MFA ON MULTILATERALIZING INF, NON-MILITARIZATION

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000421 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/14/2018 TAGS: PREL MARR NATO RS SUBJECT: MFA ON MULTILATERALIZING INF, NON-MILITARIZATION OF SPACE, POST-START Classified By: Political Minister-Counselor Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1. 4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Vladimir Yermakov, MFA Director of Strategic Capabilities Policy, told us February 13 that FM Lavrov's proposal at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on February 12 to "multilateralize" the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) was necessary to prevent the proliferation of intermediate-range missiles. While China was "reluctant," it had not rejected the idea. Yermakov said the Russia-China proposal for a treaty on Non-Militarization of Space was similar to previous, unsuccessful efforts. He denied that Russia intended to multilateralize post-START or other treaties, at least not initially. End summary. INF --- ¶2. (C) Yermakov, who is newly arrived from four years at the Russian Embassy in Washington, told us that Russia believed that since other countries were developing greater nuclear and missile capacity, it was important to bring them under a binding Treaty obligation. Russia's draft text seeking to "multilateralize" the INF Treaty was only a start, intended to move the process forward. The question of whether to cover only ground-launched intermediate-range missiles (as under the existing INF Treaty),or all intermediate range missiles was one for further discussion. When asked whether Russia had solicited views from other countries prior to tabling the text, he said the GOR had discussed it with China, which was reluctant, but had not rejected the idea. China had told Russia it had concerns and wanted to watch how the process moved forward. India was also reluctant, whereas Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine were supportive. He said Russia had not discussed the proposal with Iran. ¶3. (C) Ivan Safranchuk, Director of the World Security Institute, told us the GOR's main goal in proposing multilateralization of the INF Treaty was to stymie U.S. Missile Defense plans for Eastern Europe. If Russia succeeded in getting other countries, specifically Iran, to sign on to a global INF Treaty, there would be no more threat from Iran, and therefore no reason for MD in Poland and the Czech Republic. Russia was not really interested in continuing just a bilateral Treaty with the U.S., he said, and "would have no alternative" but to withdraw from the INF Treaty if it failed at broadening it. Non-Militarization of Space Treaty -------------- ¶4. (C) Yermakov said the Treaty on Non-Militarization of Space tabled jointly by Russia and China at the CD was very similar to the one they proposed in 2002. Russia intended to keep the discussion in the CD for now. While the proposal focuses on all offensive weapons, it would be necessary to define the terms carefully so as to determine whether and what type of defensive weapons should be covered. Multilateralizing Post-START? -------------- ¶5. (C) In his Munich speech, Ivanov said that the post-START (Yermakov said the reference to SALT I was a poor translation) regime should be legally binding, so that, "in due course, it would really become possible to shift to the control over nuclear weapons and the process of their gradual reduction on a multilateral basis." When asked whether Ivanov's comments indicated that Russia was moving towards a policy of seeking to multilateralize a post-START Treaty and other arms control treaties, Yermakov said that Russia was not serious about multilateralizing START now. There was no point in having multilateral treaties without the U.S., and it was better to start with a bilateral agreement which, perhaps, could be expanded later to include other countries, as Russia was proposing with the INF Treaty. ¶6. (C) Yermakov reiterated Russian arguments about the need for a binding, post-START Treaty that "took all the best elements of the START Treaty," and that provided stability and predictability about both sides' nuclear arsenals. Russia did not understand what "operationally deployed strategic weapons," as used in the Moscow Treaty, meant. Therefore, it was important to provide a clear picture of all strategic weapons and delivery vehicles. BURNS