SENATOR LUGAR: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR U.S. RELATIONS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003708 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV EFIN MARR PARM KNNP OREP RS IR AF SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR U.S. RELATIONS ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Senator Lugar heard a mixed, but mostly positive, message on Russian receptivity towards rebuilding U.S.-Russian relations, with a range of officials and respected observers calling for a return to the official diplomatic architecture that once governed bilateral dialogue. There was broad agreement that arms control must return to its former pride of place, with the necessity of completing a post-START treaty by December 2009 adding an element of urgency to resuming presidentially endorsed negotiations. While these interlocutors demurred from endorsing additional sanctions on Iran, they described the Middle East, Afghanistan, the international economic crisis (and its relationship to energy and food security),and European security (including a review of missile defense cooperation) as natural agenda items for renewed engagement. Largely placing the onus on the U.S. to revitalize relations in the wake of Georgia, they pointed to "123," WTO, and Jackson-Vanik as near-term deliverables, while arguing the new administration should realize that Russia would not walk back its recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. They argued that a dialogue on human rights and democracy would be more successful within the framework of a robust bilateral relationship, and readily agreed with our view that the draft amendments to the law on treason are "Stalinist" in tone. End Summary Interest, but Trepidation, in Bilateral Relations -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) During his December 16-20 visit to Moscow, Senator Lugar heard a generally positive message on the degree of Russian willingness to reinvest in the U.S. relationship, with a range of views on the substantive components of the agenda. Former PM Primakov argued the desire to rid the relationship of its current tension was "palpable," while Chairman of the Federation Council's International Relations Committee Margelov welcomed the positive signal that was being sent by the dispatch of three congressional delegations to Moscow in December. "We've been waiting for this signal," Margelov commented, adding that the international community suffered when U.S.-Russian relations frayed. Commenting that "hope was on the way" in our bilateral relations, Margelov rued the squandering of trust and confidence, which he blamed on decisionmakers that were wedded to a Cold War mentality. However, former Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and former Ambassador to the U.S. Vladimir Lukin struck a cautionary note, emphasizing the degree to which public opinion in Russia was jaundiced towards the U.S., as a result of dashed expectations over the last eight years and the rupture over Georgia, with the feeling widespread that the "onus" was on the U.S. to make amends. Rebuilding Diplomatic Architecture -------------- ¶3. (SBU) A consistent message throughout Senator Lugar's consultations was the need to restore a formal architecture to the relationship. Ivanov, Lukin, Primakov and Margelov were open to different proposals, but pointed to the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission as one model of engagement that propelled the bureaucracy to be responsive. Ivanov suggested the creation of a U.S.-Russian "transition team" that could lay the foundation for the first Medvedev-Obama meeting, and criticized the absence of summitry in the bilateral relations. One-off meetings were not sufficient to achieve results, given the difficult issues that crowded the bilateral agenda, he argued. Margelov agreed, citing a conversation he had with former SecDef Cohen on the need for a more "disciplined dialogue." The original Camp David Checklist drawn up by Presidents Bush and Putin, Margelov complained, was never institutionalized. Margelov welcomed the Senator's suggestion of a resumption of in-depth conferences (e.g. the Aspen Institute congressional seminars),and noted his own interest in raising the profile of U.S.-Russian parliamentary exchanges, both committee-to-committee and the Senate-Federation Council Joint Working Group. While Primakov and Lukin endorsed their respective track-two efforts (i.e., the Kissinger "wise men" dialogue, and Carnegie human rights dialogue),Eurasia Foundation's Andrey Kortunov made the general point that the bilateral relationship was too narrowly grounded. Back to the Past: Return of Arms Control -------------- ¶4. (SBU) Interlocutors were unanimous on the need for arms control to return to its pride of place in U.S.-Russian relations, noting that the December 2009 expiration of START provided a natural focal point for the new administration. Margelov, citing a Russian proverb, said all good new things are simply old things that have been forgotten. After 15 years of strategic neglect (with the exception of CTR, Margelov hastened to add),post-START provided an important and achievable deliverable to showcase a new U.S.-Russia partnership. Primakov hailed the pragmatism that he thought characterized the Obama team's approach to arms control, and argued that achieving an agreement on post-START could be a centerpiece to the new administration's initial efforts with Russia. Ivanov, Lukin, and Kortunov separately agreed, noting that even if an MOSCOW 00003708 002 OF 003 agreement wasn't concluded by December 2009, the first meeting between Presidents Obama and Medvedev could kick-start intensive negotiations, and provide ballast to a new architecture in U.S.-Russian relations. At a Carnegie Center conference marking the 15th anniversary of the U.S.-Ukraine-Russia Trilateral Agreement, defense analyst Aleksandr Golts told the Senator that in the "complete absence of trust" between Russia and the U.S., the rigors of arms control verification could rebuild habits of cooperation and engagement. Iran: Little Appetite for Sanctions -------------- ¶5. (SBU) Pressed by the Senator and Ambassador to identify how Russia could be more helpful on Iran, interlocutors declined to endorse more sanctions as a means of persuading Tehran to meets its international obligations. Noting that there were divisions within the Iranian leadership, with some opposing a further radicalization of Tehran's policy, Primakov warned against providing hardliners with a pretext to rally public opinion against the West. While pushing hard for direct negotiations between the new Administration and Tehran, Primakov sidestepped the Ambassador's proposal that Russia match greater U.S. diplomatic carrots with support for additional sanctions. Primakov argued that any toughening of the Russian line during a period of Iranian diplomatic engagement with the U.S. would send a perverse signal to Tehran that Russia opposed its dialogue with the West. Only after all diplomatic means had been exhausted, Primakov maintained, could sanctions sequentially be taken up. Middle East: Building on Annapolis -------------- ¶6. (SBU) Russian interest in building on the Annapolis process was stressed by interlocutors as another area in which U.S.-Russian relations could deepen. Primakov repeated Lavrov's message to Senator Lugar that Russia wanted to build responsibly on the Annapolis conference. While the U.S. was indispensable to Middle East Peace, Primakov stressed that Russia brought to the table a set of relationships with Syria, Iran, and Hamas that complemented U.S. diplomacy in the region. By redoubling joint efforts, the U.S. and Russia would be able to "divide and conquer" players in the Middle East peace process. Separately, fellow Middle East hand Margelov agreed, seeing little difference in U.S. and Russia strategic goals in the region. Afghanistan: Missing Element -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Margelov and Kortunov separately stressed Afghanistan as an area where the U.S. and Russia had failed to coordinate efforts, despite overlapping interests. Margelov welcomed the emphasis that the new administration intended to place on Afghanistan, and stressed that concern over the deteriorating situation had helped produce the Russian-German transit agreement. Margelov marveled that the transit of German troops over Russian territory raised no eyebrows among a population still steeped in WW2 history and emotion; he attributed it to the "obvious fact" that NATO was defending Russia's southern flank. While there were clear areas where Russia would not be helpful, such as in sending forces to Afghanistan, Margelov pushed for more expansive thinking on military transit (noting the weakness inherent in over-reliance on Pakistan), counter-narcotics, and border security. Margelov floated the idea of a quintet session to explore cooperation on Afghanistan, consisting of the U.S., Russia, China, the UK and France. While former FM Ivanov thought cooperation on Afghanistan was too ambitious given the current level of distrust, he urged the U.S. to set aside its phobia of CSTO; working with the organization would unlock Russian cooperation and send a welcome message that the U.S. did not dispute Russia's right to engage regionally with its neighbors, even as the U.S. sought to protect its strategic interests in the area. European Security/MD: Giving a Nod to Medvedev -------------- - ¶8. (SBU) Kortunov expressed concern that the calendar would force the administration to take an early public line reaffirming support for Georgian and Ukrainian membership in NATO, which could further inflame Russian public opinion. He urged that the U.S. "sweeten the pot" by according serious attention to Medvedev's proposal for a European Security Treaty (EST) and, representing the liberal wing of the Russian political spectrum, asserted that NATO did not have to be the beginning and end of European security. Ivanov argued that NATO expansion begged the question of NATO's mission, and said that the U.S. was wrong to view EST as a Trojan horse designed to bring down the Euro-Atlantic alliance. The fact remained, Ivanov stressed, that NATO enlargement did not stop terrorist bombings in Madrid or London. Both Ivanov and Margelov urged a return to "old topics," but said dialogue had to take place "on a new level." The lack of trust in the U.S., Ivanov commented, fed the Russian view MOSCOW 00003708 003 OF 003 that NATO's enlargement was really about encirclement. When missile defense was raised with the Senator, it was with the expectation of a comprehensive U.S. review, with Kortunov arguing that negotiating a new ABM treaty could answer Russian concerns over the scope of U.S. missile defense objectives. Financial Crisis: Weathering the Storm -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Senator Lugar heard consistent calls for deepening an economic dialogue, with energy and food security two desired components to bilateral conversations. Primakov argued that a new system of international finance would need to evolve that better protected the average consumer. While Russia had trumpeted itself as a safe economic harbor during the international economic storm, the assertion was proven false. The lesson that Russia had drawn from the crisis, Primakov noted, was that foreign sources could no longer serve as the primary mechanism for investment and financing in Russia. Margelov welcomed both bilateral and multilateral discussions of the crisis, commenting that the G20 was useful "transition format" until a broadening of the G8 and compromise on UNSC reform were reached. A common critique of U.S.-Russian relations was that engagement was limited to a narrow elite; expanding business-to-business ties, in addition to other scientific and student exchanges, was touted to the Senator as a long-term corrective to the current crisis of confidence. Bellwethers: 123, WTO, and Jackson-Vanik -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Reflecting the widespread Russian view that the burden of proof is on the U.S. to demonstrate its sincerity in rebuilding relations with Russia, Senator Lugar's interlocutors honed in on the civil nuclear "123" agreement, WTO, and Jackson-Vanik as three important bellwethers of the new Administration. Primakov welcomed the Senator's support for 123, and expressed hope that momentum would build in Congress for moving forward on the initiative, thereby unlocking civilian nuclear energy cooperation and reinforcing U.S. and Russian leadership in promoting the responsible, safe, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Mention of Jackson-Vanik elicited mostly groans and the view that this was a U.S. domestic issue; Russia would not accept any "linkage" on the antiquated Soviet-era legislation. Georgia: New Realities -------------- ¶11. (SBU) Georgia was touched on only lightly, with two points being underscored: first, the U.S. blame-Russia-first response to the Georgian attack on Tskhinvali had deeply alienated the Russian public; and, second, whatever the differences in analysis of the origins of the crisis, there should be no expectation that Russia will walk back its recognition of South Ossetia and Georgia. Primakov, who lingered longest on Russia's justification for military action, argued for a rejuvenated diplomatic architecture and agenda in the context of making every possible effort to overcome the legacy of Georgia. Human Rights: Dialogue, but no Dictation -------------- ¶12. (SBU) In response to the Ambassador's emphasis on the need for a frank dialogue on issues of concern, specifically with respect to trend lines in Russia's political development, Lukin told Senator Lugar that Russians were more conservative than their government and attributed Russia's last eight years of economic success to Putin's establishment of a political "vertical of power." While this sparked a rise from Kortunov, who quoted polling data that 45 percent of Russians were dissatisfied with the direction of Russian policy, there was broader agreement that the U.S. needed to broach its concerns mindful of its tone and the diminished authority of the U.S. among the Russian public. When the Ambassador urged Ivanov and Lukin, as influential Russian voices, to speak up against the new draft law on treason, Lukin readily conceded that the legislation was "over the line" and Stalinist (with Ivanov joking darkly that he could conceivably be charged under the law just for coming to a Spaso lunch),but dismissed the impact of official U.S. statements. Instead, Lukin encouraged Americans who have special credibility in Russia to be in direct contact with Medvedev or Putin about it. There was broad agreement that U.S. concerns resonated when the relationship was on stronger footing. Political pot-shots and grosser forms of anti-Americanism were easier when both sides were disengaged and not invested in building a positive agenda. The Ambassador laid down a marker with Ivanov and Lukin that the release of imprisoned oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovskiy would send a powerful and positive signal to the U.S. RUBIN