RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY APPROACHES IMPROVEMENT IN TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000391

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY APPROACHES IMPROVEMENT IN TIES
WITH GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 353

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for
reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The MFA told us that Russia remained
committed to improving bilateral relations with Georgia, and
was prepared to discuss "anything and everything" with the
two Georgian DFMs visiting Moscow on February 15, but
stressed that Russia was interested only in concrete action
from Georgia. News on February 13 of the release of two
North Ossetian peacekeepers in Georgia was greeted as a
"positive step forward". In a February 11 meeting with the
Ambassador, visiting EU Special Representative for the South
Caucasus Semneby said the Georgian DFMs would likely present
a low cost, high impact "package of deliverables" to Russia,
including the release of the North Ossetian peacekeepers and
the opening of a Russian school in Tbilisi. Press reports
indicated that Russia and Georgia have also agreed to discuss
the removal of Russia's ban on Georgian wine. On the
unresolved conflicts, the MFA characterized as "illogical"
Saakashvili's statements at Wehrkunde that Kosovo and
Abkhazia were fundamentally different conflicts, and Semneby
expressed doubt Russia would recognize Abkhazia immediately
in the event of CDI. Initial reactions from GOR officials to
Georgian opposition leader Patarkatsishvili's sudden death
were relatively mild, with only a few Duma deputies pointing
their fingers at Saakashvili. While GOR-GOG relations are by
definition volatile, Georgia's release of the North Ossetian
peacekeepers has improved the atmosphere for the DFMs' Moscow
consultations. End summary.

Russia Prepares for Georgian DFM Meeting
--------------


2. (C) MFA Third CIS Department Deputy Director Aleksandr
Povlovskiy confirmed for us in a February 13 meeting that
Russian DFM Gregoriy Karasin will receive Georgian First DFM
Nikolos Vashakidze and DFM Grigoliy Vashadze on February 15
(reftel). Povlovskiy stressed that Russia is prepared to
discuss "anything and everything" with Georgia, including
steps to improve relations, but as Karasin recently told the
Ambassador (reftel),Russia is awaiting concrete action from
Georgia. Anything less would be perceived as rhetoric.
Subsequently, when news broke of Georgia's release of the two
North Ossetian peacekeepers, Povlovskiy termed it a "positive
step forward."


3. (C) In a February 11 meeting with the Ambassador,
visiting EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus
Peter Semneby said that based on his February 5 talks in
Tbilisi, the Georgian DFMs would be presenting a "package of
deliverables" to their meeting with Karasin. The measures
were more symbolic in nature, but Semneby said the Georgians
were convinced that concessions on relatively minor issues
(for Georgia),such as the release of the detained North
Ossetian peacekeepers and the opening of a Russian school in
Tbilisi, would go a long way in improving bilateral ties.
Semneby commented that FM Lavrov's presence at President
Saakashvili's inauguration and Russia's apparent proposal to
discuss joint control over cross border traffic, which could
include the conflict areas, were indications that Russia was
prepared to reciprocate positive gestures, but agreed that
the GOR would keep all its options on the table. (Note:
Press reports indicated that Russia and Georgia recently
exchanged letters on possible ways to remove Russia's ban on
Georgian wine.)

Kosovo and Frozen Conflicts
--------------


4. (C) In reaction to Saakashvili's comments at Wehrkunde
about the fundamental differences between Kosovo and the
unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Povlovskiy characterized
position on Kosovo as "illogical and strange." He argued
that Georgia, "more than any other country," should be
concerned about the impact of a Kosovo CDI on the issue of
territorial integrity.


5. (C) Semneby told us he was convinced that the West's
recognition of Kosovo's independence would complicate
Russian-Georgian relations, but doubted Russia would
recognize Abkhazia in the short term. He commented that,
unless Georgia was offered MAP at the NATO Bucharest Summit
or domestic pressure increased as a result of violence in
Kosovo, Russia would likely hold onto its Abkhazia "card" for
the time being. Semneby added that several members of the
political elite, such as former PM Primakov, have told him
that Russia has marginalized itself in the world because of
its blunt approach to Georgia. Specifically, Russia should
recognize -- and adopt a policy consistent with -- the clear
distinctions between South Ossetia and Abkhazia.


6. (C) Povlovskiy disputed the notion that Russia had a
one-size-fits-all approach to the frozen conflicts in
Georgia, emphasizing that such allegations were likely
connected with Georgia's "propaganda campaign" in support of
South Ossetian "alternative leader" Sanakoyev. Povlovskiy
claimed that Georgia was actively promoting the idea that a
resolution to the South Ossetian conflict was within reach
only because Sanakoyev (and Tbilisi) was making headway with
some South Ossetians. Povlovskiy did not deny that South
Ossetia was more manageable, but cautioned against putting
too much stock in Sanakoyev or in Tbilisi's South Ossetia
policy; South Ossetian leader Kokoity still enjoys strong
support in the region.

Initial Reactions to Patarkatsishvili's Death
--------------


7. (C) Official reactions to the February 12 death of
prominent Georgian businessman and opposition leader in
self-exile Badri Patarkatsishvili have been relatively mild.
Povlovskiy said that Patarkatsishvili's death appeared to be
a result of natural causes, but speculated that Georgian
opposition leaders would try to "capitalize on his death" by
blaming the Georgian special services. During a session in
the State Duma, International Relations Committee Deputy
Chairman Leonid Slutskiy said that he did not see "any
special circumstances or terrorist activity" in
Patarkatsishvili's death, and Deputies Vladimir Nikitin and
Gennadiy Gudkov doubted Georgian special services played a
role. However, Nikitin and Gudkov pointed out that
Saakashvili "clearly gained" from Patarkatsishvili's death,
while the Georgian opposition lost a major source of
financing.


8. (C) Deputies Vladimir Kolesnikov and Stanislav Govorukhin
were more suspicious of Georgian foul play. Kolesnikov said
he did not exclude the possibility that Saakashvili or
oligarch-in-exile Boris Berezovskiy was involved in
Patarkatsishvili's death and proposed that Russian
authorities conduct a joint investigation. Govorukhin added
that instead of looking for a "Russian footprint,"
investigators should focus on Georgia's possible involvement,
underscoring Patarkatsishvili's "complex relations" with
Saakashvili. However, both deputies stressed that the
investigation should be objective and complete.
BURNS