FORMER PM PRIMAKOV ON US-GOR DIALOGUE, MD, MAP,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000387 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/12/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON RS SUBJECT: FORMER PM PRIMAKOV ON US-GOR DIALOGUE, MD, MAP, KOSOVO, MEPP Classified By: Ambassador William J. Burns: Reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, former Prime Minister Primakov praised his dialogue with Dr. Kissinger and pushed for strategic reengagement on missile defense. He related Putin's unhappiness over the perceived shift in the post-2 2 U.S. offer, but argued that a compromise was still possible on a joint U.S.-Russia-Europe architecture. Primakov complained about a lack of respect towards Russia, embodied in the Jackson-Vanik amendment, and warned that extending MAP to Ukraine and Georgia would confirm views that the U.S. was imposing its views on Europe. Truculent over Georgia, he warned that any GOG military action against Abkhazia would spark a North Caucasus uprising, and questioned why the U.S. was generating pressure on Russia with the prospect of Kosovo's independence. Primakov said the decision to forgive Iraqi debt had been difficult domestically. While reiterating the need to engage Hamas, Primakov was pessimistic about the Moscow conference, noting planning seemed to have stalled. Primakov urged us to see Moscow's diplomacy as an "organic extension" of Annapolis. Arguing that Syria influenced, but did not control, events in Lebanon, Primakov urged concerted U.S. and Russian engagement to wean Asad from Iran. End Summary Kissinger-Primakov "Wise Man" Dialogue -------------- ¶2. (C) In a February 12 meeting with the Ambassador, former Prime Minister Primakov said he was pleased with the informal dialogue that he and Dr. Kissinger had established, noting that the participants on both sides were solid and not in it for the publicity. The conversations were frank and there was broad consensus on the most important issues. Primakov said he particularly welcomed the opportunity to meet with the President and his advisers, commenting that at the very highest levels in both governments there was a realistic appraisal of the importance of the bilateral relationship and an appreciation of the strategic cooperation that could still be achieved. Primakov was disdainful of both the Russian and American bureaucracies -- the governments were built on "sand." Missile Defense: Opportunity Still Exists -------------- ¶3. (C) Noting that Putin had met with him before his January meetings in Washington, Primakov reiterated the Russian leadership's disappointment with the outcome of the October 2 2 negotiations. While Putin had hoped for more radical forms of joint cooperation in missile defense, he found the proposals advanced by Secretary Gates, including the idea of a permanent Russian presence at the Polish and Czech sites, a "positive step forward." Primakov did not find subsequent U.S. explanations of Polish and Czech sovereignty convincing, nor did he accept that a simple misunderstanding had occurred: "we understand what permanent presence means." Russian cooperation had been pushed away, he charged. ¶4. (C) Primakov argued that a modus vivendi was needed on missile defense, since the optimal outcome was a system that was jointly conceived, deployed, and shared by the U.S., Europe, and Russia. A true partnership would eliminate suspicions in Russia over the target of the U.S. military activity. Reflecting back upon negotiations with Secretary Albright, Primakov said that at a certain point the political leadership on both sides has to say "agree," and force the bureaucracies to implement the order. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador agreed that the Kissinger-Primakov channel was useful in refocusing attention on the bilateral relationship, and noted that discussions continued over how best to approach the cluster of security and economic issues in which the U.S. and Russia had mutual interests. Missile defense, post-START arrangements, civilian nuclear cooperation, and non-proliferation were areas in which the U.S. and Russia had unique capabilities and responsibilities. The next session of the 2 2, which could take place as early as March, would provide another opportunity to look at these issues as a package, while Putin remained in office. Economic cooperation and Russian accession to WTO were also areas of mutual interest, with the Ambassador noting USTR efforts to work with Finance Minister Kudrin to help move Russia across the finish line. Primakov welcomed U.S. assistance, noting that Poland was changing its position on Russian membership and flagging his own outreach to Saudi Arabia, including a personal letter to Prince Bandar bin Sultan. ¶6. (C) When pushed by the Ambassador, Primakov said that there was still an opportunity for the U.S. and Russia to reach agreement on missile defense, provided that the ideas that the Russian leadership thought it heard in October still applied: a continuous Russian presence at the sites, their delayed operationalization until there was objective evidence of the Iranian threat, and a pause in concluding the Polish and Czech agreements until after the U.S. and Russia had at least made a maximum effort to agree upon an approach. Primakov argued that missile defense could not be one-sided; both sides would have to compromise. The fact that Iran represented a real security threat to Russia created the logic for closer cooperation with the U.S.; exaggeration of the Iranian threat, however, exacerbated concerns on the Russian side over American intentions. Respecting Russia -------------- ¶7. (C) Primakov argued that Russia was evolving in the right direction, despite problems -- such as corruption -- which were evident to everyone. While Russia had "felt its weakness" during the 1990's, reports of another year of eight percent growth were testament to the country's recovery. Some measures taken by the GOR were historically necessary, such as breaking the political backs of those oligarchs whose concentration of capital was obtained through the privatization of massive state assets. Primakov emphasized the extent to which big companies were stifling economic development and squeezing small and medium businesses out of the market. "Khodorkovskiy was necessary," he insisted, while noting his own opposition to the disgraced oligarch's arrest, because the oligarchs had proclaimed themselves the "new masters of the country;" Khodorkovskiy's flaunting of the government's writ was unacceptable. Primakov conceded that the absence of political choice in Russia had reached an "absurd" level, but noted that news of American primary battles had effectively made that point among the Russian elite. ¶8. (C) Primakov questioned the U.S. stance towards Russia, which was reflected in the continued existence of the Jackson-Vanik amendment. "How long have we spoken about this?" Describing the amendment as ludicrous, particularly against a backdrop of free immigration (with tens of thousands of "Soviet Jews" returning to Russia),Primakov said U.S. inaction was particularly irritating given the lifting of the amendment against Ukraine. The impression was that the U.S. sought to "restrain" Russia. Primakov swatted away the idea of a return of the Cold War, as well as the prospect of a unipolar world. Georgian and Ukrainian MAP; Kosovo -------------- ¶9. (C) Primakov warned that MAP for Ukraine and Georgia would be seen as a cynical imposition of American views on the Alliance, since to speak of democracy in conjunction with either country was "funny." It created the same angst in Moscow as Russian efforts to build bases in Mexico would unleash in Washington. Recounting a visit to Tbilisi a couple of years ago, Primakov dwelled on the numbers of American military that he ran across in the city center. While the Ambassador noted our efforts to train Georgian forces that were being dispatched to Iraq, Primakov disputed the goal of Georgian preparations. If the idea was to invade Abkhazia, he warned, Georgia would unleash a nightmare. Russia would not be able to close its borders and sympathetic neighbors would take matters into their own hands, with all of the North Caucasus arriving in Tbilisi "in a week." The situation was dangerous. ¶10. (C) Similarly, Primakov warned that Kosovo would generate "enormous pressure" on the GOR to respond in kind. Questioning why the Administration had not heeded the advice of former U.S. officials Scowcroft, Eagleburger, and Bolton in this regard, Primakov reiterated that "these are very dangerous times for us." The Ambassador replied that no one should underestimate the risks involved, but stressed that the U.S. and a large majority of the EU states were prepared to recognize Kosovo's independence in the very near future. He urged Primakov to counsel the GOR to focus on those important areas where cooperation could be deepened or initiated, rather than let Serbia poison U.S.-Russian relations. Middle East -------------- ¶11. (C) The Ambassador welcomed the GOR decision to waive 93 percent of the Iraqi debt, which Primakov stressed had been an unpopular decision to take at home. In response to Primakov's pessimism over whether Iraq would honor an MOU on economic cooperation, the Ambassador noted that FM Zebari had been cautious in public, but privately recognized that Russian firms were prepared to take certain risks to establish a presence in Iraq. ¶12. (C) Primakov chided the U.S. for not engaging with Hamas, asserting that Americans were "meeting with Baathists all over Europe." Hamas was a problem, Primakov stressed, and that is why its leadership needed to be engaged. Referring to his multiple conversations with Hamas leader Khalid Mishaal, Primakov argued that while the Hamas leadership couldn't recognize Israel outright, for its own internal reasons, its formulation of recognizing 1967 borders should be sufficient as a starting point. Israel and the U.S. could either chip away at Hamas, or face losing out to extremists entirely. Primakov noted that he had taken Mishaal to task for the continued rocket attacks, which resulted foremost in the suffering of innocent Palestinian civilians who bore the brunt of Israeli retaliation. Primakov attributed the attacks to the mindset of a "military wing," which had yet to become used to acting as a political party responsible for the broader interests of its members. Primakov said the Israeli blockade was ineffective, and risked spoiling the situation on the West Bank as well, but conceded that Abu Mazen remained opposed to GOR efforts to effect a Palestinian reconciliation. "He hates Hamas." ¶13. (C) Primakov was pessimistic on the prospects of the Moscow conference, noting that nobody is talking about serious preparations. He pitched the importance of continued U.S. consultation with Moscow; rather than Moscow being a pit-stop on the road to a Washington-dictated outcome, Russian diplomacy should be an "organic extension" to American efforts in the region. The U.S. is the essential actor in the region, he stressed, and the only country able to strike fear in the Israeli leadership. Primakov attributed American influence to the milder than expected Winograd report, arguing that Olmert owed his position to the U.S. The more attention that the U.S. devoted to the peace process, the better the prospects for advancement. At the same time, the parameters that the U.S. set would define the final outcome. If America agreed that Israeli checkpoints and the security wall made "Swiss cheese" out of the Palestinian Authority, only then would it be recognized as Swiss cheese. While the U.S. remained the final arbiter, Primakov argued that Russia could be helpful in drawing the Syrians into the tent; if Syria did not agree with the outcome, it would brush any settlement aside. ¶14. (C) The Ambassador underscored deep disappointment over Syrian tactics in the wake of the Annapolis conference and, in particular, its stymieing of the selection of General Suleiman as the compromise presidential candidate in Lebanon. Noting Saudi and Egyptian frustrations as well, the Ambassador argued that Syria had overplayed its hand and by urging a harder line in Lebanon had betrayed the confidence of the international community. Primakov agreed Asad's tactics were short-sighted, but argued that the problem of Lebanon was not entirely of Syria's making. The Lebanese factions were engaged in horse-trading; it was something they did passionately and well. While the Syrians may think that they have an ace up their sleeve, the facts on the ground would be determined by the Lebanese factions; Syria had influence, but no control. Russia and the U.S., Primakov commented, could push Syria in a positive direction, while Iran's sway was negative. Splitting Asad from Iran remained the task at hand, Primakov argued, with a nod to the Baker Report. The Ambassador noted that positive Syrian behavior could increase international interest in the Moscow conference, and overcome FM Livni's doubts about the proposed session. BURNS