RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY APPROACHES IMPROVEMENT IN TIES

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000391 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA CAUTIOUSLY APPROACHES IMPROVEMENT IN TIES WITH GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 353 Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns for reasons 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The MFA told us that Russia remained committed to improving bilateral relations with Georgia, and was prepared to discuss "anything and everything" with the two Georgian DFMs visiting Moscow on February 15, but stressed that Russia was interested only in concrete action from Georgia. News on February 13 of the release of two North Ossetian peacekeepers in Georgia was greeted as a "positive step forward". In a February 11 meeting with the Ambassador, visiting EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Semneby said the Georgian DFMs would likely present a low cost, high impact "package of deliverables" to Russia, including the release of the North Ossetian peacekeepers and the opening of a Russian school in Tbilisi. Press reports indicated that Russia and Georgia have also agreed to discuss the removal of Russia's ban on Georgian wine. On the unresolved conflicts, the MFA characterized as "illogical" Saakashvili's statements at Wehrkunde that Kosovo and Abkhazia were fundamentally different conflicts, and Semneby expressed doubt Russia would recognize Abkhazia immediately in the event of CDI. Initial reactions from GOR officials to Georgian opposition leader Patarkatsishvili's sudden death were relatively mild, with only a few Duma deputies pointing their fingers at Saakashvili. While GOR-GOG relations are by definition volatile, Georgia's release of the North Ossetian peacekeepers has improved the atmosphere for the DFMs' Moscow consultations. End summary. Russia Prepares for Georgian DFM Meeting -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Third CIS Department Deputy Director Aleksandr Povlovskiy confirmed for us in a February 13 meeting that Russian DFM Gregoriy Karasin will receive Georgian First DFM Nikolos Vashakidze and DFM Grigoliy Vashadze on February 15 (reftel). Povlovskiy stressed that Russia is prepared to discuss "anything and everything" with Georgia, including steps to improve relations, but as Karasin recently told the Ambassador (reftel),Russia is awaiting concrete action from Georgia. Anything less would be perceived as rhetoric. Subsequently, when news broke of Georgia's release of the two North Ossetian peacekeepers, Povlovskiy termed it a "positive step forward." ¶3. (C) In a February 11 meeting with the Ambassador, visiting EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby said that based on his February 5 talks in Tbilisi, the Georgian DFMs would be presenting a "package of deliverables" to their meeting with Karasin. The measures were more symbolic in nature, but Semneby said the Georgians were convinced that concessions on relatively minor issues (for Georgia),such as the release of the detained North Ossetian peacekeepers and the opening of a Russian school in Tbilisi, would go a long way in improving bilateral ties. Semneby commented that FM Lavrov's presence at President Saakashvili's inauguration and Russia's apparent proposal to discuss joint control over cross border traffic, which could include the conflict areas, were indications that Russia was prepared to reciprocate positive gestures, but agreed that the GOR would keep all its options on the table. (Note: Press reports indicated that Russia and Georgia recently exchanged letters on possible ways to remove Russia's ban on Georgian wine.) Kosovo and Frozen Conflicts -------------- ¶4. (C) In reaction to Saakashvili's comments at Wehrkunde about the fundamental differences between Kosovo and the unresolved conflicts in Georgia, Povlovskiy characterized position on Kosovo as "illogical and strange." He argued that Georgia, "more than any other country," should be concerned about the impact of a Kosovo CDI on the issue of territorial integrity. ¶5. (C) Semneby told us he was convinced that the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence would complicate Russian-Georgian relations, but doubted Russia would recognize Abkhazia in the short term. He commented that, unless Georgia was offered MAP at the NATO Bucharest Summit or domestic pressure increased as a result of violence in Kosovo, Russia would likely hold onto its Abkhazia "card" for the time being. Semneby added that several members of the political elite, such as former PM Primakov, have told him that Russia has marginalized itself in the world because of its blunt approach to Georgia. Specifically, Russia should recognize -- and adopt a policy consistent with -- the clear distinctions between South Ossetia and Abkhazia. ¶6. (C) Povlovskiy disputed the notion that Russia had a one-size-fits-all approach to the frozen conflicts in Georgia, emphasizing that such allegations were likely connected with Georgia's "propaganda campaign" in support of South Ossetian "alternative leader" Sanakoyev. Povlovskiy claimed that Georgia was actively promoting the idea that a resolution to the South Ossetian conflict was within reach only because Sanakoyev (and Tbilisi) was making headway with some South Ossetians. Povlovskiy did not deny that South Ossetia was more manageable, but cautioned against putting too much stock in Sanakoyev or in Tbilisi's South Ossetia policy; South Ossetian leader Kokoity still enjoys strong support in the region. Initial Reactions to Patarkatsishvili's Death -------------- ¶7. (C) Official reactions to the February 12 death of prominent Georgian businessman and opposition leader in self-exile Badri Patarkatsishvili have been relatively mild. Povlovskiy said that Patarkatsishvili's death appeared to be a result of natural causes, but speculated that Georgian opposition leaders would try to "capitalize on his death" by blaming the Georgian special services. During a session in the State Duma, International Relations Committee Deputy Chairman Leonid Slutskiy said that he did not see "any special circumstances or terrorist activity" in Patarkatsishvili's death, and Deputies Vladimir Nikitin and Gennadiy Gudkov doubted Georgian special services played a role. However, Nikitin and Gudkov pointed out that Saakashvili "clearly gained" from Patarkatsishvili's death, while the Georgian opposition lost a major source of financing. ¶8. (C) Deputies Vladimir Kolesnikov and Stanislav Govorukhin were more suspicious of Georgian foul play. Kolesnikov said he did not exclude the possibility that Saakashvili or oligarch-in-exile Boris Berezovskiy was involved in Patarkatsishvili's death and proposed that Russian authorities conduct a joint investigation. Govorukhin added that instead of looking for a "Russian footprint," investigators should focus on Georgia's possible involvement, underscoring Patarkatsishvili's "complex relations" with Saakashvili. However, both deputies stressed that the investigation should be objective and complete. BURNS