RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH OSSETIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003753 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV RS GG SUBJECT: RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH OSSETIA Classified By: Pol M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a December 24 meeting, Russia's ambassador to South Ossetia, Elbrus Kargiev, told us "president" Kokoity needed to gain experience in running a peacetime government, while making quiet progress on security and economic development instead of overreacting to accusations in the press. Kargiev rejected our call for Russia to influence South Ossetian authorities to allow more monitors into the region, citing South Ossetia's "sovereignty." However, he noted it was essential for a multi-ethnic South Ossetia to work with international organizations to ensure security and the return of IDPs. Kargiev called for an independent international commission to confirm the technical viability of resuming interrupted gas deliveries from Georgia, charging that the GoG was playing politics in cutting off gas. Kargiev said that Russia's border demarcation policy was to recognize Soviet-era administrative boundaries. According to Special Envoy for South Ossetia, Yuriy Popov, Kargiev's new assignment will be his last, and is meant to secure him the title of Ambassador before he retires. Karigiev expects to take up his post in February 2009. End Summary. -------------- Support for South Ossetian government -------------- ¶2. (C) In a December 24 meeting, Russia's ambassador to South Ossetia Elbrus Kargiev provided muted criticism of the South Ossetian "president," stating Kokoity needed learn how to control a peacetime government, including by gaining experience in running a bureaucracy. Kargiev endorsed Kokoity's call for a strong presidium, "like Russia's prime ministry," maximizing the government's effectiveness by centralizing power and financial control. Instead of overreacting to accusations in the press, including the December 4 interview with former security council secretary Anatoliy Barankevich, Kokoity should make quiet progress on security and economic development. Kargiev called for an independent committee to investigate former Prime Minister Yuriy Morozov's allegations of government corruption in South Ossetia, but made mild fun of Barankovich's grandiose claims of leadership during the attack on Tskhinvali. (Note: In addition to suggesting Kokoity was a coward, Barankovich accused the "president" of corruption, abuse of Georgian prisoners, and overall incompetence. End Note.) ¶3. (C) Noting his recent travel to Tskhinvali to present his credentials, Kargiev commented on the new sense of independence and self-worth among South Ossetians, and asserted that even small peoples have the right to independence. Acknowledging our point that the international community would not fall in line with Russia's recognition of South Ossetia, Kargiev made the case for its sustained independence. Although there was little industry -- Kargiev noted machine-building, agriculture (especially fruits),and tourism -- Kargiev argued that South Ossetia was economically viable. Russia's military base in South Ossetia would provide the stability needed to develop the economy. He sidestepped questions over Kokoity's previously expressed interest in joining the Russian Federation, noting only that North and South Ossetians were separated by more than a border, with diverging linguistic, clan, and social developments complicating any potential merger. -------------- Cooperation with international organizations -------------- ¶4. (C) Kargiev rejected our call for Russia to influence South Ossetian authorities to allow more monitors into the region, citing South Ossetia's "sovereignty." Kargiev supported South Ossetia's refusal to accept an OSCE mission in South Ossetia that was part of the Tbilisi OSCE mission. However, as part of a lasting conflict resolution, Kargiev said Georgians would have to feel safe living in South Ossetia, and South Ossetia had to work with international organizations. Kargiev said Russia was urging Kokoity to allow Georgian IDPs to return, and to make South Ossetia a multi-ethnic state. -------------- Borders -------------- ¶5. (C) While Kargiev declined to comment on Russia's decision to reoccupy the Perevi checkpoint, he insisted that Russia's policy was to recognize Soviet-era administrative boundaries; walking back that recognition, he suggested, would open a Pandora's box of post-Soviet territorial MOSCOW 00003753 002 OF 002 tensions. He also applied this to the Akhalgori question, affirming that Leningori district was part of South Ossetia according to Soviet-era border demarcations. --- Gas --- ¶6. (C) Kargiev called for an independent international commission to confirm the technical viability of restoring the interrupted gas deliveries from Georgia, charging that the GoG was playing politics in cutting off gas. He rejected Tbilisi's assertions that poor weather had prevented the removal of land mines, and said Russian experts had inspected the facilities. Lavrov in his December 23 press conference with Abkhaz "Foreign Minister" Shamba affirmed the pipeline's operability and challenged Georgia to provide the gas. -------------- Biographics -------------- ¶7. (C) Kargiev was most recently General Counsel in Trabzon, Turkey, and earlier served as deputy prime minister and minister for education in North Ossetia. While his family no longer resides in Vladikavkaz, Kargiev is intimate with the clan and class cleavages that mark North Ossetia's relations with its southern neighbor. According to Special Envoy for South Ossetia, Yuriy Popov, Kargiev's new assignment will be his last, and meant to secure him the title of Ambassador before he retired. Karigiev expects to take up his post in February 2009. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Charming and friendly, Kargiev is unlikely to play a decisive role in GoR policy formulation on South Ossetia. RUBIN