AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 19 MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000460

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM TSPL PARM KNNP CVIS RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S FEBRUARY 19 MEETING WITH DFM KISLYAK

REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 181741Z FEBRUARY

B. MOSCOW 449 NODIS

C. STATE 15823

D. 07 STATE 170386

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns:
Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a February 19 meeting with the
Ambassador, DFM Kislyak stressed the importance of setting a
date for the next 2 2 meeting. The Ambassador conveyed a
copy of the President's letter to Putin (ref a),which he had
earlier delivered to Kremlin Foreign Policy Adviser Prikhodko
(ref b). Kislyak confirmed that Russia was prepared to work
seriously on a strategic framework, if the outcome were
substantive. He iterated U.S.-Russian differences on missile
defense, CFE, and post-START; described Iran as an area of
both cooperation and disagreement; expressed pessimism over
completion of the 123 agreement and the CTWG; and heralded
only the GICNT as a mechanism that "worked." On ISTC,
Kislyak said the GOR agreed on the need to transform the
organization, but had not achieved a national consensus yet
on new priorities that would make expert level discussions
productive at this stage. Kislyak said Russia's disagreement
over the ISTC's Chief Financial Officer was substantive, and
a change in personnel was required. The Ambassador pushed
Kislyak on the need to issue a formal GOR request to Georgia
to dispose of the high level radioactive material in Sukhumi,
expressed concern over the GOR failure to issue a visa to HRW
Director Kenneth Roth, and updated the DFM on next steps in
the Kuznetsov case. Kislyak parried with a demand for more
information on the U.S. refusal to issue Oleg Deripaska a
visa. Ambassador said he had already provided our response.
End Summary

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POTUS Letter
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2. (C) In a February 19 meeting with Deputy Foreign
Minister Sergey Kislyak, the Ambassador provided a copy of
the President's response (ref a) to Putin's February 17
letter, which he had conveyed earlier in the day to
Presidential Foreign Policy Adviser Sergey Prikhodko (ref b,
notal). The Ambassador noted that the White House's quick
response to Putin's message reflected the seriousness with
which we took Russian concerns over Kosovo. Kislyak
commented that the correspondence rehashed very familiar
positions, over which there was no agreement between the U.S.
and Russia. Without any particular emotion, Kislyak
reiterated only that Russia took a very different view of the
precedent established by Kosovo's unilateral declaration of
independence and its recognition by many Western states.

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Timing of 2 2
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3. (C) Kislyak was frustrated by the absence of a U.S.
counterproposal on 2 2 dates, saying it was understandable
that the original March 13 proposal wouldn't work because of
other travels by the Secretary, but Russia needed certainty
or at least options for the consultations. Lavrov's schedule
was busy and the longer the delay, the greater the
complications in finding a mutually acceptable time. Kislyak
reiterated that as we looked ahead to other forms of
high-level engagement, the 2 2 took on even greater
significance.

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Strategic Framework: Substance Required
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4. (C) The Ambassador emphasized the President's interest
in taking up Putin's offer of reinvigorating a discussion
over transatlantic relations. The U.S. would continue to
look for ways to narrow differences, which remained
substantial. The Ambassador noted that the Budapest dialogue
with U/S Rood would provide a valuable opportunity. While
the areas that the strategic framework could cover were well
known, the task remained to build common ground. Kislyak,
noting his own homework on how to conceive of the strategic
framework in advance of the Budapest dialogue, argued that
there was little to work with at present. Any serious effort
would require more than goodwill; a conscious desire was
needed to "overcome stereotypes" that prevented taking each
other's concerns into account. Reiterating that Russia was
prepared to work seriously, Kislyak provided his take on the
existing divergence in approach:

-- Post-Start: While Kislyak did not have a readout of the
February 18 meeting between A/S DeSutter and MFA Director
Antonov, he argued that the U.S. position was divorced from
the START framework. Describing the U.S. position as
"dangerous" and "destabilizing" to the NPT regime, Kislyak
charged that it boiled down to a regime of reciprocal visits
and confidence building measures in the form of briefings.
U.S. insistence on "absolute flexibility" on its nuclear
offensive capability, both geographically and in terms of
delivery vehicles, coupled with American ABM activities, was
untenable. Kislyak complained that the post-START paper

promised "in two weeks" over two months ago was still
outstanding.

-- Missile Defense: Kislyak concluded that the working group
discussions on missile defense had exhausted their usefulness
and commented that the U.S. knew where its proposals differed
from the architecture discussed by the Secretary and
Secretary Gates in October 2007.

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-- CFE: Kislyak welcomed A/S Fried's efforts to continue the
dialogue with Antonov on February 19, but noted there had
been no significant bridging of positions since October 2007.

-- Iran: This is an area "where we agree and disagree."

-- 123: Having read the transcripts of recent congressional
hearings, Kislyak questioned whether the administration had
the necessary "zeal" to carry the initialed 123 through to
completion over congressional concerns. The Ambassador
reinforced the importance of a prompt and thorough Russian
reply to our latest paper on Arak.

-- CTWG: Kislyak charged that the failure to hold a Core
Group meeting in 2007 meant that the U.S. and Russia had lost
their only instrument to discuss systemic counter-terrorism
cooperation; instead of strategic engagement, there was
piecemeal cooperation. The Ambassador disputed Kislyak's
assessment, reaffirming U.S. interest in using the CTWG
format.

-- GICNT: Of the seven areas originally identified in the
strategic framework, Kislyak commented that only the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism worked.

International Science and Technology Center
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5. (C) The Ambassador conveyed the ref (c) letter from U/S
Rood, proposing a bilateral dialogue on how to transform the
ISTC and flagging U.S. concern over the failure of Russia to
promptly renew the visa of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO).
After quickly reading the text, Kislyak confirmed that
Russia was serious about giving further thought to the future
of the ISTC, since its existing mandate had been fulfilled.
The goal, he argued, should be to transform ISTC into a
center of scientific excellence; to promote science rather
than to employ scientists. This adjustment, Kislyak noted,
would not be easy and would require revisiting the legal
structure on which the ISTC was founded. Reflecting his
conversations with Russian scientific and government circles,
Kislyak conceded that the GOR was not yet in a position to
provide a consensus view on next steps. Instead, more time
was needed internally to synchronize approaches. Kislyak
lauded at length the "absolutely unique" marriage of
geographical diversity and competitive peer review that
undergird the ISTC's activities, but repeated that there was
no national consensus on what a restructured ISTC's
priorities should be.


6. (C) As regarded the CFO, Kislyak said it was not a
technical issue related to a visa issuance, but a Russian
requirement for change. Kislyak declined to be drawn out on
Russian objections to the current CFO, but said that her more
than six years in office were reason enough to seek fresh
thinking into the organization. Noting that the GOR had
signaled its concern over the CFO earlier, Kislyak
underscored that "substantive" issues were at play. Kislyak
hinted at additional amendments to the ISTC's status that
would be sought by the GOR, noting that its tax exemption was
negotiated within the "procedures of the 1990's." The fact
that the Duma had never ratified the agreement reflected
continued unhappiness over its structure, which needed to be
"massaged." The Ambassador stressed that the ISTC was an
important area of bilateral collaboration and one that should
be used to advance our shared non-proliferation goals.
Kislyak agreed, but added that it was important to get the
structure right and that the U.S. and Russia would first have
to agree on goals.

Sukhumi: High Level Radioactive Material
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7. (C) The Ambassador reminded Kislyak that the GOR needed
to formally notify Georgia of its proposal to remove the high
level radioactive materials from Abkhazia for disposal in
Russia (ref d). The U.S. was prepared to encourage Georgia
to accept the Russian proposal, but that official contact
between the two governments had not yet taken place. Kislyak
acknowledged that there were differences with Rosatom,
stating that the two still needed to work out the
"nitty-gritty." Kislyak agreed with the Ambassador on the
importance of accounting for loose radioactive materials, but
took a dim view of whether the bilateral initiative would
improve Russian-Georgian relations.

Visas: HRW and Deripaska
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8. (C) The Ambassador expressed concern over news that
Human Rights Watch Director Kenneth Roth had been unable to
obtain a visa to travel to Moscow for a February 21 press
conference on HRW's annual report. Neither Kislyak nor MFA
North America Department Director Igor Neverov were familiar
with the case, and we later provided Neverov's office with
additional background on the visa application.


9. (C) "Speaking of visa cases," Kislyak harped again on
U.S. reasons for refusing to issue to Russian businessman
Oleg Deripaska. Kislyak maintained that the Secretary had
promised Lavrov an explanation during their December 2007
meeting in Berlin, but dismissed the subsequent general
explanation of our visa issuance criteria as insufficient.
The Ambassador commented that he thought there was little
more that could be provided in terms of specificity.

Kuznetsov
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10. (C) The Ambassador briefed Kislyak on next steps in the
case of convicted UN official/Russian national, Vladimir
Kuznetsov. Kislyak expressed appreciation for the
Secretary's support in keeping this process on the front

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burner, and reiterated the importance of a resolution to the
GOR.
BURNS