DFM Ryabkov meets Codel Tauscher: Iran, Missile Defense,

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003728 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS SUBJECT: DFM Ryabkov meets Codel Tauscher: Iran, Missile Defense, Bilateral Relations ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Meeting the Codel Tauscher delegation on December 16, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov stressed that Russia wanted improved relations with the U.S., even as he acknowledged the "negative mindset" of the Russian public and the damage that issues like NATO enlargement had produced in the relationship. He urged "bold moves" by the new administration towards Iran, and reiterated Russian arguments against further sanctions; pressed for an alternate approach, he indicated Russia might produce a "food for thought" paper on the way ahead, but judged the P5+1 proposal to still be relevant. He discounted Iranian statements on missile development as fodder for the domestic audience. Ryabkov stressed the "great disconnect" over missile defense and reviewed GOR opposition to the Polish and Czech sites. Noting there was no easy antidote, he urged re-engagement. While Ryabkov was skeptical of "total change" under the next administration, he welcomed any moves away from "fait accompli diplomacy." End Summary U.S.-Russia Relations -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In a December 16 meeting with Rep. Ellen Tauscher (D-CA), Rep. Loretta Sanchez (D-CA),Rep. Rick Larsen (D-WA),Rep. Doug Lamborn (R-CO),staff members, and the Ambassador, DFM Ryabkov welcomed intensified congressional exchanges, noting they comprised a "vital core" to the bilateral relationship. Ryabkov stressed that Russia was "very, very focused and engaged" on the future of U.S.-Russian relations, which were indispensable both for Russian interests and Russia's place in the world. While the agenda was complex and the "history not easy," Russia was prepared to look forward; rather than focusing on differences, Russia sought increased understanding. Government and congressional ties could achieve a more positive agenda. Ryabkov said that Moscow was not simply "reflecting" on the relationship in advance of the change of U.S. administration, but continuing to engage, whether on piracy and the Middle East peace process, or CFE negotiations in Geneva on December 17. As the new administration settled into place, Ryabkov predicted that the level of engagement would only intensify. ¶3. (SBU) In response to the Members' emphasis on the importance of U.S.-Russian relations, the need to restore trust and move forward on overlapping strategic interests, and their reaffirmation of U.S. intent to counter an Iranian nuclear threat, but hope that Russia could be a partner in missile defense, Ryabkov reiterated that the prospect of closer U.S.-Russian relations was "very attractive to everyone here," while conceding that anti-Americanism had grown over the last several years. Ryabkov reiterated that Russia's ability to project power and play a responsible role would in part be defined by its relationship with the U.S. Nevertheless, the negative mindset of the Russian public would be difficult to transform, with issues like NATO enlargement negatively influencing overall Russian attitudes to the U.S. Ryabkov charged that the U.S. had acted in a way that neglected or ignored Russian core interests over the years, with the result that trust had eroded. Iran: Bold U.S. Initiative Required -------------- ¶4. (SBU) While reiterating Russian opposition to a nuclear Iran and the leadership's "tremendous efforts" to persuade Tehran to meet its international obligations, Ryabkov argued that Iran has "less than zero" confidence in the U.S. Similarly, the U.S. had no faith in the Iranian regime, underscoring the need for greater transparency and engagement between the two. Acknowledging that engagement was no panacea, Ryabkov noted the historically complex relations, but urged renewed American leadership in reaching out to Tehran. "Bold openings" by the President-elect could change the calculus, he argued, and tap into those elements of the leadership looking for a different paradigm of engagement. Ryabkov underscored Russian opposition to further sanctions, repeating that it consolidated public support behind the regime, and allowed Tehran to play on anti-U.S. and -Israeli sentiment. Russia did not accept that economic sanctions produced positive political change. "Psychological traits and national providence" produced a further rallying around the leaders, whenever Iran was cornered. Further deadlock would be the outcome. The Ambassador interjected that if Russia believed sanctions were a dead end, it should propose alternate strategies to preclude the emergence of a nuclear Iran. Ryabkov took the point and suggested that Russia would offer a food for thought paper. ¶5. (SBU) Ryabkov judged that the P5+1 proposal was still relevant and welcomed a possible mid-level meeting before the December holidays. Acknowledging that the Iranians could "replay their melodies" while waiting for the next administration, Ryabkov argued again for a "bold move" and urged that engagement with Iran on a variety of regional issues be held out, if the leadership demonstrated it was serious about a freeze-for-a-freeze. Ryabkov noted that Russia constantly stressed engagement over sanctions, MOSCOW 00003728 002 OF 002 because the latter were constantly "mis- and over-interpreted." Noting the "extraordinary speculation" prompted by UNSCR 1835, Ryabkov concluded that there was no alternative to engagement with the Supreme Leader and Ahmedinejad. Ryabkov urged the offer of a "reasonable alternative" to the development of enrichment capabilities, commenting that there was still no proof of advanced missile technology. While Tehran trumpeted its missile achievements, the statements were aimed at a domestic audience. The Iranians underestimated the extent to which their statements solidified U.S. and European opinions, with Ryabkov reiterating that Iranian boasts were designed to show a domestic audience that the country was advancing. Missile Defense: The Great Disconnect -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Ryabkov stressed the "great disconnect" in perceptions over what missile defense represents, the threat it targeted, and the means for resolving the dispute. He underscored that missile defense changed the security environment in Russia's neighborhood and listed Russian concerns: the GOR could not be certain of future enhancements, remained unhappy with "the geography chosen," was "not ready to be satisfied" by the transparency and confidence building measures offered, which were weaker than those first proposed during the October 2007 2+2 meeting, and did not believe that this was just about Iran. The absence of trust in U.S.-Russian relations intensified the belief that the increasing strands of U.S. missile defense activity "visible in many regions" would lead to a "very different configuration" in the future. ¶7. (SBU) Ryabkov said there was no easy antidote to the standoff. The U.S. had engaged in "fait accompli" policymaking over the last years and had wasted opportunities to engage with Russia. If that trend continued, he warned, trust and confidence in the U.S. would worsen. Ryabkov acknowledged without elaboration the perception that Russian behavior had also worsened, pushing again for "early and frequent" engagement. While the extraordinary was not achievable just by leaders meeting or experts negotiating, Ryabkov urged rejuvenation of a process that would move both countries away from a legacy of "mistrust and mutual discomfort." What Next Under the Obama Administration? -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Ryabkov polled the Representatives for their views on what Russia should anticipate under the next administration, noting his personal belief that any policy changes would be evolutionary, the result of "adding and subtracting," with "total change not possible." While the Representatives underscored that the U.S. strategic objective of preventing Iran from becoming nuclear power would not change, they suggested a change in tone, a greater use of soft power, a willingness to listen, an interest in reengagement with Russia, and a move away from foreign policy fait accompli should be expected. Ryabkov welcomed the advice, ranging from "be very optimistic" to "don't be overly optimistic, but optimistic nonetheless," adding that more dialogue would produce the greater confidence required to generate the reasonable solutions to the challenges on the U.S.-Russian agenda. ¶9. (SBU) The delegation cleared this message. RUBIN