FEAR, PARANOIA, AND TREASON - MOSCOW PREPARING FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003689

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/15/2017
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI
SUBJECT: FEAR, PARANOIA, AND TREASON - MOSCOW PREPARING FOR
CRISIS

REF: MOSCOW 03544

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Eric Rubin. Reason: 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary: As the economic crisis deepens, a
GOR-proposed expansion of the definition of espionage is
being interpreted as a blatant attempt to further restrict
and intimidate critics of the United Russia dominated
government from organizing any opposition to the present
power structure. In conjunction with a recent move to stop
jury trials for terrorism, espionage, and even mass disorder,
the proposal to change the definition of treason has ignited
a firestorm on the part of human rights groups and political
parties. While some within United Russia are concerned about
the legislation and ultimately expect Medvedev to reject the
change, a signal has nonetheless been sent to those, mainly
shapers of both elite and more popular opinion, that they
need to be careful in their dealings with foreigners at a
time when Russia is struggling to contend with the
consequences of a "foreign-produced" economic crisis.
Embassy will monitor the discussion of this proposal
carefully. We recommend that Washington consider
consultations with other governments on this matter and a
joint approach to the GOR to convey our concern for its
implications for bilateral and multilateral cooperation, not
to mention for Russian society itself. End Summary.

Legal Maneuvering
--------------


2. (SBU) The White House on December 12 proposed to the Duma
legislation that, if passed, would fundamentally broaden the
definitions of treason and espionage. The new language would
denote as treason "activity against the security of the
Russian Federation, including its constitutional order,
sovereignty, territorial and state integrity." (Currently,
the legislation defines treason as "hostile act" that
threaten the "foreign security of the Russian Federation.")
Analysis of the proposed legislation by USAID experts
suggests that the new language is extremely vague -- to the
extent that law enforcement bodies could accuse Russians
rendering "financial, technical, consulting, or other
assistance" to a foreign government or international or
foreign organizations of treason. Indeed, under those terms,
cooperation with Russian NGOs or individuals on programmatic
assistance programs, such as those managed by USAID, or even
work by FSNs in the Embassy, could be construed as criminal.


3. (SBU) Even before the proposed expanded definition, legal
experts here criticized the criminal code's provisions on
espionage for giving investigators too much discretion and
creating opportunities for abuse. Igor Trunov, a prominent
Moscow lawyer, told us that he believes many Russian laws
(especially the espionage laws) are written in a deliberately
vague manner, so as to give maximum possible discretion to
investigators. He himself has lobbied unsuccessfully for
tighter espionage laws. Instead, Trunov argued the new
revised laws can only aggravate an already bad situation, by
expanding investigators' discretion and creating even more
opportunities for abuse.


4. (SBU) The proposed legislation changing the definition of
treason arrived at the Duma on the very day that the
legislature passed an amendment to the criminal code that
restricts jury trials for certain crimes related to state
security. (The upper Federation Council approved the jury
trial amendment on December 17.) If signed into law by
President Medvedev, those accused of serious crimes,
including terrorism, hostage-taking, the organization of
illegal armed units, espionage, high treason, violent seizure
of power, armed revolt, sabotage, and mass disorder, would
have their case heard by panels of three professional judges
rather than a jury of their peers (Reftel).


5. (C) Within the Duma, the Communists and the "leftist"
Kremlin party, Just Russia, had sought to make changes to the
bill that would have removed "mass disorder" from the list of
crimes, according to press reports. Yelena Mizulina of Just
Russia aggressively fought against the bill and told us she
had support of other members of her party, but despaired that
it was a "done deal" by the party of power United Russia.
Mizulina told us that the treason/espionage law amendments
were directly connected to the jury trial law and explained
that both sets of legislation were designed, collectively, to
give the siloviki the power to arrest anyone, with no
judicial or prosecutorial oversight. She also said that
while she had previously hoped to challenge the jury trial
legislation in the Constitutional Court, she now realized
that any such challenge would be useless as the Court's
Chairman, Valeriy Zorkin, had been co-opted by the Siloviki
on this issue.


Opposition in Uproar
--------------


6. (C) The human rights community has mobilized to protest
the proposed legal changes, comparing the changes to
Stalinist policies that intimidated those who sought contact
with foreigners. Leader of the Moscow activists, Lyudmila
Alekseyeva, held a press conference on December 17, with
Svetlana Gannushkina of "Civic Action," Lev Ponomarev of "For
Human Rights," and Academic Yuriy Ryzov and Erist Chernyy of
the "Committee for the Defense of Scholars" to denounce the
proposed legislation. Ponomarev noted that no lawyers in the
country supported the changes to the jury trial law, besides
those sitting in the Duma. Only totalitarian regimes equate
criticism of the government with treason, he postulated, and
warned the enactment of the laws would mark a transition
point for the regime. Gannushkina raised concern about the
treason law's reference to protecting "sovereignty," since
the international conception of the term is changing in world
practice - today many things that were formerly considered
purely internal affairs of a country no longer are sacrosanct.


7. (SBU) Beyond the human rights community, the
Kremlin-linked Public Chamber made a scathing criticism of
the proposed legislation on jury trials. The Public Chamber's
expert assessment dismissed the bill as "motivated by the
interests of the security services," which sought an easy way
to compensate for poor investigations and prosecutors'
inability to convince jurors to hand down guilty verdicts.
The report, passed to Federation Council Speaker Sergey
Mironov, apparently did not have any affect on that body's
decision to approve the legislation without any amendments.
We expect similar criticism from the Public Chamber on the
treason law and the legislature to likewise ignore their
recommendations.

Duma Members More Circumspect
--------------


8. (C) Duma Legal Affairs Committee Chair Aleksandr Moskalets
told us December 17 that he considered the proposed changes
to the definition of treason to be "stupidity." He said he
was confident that the draft law would not enter into effect
for two reasons: (1) He thought that there would be serious
reservations within the United Russia faction in the Duma
about supporting such extreme changes to existing
legislation; and (2) Even if the draft were approved by both
the Duma and Federation Council, he doubted that President
Medvedev would sign it. When questioned about this, he said
he had complete confidence in Medvedev's "legal mind and
commitment to an open society." Moskalets confided in us
that he had opposed the change to the law on jury trials, and
was disappointed that he had not been able to convince his
fellow United Russia deputies not to close this possibility
for direct citizen involvement. Just Russia Deputy Oksana
Dmitrieva also told us December 17 that she was troubled by
the espionage law and that she expected Just Russia faction
deputies to oppose it. Nonetheless, she would not predict
whether it would ultimately be approved or not.

The Reason Why
--------------


9. (C) Amid the storm of criticism, some have sought to
explain the timing and the "target" of those amendments.
Voicing the most pervasive explanation, Alekseyeva publicly
linked the legal changes to the regime's fear of losing
control as the economic crisis deepens in the coming months.
She highlighted the haste in which the jury law was passed --
taking only two weeks to pass both houses of the legislature
-- as a sign of the growing concern within the top echelon of
government about social unrest. Moskalets, in spite of his
professed opposition to the laws, confirmed as much. "We
have learned from the mistakes that were made in the past in
keeping order during difficult economic times. There will
not be another Russian revolution."


10. (C) New Times political editor Yevgenia Albats told us
that the changes targeted journalists, politicians, and
scientists who posed any sort of opposition to the regime.
However, she did not see the economic crisis as the driving
factor behind the decision to make changes now. Rather, she
noted that discussions of changing the law on treason have
long been under discussion among the security services.
Albats ascribed the amendments to innate paranoia within
"silovik" camp, including Premier Putin, that Russia is
surrounded by enemies who seek to take advantage of any
perceived weakness to undermine the regime.


11. (C) Others saw the push to expand the power of the

investigative bodies as an insurance policy against any
attempt by disgruntled members of the elite to use expected
public dissatisfaction to challenge the existing order.
Carnegie scholar Masha Lipman told us that the new laws fit
within the tandem's strategy of preemption, providing tools
to defend against a challenge from within the elite. Andrey
Soldatov, Editor of the Agentura Website, argued in the Daily
Journal that the changes are not aimed at the political
opposition or human rights community, but instead are focused
at intimidating journalists (and potentially businesses)
looking for information on state corporations and other
powerful businesses linked to the state -- like Gazprom and
Rosneft.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Whether or not the White House is serious about
pressing forward with the treason law, the regime has issued
a warning to opponents that it is prepared to "tighten the
screws" in ways not experienced since Soviet times. The
timing of the measures and the haste in which they have been
pushed through the system suggests senior leaders are losing
their confidence in their ability to control events -- a fear
that recent demonstrations in the Far East and Urals against
the regime's automobile import tariffs has likely deepened.
While the systematic narrowing of independent political space
in Russia during the good economic times of the past eight
years elicited only moderate opposition, changes to the basic
legal foundations on which some of that remaining political
freedom rests would mark a significant step backward.
Ordinary Russians, beyond the usual Moscow and St. Petersburg
intellectual and political circles are probably too focused
on the severity of the economic downturn and pocketbook
issues to be bothered by the imposition of these new
political restrictions -- but increasing social discontent
with the government's response to the crisis could change
that calculus.


13. (C) Introducing a law that threatens citizens for having
foreign contacts has already had a chilling impact. Yet, it
has also united those who see this as crossing the Rubicon.
The Ambassador has already conveyed his deep concern over
these developments to GOR officials. We have also conferred
with other embassies in Moscow about these proposals, whose
representatives are equally concerned. We will monitor steps
in the coming weeks and recommend that Washington consider
consulting with other governments with the aim of a
multilateral approach to the GOR, noting the consequences
that the approval of the espionage legislation could have in
all fields of cooperation, as well as for Russian society.
End Comment.
BEYRLE