RUSSIA DOES LITTLE ON INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003684 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER ETRD MARR IN PK RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA DOES LITTLE ON INDIA-PAKISTAN TENSIONS REF: NEW DELHI 3114 Classified By: Deputy Political Counselor David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Russia has taken minimal action to calm tensions between India and Pakistan following the Mumbai attacks. While Medvedev stressed that the attacks should not be allowed to jeopardize India's dialogue with Pakistan, and has played up Russia's limited counter-terrorism cooperation with India, the GOR neither sent an explicit message warning India not to retaliate against Pakistan, nor has it reached out at a high level to Islamabad. Medvedev's December 4-5 trip to New Delhi was largely intended to demonstrate the health of the bilateral relationship at a time when India is significantly broadening its ties with other countries. The GOR remains committed to expanding trade with India while defending its troubled, but still significant, military cooperation with this traditional ally. End summary. Russia's Muted Response to India and Pakistan -------------- ¶2. (C) During a December 17 briefing on Medvedev's trip to India, MFA Counselor Alexei Milichenkov said that the Russian President stressed during his December 4-5 meetings with PM Singh and other Indian interlocutors that events in Mumbai should not be allowed to jeopardize the security situation in South Asia, nor negatively influence India's dialogue with Pakistan. Milichenkov avoided a direct answer to our question whether Medvedev explicitly discouraged India from taking action against Pakistan, and instead appeared to suggest that the heavy lifting on this issue had been done by the U.S. by mentioning the Secretary's December 3 visit to New Delhi. Milichenkov said that the GOR thought it positive that India recognized that only certain rogue elements in Pakistan were to blame for the attacks and not the Gilani government, but added that, at the time of Medvedev's visit, it did not appear that the Indians had fully determined who was behind the attacks and what response should be taken. ¶3. (C) Milichenkov stated that combating terrorism remained one of the primary topics of discussion between Russia and India. The issue was covered by the annual meetings of the heads of their respective security councils and the joint working group against international terrorism, which wrapped up its meeting in New Delhi on December 17. Based upon Milichenkov's description of these fora, the meetings apparently amounted to little more than an exchange of views and information. ¶4. (C) MFA Pakistan Desk Chief Andrei Starkov told us separately on December 17 that Russian officials had discussed the impact of the Mumbai attacks on South Asia with their Pakistani counterparts on the margins of the French conference on Afghanistan, but the GOR had not made any special outreach to Islamabad to help defuse tensions with India. Despite Russian envoy to NATO Rogozin's reported November 28 statement that Russia should help Pakistan fight terrorism, relations appeared to move at their regular, rather limited pace, with the meeting of the bilateral counter-terrorism working group planned for the end of 2008 postponed until 2009. Medvedev's Pro-Forma India Trip -------------- ¶5. (C) Both Milichenkov and, in a separate meeting, Indian Emboff Deepti Ganji described Medvedev's India trip as the relatively uneventful continuation of rotating annual visits by the Russian and Indian leaders that began after Putin went to India in 2000. Milichenkov called the most recent visit "fruitful," then proceeded to list the agreements signed in New Delhi, many of which were MOUs between various government ministries (reftel). Ganji complained that the seemingly lackluster results of the visit were the outcome of holding regularly scheduled visits that necessitated bureaucrats to produce deliverables. Russia to Increase Economic Ties with India... -------------- - ¶6. (C) Milichenkov said several of the agreements signed in New Delhi were intended to help expand economic ties with India, which was a Russian priority. He admitted that it was an "open secret" that the current level of bilateral trade was considerably "less than the level of political interaction." The Russian and Indian governments were working to create a "hospitable atmosphere" for expanded contacts between businesses that were "more active and more flexible" than government structures. As an example, Milichenkov pointed to the Russia-India trade forum, founded in 2007. ...While Military Ties are Troubled -------------- ¶7. (C) Milichenkov stressed that Russia and India remained "major partners" in the sphere of military cooperation, despite well publicized problems such as the years-long delay in delivering the refitted aircraft carrier Admiral Grushko to India. He maintained that when you have such large scale military cooperation as Russia and India, it was "quite natural" to encounter problems; the test was how to overcome them. Milichenkov thought that India clearly intended to continue its military relationship with Russia, as evidenced by the formal extension of the agreement on military cooperation for ten years beyond its expiration in 2010. ¶8. (C) Ganji said that both sides were "getting used to" the changing nature of their military ties as India broadened its relationship with the U.S. and others. She thought that Moscow understood New Delhi was not distancing itself, but taking advantage of political and economic realities that necessitated changes in their once close, Cold War-era relationship. BEYRLE