooted in its dissatisfaction with
U.S. efforts to consult Russia or treat Russia as an equal
partner. Additionally, Russia wanted more influence over
world events.


7. (U) In his February 10 speech, Sergey Ivanov noted that
in "occupying an appropriate place in world politics," Russia
did not intend to establish military blocs or engage in open
confrontation with its partners. He argued that Moscow and
Washington had long shared "a special responsibility for the
future of the world," and said this could "continue to serve
as a firm basis unifying our nations."


8. (C) But, experts like Tatyana Parkhalina, Director of the
Center For European Security, note that while Russia does not
anticipate major confrontation with the West, it still helps
bolster Putin's and his anointed successor Dmitriy Medvedev's
election-year standing to demonstrate how Russia has "stood
up" to perceived threats from the West. Portraying the U.S.
and the West as adversaries also justifies the need for
additional increases in defense spending, which are essential
if Russia is to match reality to its intentions.

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Russia's Defense Spending
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9. (U) The Soviet state budget listed military spending in
1988 as approximately USD 33 bn., but most experts speculated
that the figure was 10 times higher. By 1997, Russian
military spending had dropped to 1/7th of the listed 1988
figure. In keeping with Putin's demand for upgrade and
modernization of the military, the budget increased to almost
USD $8 bn in 2001, and by 2007 it had almost quadrupled to
USD $31 bn. Defense spending for 2008 is approximately USD
32.6 bn., and projected to increase to USD 36.67 bn. and USD
44.82 bn. in 2009 and 2010 respectively. Although the
amounts have increased substantially, defense spending has
remained at approximately 2.6-2.8 percent of GDP over the
past six years. GOR officials frequently note that Russian
defense spending constitutes only a fraction of U.S. outlays.



10. (C) The problem is that reality does not match the
rhetoric, and that despite the influx of billions of dollars
in the defense industry, it will be difficult for Russia to
overcome the enormous obstacles facing it. Recent exercises
point up the woeful state of Russia's current military
hardware. Experts estimated that in 2005, 70-80 percent of
Russian military equipment was obsolete. Konovalov said that
there were currently only 16 TU-160's in actual operation,
manufacture of the TU-160 engines ceased 15 years ago, and
there were insufficient spare parts to keep the bombers in
the skies for more than a few more months. Mukhin noted that
for the recent naval operations in the Med and North
Atlantic, Russia had to pull the 11 ships (seven of which
were support vehicles) from its Black Sea, Baltic, and
Northern fleets. He said these were likely the only ships
the Navy could currently field, due to disrepair, parts and
fuel issues (Viktor Litovkin, defense expert for the
Independent Military Review, points out that one of the
cruisers was the Maxim Gorky, which served as the meeting
locale for President George H.W. Bush and Gorbachev in Malta
on December 3, 1989). There had been no flight operations
off the deck of the Kuznetsov, Russia's only aircraft
carrier, because of the state of the ship and the lack of
qualified carrier pilots.


11. (C) Mukhin and other experts have also highlighted that
many weapons systems production have fallen behind schedule,
are turning out poor quality equipment, or have major cost
overruns. Two, rather than six, SU-34 aircraft were
delivered in 2005; a battalion of Iskander-M missiles were to
have been delivered in 2005 to the North Caucasus Military
District, but only arrived in 2007; the Bulava
submarine-launched missile, which was to have entered the
Navy's regular inventory in 2008 has had only six tests, four
of which failed, and one of which failed partially.
Analytical weekly Kommersant Vlast reported that India's
lease of a Chakra nuclear submarine was delayed from
mid-August 2007 to June 2008 due to delays in construction at
the Russian factory, and Russia raised the price from USD 650
million to USD 785 million. Delivery of re-equipped and
updated aircraft carrier to India was put off from late-2008
to 2011-2012, and Russia added USD 1 billion to the USD 700
million price tag. Algeria reportedly suspended or canceled
contracts for MIG aircraft due to poor quality of the first
deliveries.


12. (C) Inflation has also eroded GOR efforts to bolster its
forces. Mukhin notes that the defense budget share of GDP
remained steady over the past few years, at approximately 2.7
percent, with inflation, which has been running close to 10
percent per year in the general economy (but which may be
much higher -- possibly 20 percent -- in the defense
industry) wiping out much of the real increase in spending.
He said that while the Russian leadership had a clear,
long-term plan for the renewal of military hardware, it had
"no understanding of the need to increase real spending on
defense."


13. (C) Another problem is the lack of subcontractors and
skilled personnel able to carry out Russia's ambitious
projects. Safranchuk explained that during the 90's'
cutbacks in defense spending, many subcontractors went out of
business or scaled back production lines dramatically due to
lack of orders. Specialty and highly-skilled workers left
for other fields. There is a major effort to bring
production lines back into service, Safranchuk noted, but it
will be several years before they are able to operate at the
necessary capacity. Similarly, there are efforts to increase
technical training and provide incentives for young Russians
to enter technical fields, but again it is a long-term
process.


14. (C) Complicating all these efforts is the perennial
problem of corruption. Defense Minister Serdyukov was given
the task of stemming the apparent disappearance of millions
of dollars of defense monies. According to most experts, he
has made some progress and his restructuring of the Defense
Ministry and introduction of accountants and financial
experts has enabled him to get more control over where the
money goes. Still, bribes and paybacks will continue to
exist, but, as Safranchuk says, "at least now not all the
money will disappear."


15. (C) Finally, Russia's lack of a clear strategic vision of
what its future military should look like makes it difficult
to develop a plan for its defense industry. While Russia
continues to focus on its nuclear capability, its military is
not adequately developing the types of modern conventional
equipment and weaponry necessary to fight future wars.
Litovkin noted that you needed a different military for
different enemies and Russia did not know who its enemies
were. While Russia did not really expect to fight a major
war against NATO or the United States, it still felt the need
to prepare for the eventuality (or against China),and its
doctrine remains framed in Cold War concepts. Safranchuk
agreed, saying that the main risk for Russia now was that
wrong decisions were being made. Why was Russia developing a
new version of the TU-160 strategic bomber, which in 15 years
would likely be obsolete, he asked. While acknowledging that
Russia also recognizes the need to develop the capability to
fight an asymmetric, high-tech war or conduct
counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations, they noted
that there was still skepticism in the senior military ranks
as to where such a war would be fought. Furthermore,
according to Mukhin, Russia seriously lacks modern
communications, intelligence, and reconnaissance equipment,
and is having serious problems with its efforts to develop
GLONASS, its counterpart to GPS.

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Comment
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16. (C) Barring an unlikely massive downturn in the economy,
Russia will be able to increase and modernize its military
capabilities. That said, what the military needs most of all
-- leadership, new thinking and strategic vision -- are
nowhere in sight. Selectively re-equipping and modernizing
the Soviet-era military may look impressive but is unlikely
to radically increase Russia's ability to deal with 21st
Century challenges. Without a wholesale turnover in the
uniformed military and defense industry's leaders, the focus
will be backward-looking to Soviet times, leaving a real gap
between Russia's political-military aspirations and
capabilities.
BURNS