FORMER PM PRIMAKOV ON US-GOR DIALOGUE, MD, MAP,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000387

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON RS
SUBJECT: FORMER PM PRIMAKOV ON US-GOR DIALOGUE, MD, MAP,
KOSOVO, MEPP

Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In a February 12 meeting with the
Ambassador, former Prime Minister Primakov praised his
dialogue with Dr. Kissinger and pushed for strategic
reengagement on missile defense. He related Putin's
unhappiness over the perceived shift in the post-2 2 U.S.
offer, but argued that a compromise was still possible on a
joint U.S.-Russia-Europe architecture. Primakov complained
about a lack of respect towards Russia, embodied in the
Jackson-Vanik amendment, and warned that extending MAP to
Ukraine and Georgia would confirm views that the U.S. was
imposing its views on Europe. Truculent over Georgia, he
warned that any GOG military action against Abkhazia would
spark a North Caucasus uprising, and questioned why the U.S.
was generating pressure on Russia with the prospect of
Kosovo's independence. Primakov said the decision to forgive
Iraqi debt had been difficult domestically. While
reiterating the need to engage Hamas, Primakov was
pessimistic about the Moscow conference, noting planning
seemed to have stalled. Primakov urged us to see Moscow's
diplomacy as an "organic extension" of Annapolis. Arguing
that Syria influenced, but did not control, events in
Lebanon, Primakov urged concerted U.S. and Russian engagement
to wean Asad from Iran. End Summary

Kissinger-Primakov "Wise Man" Dialogue
--------------


2. (C) In a February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, former
Prime Minister Primakov said he was pleased with the informal
dialogue that he and Dr. Kissinger had established, noting
that the participants on both sides were solid and not in it
for the publicity. The conversations were frank and there
was broad consensus on the most important issues. Primakov
said he particularly welcomed the opportunity to meet with
the President and his advisers, commenting that at the very
highest levels in both governments there was a realistic
appraisal of the importance of the bilateral relationship and
an appreciation of the strategic cooperation that could still
be achieved. Primakov was disdainful of both the Russian and
American bureaucracies -- the governments were built on
"sand."

Missile Defense: Opportunity Still Exists
--------------


3. (C) Noting that Putin had met with him before his
January meetings in Washington, Primakov reiterated the
Russian leadership's disappointment with the outcome of the
October 2 2 negotiations. While Putin had hoped for more
radical forms of joint cooperation in missile defense, he
found the proposals advanced by Secretary Gates, including
the idea of a permanent Russian presence at the Polish and
Czech sites, a "positive step forward." Primakov did not
find subsequent U.S. explanations of Polish and Czech
sovereignty convincing, nor did he accept that a simple
misunderstanding had occurred: "we understand what permanent
presence means." Russian cooperation had been pushed away,
he charged.


4. (C) Primakov argued that a modus vivendi was needed on
missile defense, since the optimal outcome was a system that
was jointly conceived, deployed, and shared by the U.S.,
Europe, and Russia. A true partnership would eliminate
suspicions in Russia over the target of the U.S. military
activity. Reflecting back upon negotiations with Secretary
Albright, Primakov said that at a certain point the political
leadership on both sides has to say "agree," and force the
bureaucracies to implement the order.


5. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the Kissinger-Primakov
channel was useful in refocusing attention on the bilateral
relationship, and noted that discussions continued over how
best to approach the cluster of security and economic issues
in which the U.S. and Russia had mutual interests. Missile
defense, post-START arrangements, civilian nuclear
cooperation, and non-proliferation were areas in which the
U.S. and Russia had unique capabilities and responsibilities.
The next session of the 2 2, which could take place as early
as March, would provide another opportunity to look at these
issues as a package, while Putin remained in office.
Economic cooperation and Russian accession to WTO were also
areas of mutual interest, with the Ambassador noting USTR
efforts to work with Finance Minister Kudrin to help move
Russia across the finish line. Primakov welcomed U.S.
assistance, noting that Poland was changing its position on
Russian membership and flagging his own outreach to Saudi
Arabia, including a personal letter to Prince Bandar bin
Sultan.


6. (C) When pushed by the Ambassador, Primakov said that
there was still an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to
reach agreement on missile defense, provided that the ideas
that the Russian leadership thought it heard in October still
applied: a continuous Russian presence at the sites, their
delayed operationalization until there was objective evidence
of the Iranian threat, and a pause in concluding the Polish
and Czech agreements until after the U.S. and Russia had at
least made a maximum effort to agree upon an approach.
Primakov argued that missile defense could not be one-sided;
both sides would have to compromise. The fact that Iran
represented a real security threat to Russia created the
logic for closer cooperation with the U.S.; exaggeration of
the Iranian threat, however, exacerbated concerns on the
Russian side over American intentions.

Respecting Russia
--------------


7. (C) Primakov argued that Russia was evolving in the
right direction, despite problems -- such as corruption --
which were evident to everyone. While Russia had "felt its
weakness" during the 1990's, reports of another year of eight
percent growth were testament to the country's recovery.
Some measures taken by the GOR were historically necessary,
such as breaking the political backs of those oligarchs whose
concentration of capital was obtained through the
privatization of massive state assets. Primakov emphasized
the extent to which big companies were stifling economic
development and squeezing small and medium businesses out of
the market. "Khodorkovskiy was necessary," he insisted,
while noting his own opposition to the disgraced oligarch's
arrest, because the oligarchs had proclaimed themselves the
"new masters of the country;" Khodorkovskiy's flaunting of
the government's writ was unacceptable. Primakov conceded
that the absence of political choice in Russia had reached an
"absurd" level, but noted that news of American primary
battles had effectively made that point among the Russian
elite.


8. (C) Primakov questioned the U.S. stance towards Russia,
which was reflected in the continued existence of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment. "How long have we spoken about
this?" Describing the amendment as ludicrous, particularly
against a backdrop of free immigration (with tens of
thousands of "Soviet Jews" returning to Russia),Primakov
said U.S. inaction was particularly irritating given the
lifting of the amendment against Ukraine. The impression was
that the U.S. sought to "restrain" Russia. Primakov swatted
away the idea of a return of the Cold War, as well as the
prospect of a unipolar world.

Georgian and Ukrainian MAP; Kosovo
--------------


9. (C) Primakov warned that MAP for Ukraine and Georgia
would be seen as a cynical imposition of American views on
the Alliance, since to speak of democracy in conjunction with
either country was "funny." It created the same angst in
Moscow as Russian efforts to build bases in Mexico would
unleash in Washington. Recounting a visit to Tbilisi a
couple of years ago, Primakov dwelled on the numbers of
American military that he ran across in the city center.
While the Ambassador noted our efforts to train Georgian
forces that were being dispatched to Iraq, Primakov disputed
the goal of Georgian preparations. If the idea was to invade
Abkhazia, he warned, Georgia would unleash a nightmare.
Russia would not be able to close its borders and sympathetic
neighbors would take matters into their own hands, with all
of the North Caucasus arriving in Tbilisi "in a week." The
situation was dangerous.


10. (C) Similarly, Primakov warned that Kosovo would
generate "enormous pressure" on the GOR to respond in kind.
Questioning why the Administration had not heeded the advice
of former U.S. officials Scowcroft, Eagleburger, and Bolton
in this regard, Primakov reiterated that "these are very
dangerous times for us." The Ambassador replied that no one
should underestimate the risks involved, but stressed that
the U.S. and a large majority of the EU states were prepared
to recognize Kosovo's independence in the very near future.
He urged Primakov to counsel the GOR to focus on those
important areas where cooperation could be deepened or
initiated, rather than let Serbia poison U.S.-Russian
relations.

Middle East
--------------


11. (C) The Ambassador welcomed the GOR decision to waive
93 percent of the Iraqi debt, which Primakov stressed had

been an unpopular decision to take at home. In response to
Primakov's pessimism over whether Iraq would honor an MOU on
economic cooperation, the Ambassador noted that FM Zebari had
been cautious in public, but privately recognized that
Russian firms were prepared to take certain risks to
establish a presence in Iraq.


12. (C) Primakov chided the U.S. for not engaging with
Hamas, asserting that Americans were "meeting with Baathists
all over Europe." Hamas was a problem, Primakov stressed,
and that is why its leadership needed to be engaged.
Referring to his multiple conversations with Hamas leader
Khalid Mishaal, Primakov argued that while the Hamas
leadership couldn't recognize Israel outright, for its own
internal reasons, its formulation of recognizing 1967 borders
should be sufficient as a starting point. Israel and the
U.S. could either chip away at Hamas, or face losing out to
extremists entirely. Primakov noted that he had taken
Mishaal to task for the continued rocket attacks, which
resulted foremost in the suffering of innocent Palestinian
civilians who bore the brunt of Israeli retaliation.
Primakov attributed the attacks to the mindset of a "military
wing," which had yet to become used to acting as a political
party responsible for the broader interests of its members.
Primakov said the Israeli blockade was ineffective, and
risked spoiling the situation on the West Bank as well, but
conceded that Abu Mazen remained opposed to GOR efforts to
effect a Palestinian reconciliation. "He hates Hamas."


13. (C) Primakov was pessimistic on the prospects of the
Moscow conference, noting that nobody is talking about
serious preparations. He pitched the importance of continued
U.S. consultation with Moscow; rather than Moscow being a
pit-stop on the road to a Washington-dictated outcome,
Russian diplomacy should be an "organic extension" to
American efforts in the region. The U.S. is the essential
actor in the region, he stressed, and the only country able
to strike fear in the Israeli leadership. Primakov
attributed American influence to the milder than expected
Winograd report, arguing that Olmert owed his position to the
U.S. The more attention that the U.S. devoted to the peace
process, the better the prospects for advancement. At the
same time, the parameters that the U.S. set would define the
final outcome. If America agreed that Israeli checkpoints
and the security wall made "Swiss cheese" out of the
Palestinian Authority, only then would it be recognized as
Swiss cheese. While the U.S. remained the final arbiter,
Primakov argued that Russia could be helpful in drawing the
Syrians into the tent; if Syria did not agree with the
outcome, it would brush any settlement aside.


14. (C) The Ambassador underscored deep disappointment over
Syrian tactics in the wake of the Annapolis conference and,
in particular, its stymieing of the selection of General
Suleiman as the compromise presidential candidate in Lebanon.
Noting Saudi and Egyptian frustrations as well, the
Ambassador argued that Syria had overplayed its hand and by
urging a harder line in Lebanon had betrayed the confidence
of the international community. Primakov agreed Asad's
tactics were short-sighted, but argued that the problem of
Lebanon was not entirely of Syria's making. The Lebanese
factions were engaged in horse-trading; it was something they
did passionately and well. While the Syrians may think that
they have an ace up their sleeve, the facts on the ground
would be determined by the Lebanese factions; Syria had
influence, but no control. Russia and the U.S., Primakov
commented, could push Syria in a positive direction, while
Iran's sway was negative. Splitting Asad from Iran remained
the task at hand, Primakov argued, with a nod to the Baker
Report. The Ambassador noted that positive Syrian behavior
could increase international interest in the Moscow
conference, and overcome FM Livni's doubts about the proposed
session.
BURNS