SCENARIOS FOR RUSSIAN POLITICS IN ECONOMIC CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003546 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR RS SOCI EFIN SUBJECT: SCENARIOS FOR RUSSIAN POLITICS IN ECONOMIC CRISIS REF: A. MOSCOW 3242 ¶B. MOSCOW 3375 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reason 1.4(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. An INDEM survey of top analysts suggests that the economic crisis has shifted elite opinion on Russia's course over the coming year, with a growing expectation that the Medvedev-Putin tandem will either muddle through or accelerate existing trends toward a "Pinochet" model - a dictatorship of development. While most of Russia's political elite see the clouds of economic crisis worsening, the survey and our own inquiries into opinions show divergence on the potential impact on the political system. Some of our contacts, particularly those associated with opposition liberal and leftist parties, expect that economic woes will lead to social dissatisfaction and the potential denting of the tandem's stratospheric popularity. Others are more skeptical, with concerns that if the economic situation reaches crisis proportions, the administration will further tighten the screws and turn inward economically as a means to distract the population from deteriorating social circumstances. Declining approval ratings for the government's handling of the crisis have begun to worry some political groups as a harbinger of tightening government control, although Medvedev and Putin have yet to suffer any significant political weakening. End Summary. The Revolutionaries ( -------------- ¶2. (C) The INDEM assessment, conducted by INDEM President Satarov himself, posits that the chances of a revolution scenario increase only if the country suffers a severe economic crisis (which it will). (In October, the INDEM experts gave only a 1 percent chance for a "revolutionary scenario.") Among our contacts, a distinct minority, generally marginalized, Western-oriented liberals or hard leftists, view economic crisis and its attendant social dislocation as an opportunity to expand their political power. At a minimum, they expect that a crisis will compel the population to look for more information and alternative models of development. As such, both Vladimir Milov of the "Solidarity" movement and the Gorbachev Foundation's Valeriy Solovey said that they expected the economic downturn to precipitate a social and political crisis, which they could use for expanding the political space. ¶3. (C) Ultimately, the "radical" liberals hope that an economic crisis will create the political conditions for a velvet or "Orange" revolution. Yabloko Youth leader and Solidarity movement organizer Ilya Yashin told us in late October that the global financial crisis would motivate Russians to question the stability on which the current government has premised its mandate. In particular, Yashin forecast that previously non-political Russian youth (the "children of perestroika," he called them) would eschew vague nationalism in favor of a political force that can deliver prosperity as well as personal and press freedoms. Unsurprisingly, he calculated that Solidarity would capture these newly politicized groups. Fellow Solidarity leader Garry Kasparov shared a similar prediction with Ambassador on November 3, noting that those who constitute what approximates a Russian middle class will flock to Solidarity when the crisis threatens their personal prosperity (Ref A). ¶4. (C) Leftist "radicals" likewise see economic crisis as shifting the balance in their favor. Karin Kleman, a leader of the newly formed Left Front movement, told us November 7 that the deepening economic crisis would lead Russia inexorably leftward. In Kleman's estimation, up to 10 percent of Russians stand to fall from the middle class into poverty since "now their chins are only just above the water." Since Russia's natural tendency is left-leaning, she added, these newly-poor Russians will protest in the streets ) along with pensioners and trade unions ) once they lose access to the lifestyle they had enjoyed pre-crisis. ( and Their Detractors -------------- ¶5. (C) Those "revolutionaries" remain a distinct but small minority. Others argued that the Russian public has weathered difficult economic circumstances in recent decades without revolt and is too apolitical and fragmented to coalesce into a revolutionary movement. Aleksandr Auzan, president of the National Project Institute, told us he had little expectation of political reaction to an economic slowdown. Society is atomized, with no faith in others outside of narrow support networks. Russia suffers from a moral crisis, with no sense that collective action can affect change, according to Auzan. In the current environment, the government can alleviate political stresses by buying out (or making specific promises) to different social groups, thereby keeping any opposition from coalescing. ¶6. (C) Aleksandr Kynev, chief of regional programs at the Information Policy Development Foundation, likewise said that he expected little change in public mood related to economic conditions, until at least the new year. Planned increases for electricity, housing, and other services will hit in early January and are likely to affect pensioners and others on fixed incomes, potentially providing fodder for localized public unrest. That said, Kynev said that broader social unrest is unlikely as is any widening of the political space. Elite Conflict -------------- ¶7. (C) INDEM's second scenario -- a "palace coup" through elite conflict -- appears somewhat more plausible, with a 4.5 percent chance that the current circumstances could overthrow the current regime. Kynev argued that the economic crisis could lead to independent activity by political players within elite circles and potentially increase competition between Kremlin groups. Head of the Mercator Group and political commentator Dmitriy Oreshkin agreed, telling us on November 25 that a breakdown in the "Putin consensus" is likely under the pressure of economic difficulties. He was dismissive of the idea of any independent "grass-roots" movement emerging, but noted that social dissatisfaction could, however, be used as a tool in intra-elite conflict. He harked back to Kemerovo Governor Tuleyev's use of coal miners to advance his political agenda and argued that local and federal elites had manipulated almost all "major" strikes to achieve narrow political interests. ¶8. (C) Predicting where possible fractures will emerge within the elite remains a difficult task. Already, the collapse of the Russian stock market has wiped away billions in oligarchic wealth and shifted the balance of power. BBC Editor in Chief for Russia, Konstantin Eggert, said that he expected fighting within the elite to emerge as the administration "picks winners" to award state financing -- those left in the cold are likely to seek recompense or retribution. Others, like Panorama head Vladimir Pribylovskiy, see the major fracture within the presidential team between the "liberals" around Medvedev (including Finance Minister Kudrin, Presidential Aide Dvorkovich, and others) vs. the security service group around Deputy Premier Sechin and former FSB head Patrushev. Thus far Putin has proved skilled at managing the competition between the disparate elite groupings, so such a scenario presupposes a decline in his position as conflict arbiter. Dictatorship of Development -------------- ¶9. (C) The most likely scenario for INDEM's experts, with a 56 percent likelihood, was a Pinochet model of increased political control associated with an even greater state-driven economic system. Proponents of this view point to the intensification of political control as a reflection within the administration about the "low probability, high impact" scenarios outlined above -- popular unrest and elite conflict. Center for Political Technologies analyst Tatyana Stanovaya argued that the main driver in Putin's speech at the United Russia conference last week and the economic stimulus package that he outlined was the preservation of Putin's popularity and political stability. Olga Kryshtanovskaya of the Institute for the Study of Elites identified similar objectives as the main drivers in the tandem's approach to the economic crisis to us in a conversation earlier in October. Putin's promises to increase tax breaks, government salaries, and to stop the devaluation of the ruble are the public "carrots" to hedge the risk of the souring public mood. ¶10. (C) Behind the scenes, we have seen evidence of the "knout" being brought into play as well. Putin's public threats to the four prominent state-linked bankers against using government stimulus money for "speculation" and Medvedev's warnings about economic-related destabilization of the social order give evidence of their concerns. Those statements served as a "signal" to the elite across Russia, likely triggering reactions such as the Prosecutor's office threat to journalists writing about bank failures. Moreover, it suggests that pressure on political movements and players outside the system could be increased -- such as the recent moves against NDI's democracy programs. Michael Delyagin, the head of the Institute of Globalization Problems, has argued that attacks against four leftists earlier this month were a coordinated strategy by the security services to undermine left-wing criticism of the regime. (Ref B.) ¶11. (C) As polling numbers dip -- already, the independent Levada Center claims that approval ratings for the government's approach to the economic crisis fell from 33 percent to 27 percent over the past month -- further tightening of the screws on non-systemic political movements like the emerging Solidarity bloc certainly seems plausible. Moreover, regional and local leaders may see the center's concern about maintaining stability as an excuse to crack down on "meddlesome" human rights groups and other activists. In spite of those concerns, public approval ratings for Medvedev and Putin remain above 70 percent. Comment -------------- ¶12. (C) The deepening economic crisis dominates the political landscape, leading to considerable speculation about the duration and depth of coming troubles; their impact on society; and the potential political repercussions. Despite the calming "things are under control" message from the Kremlin and White House -- a belated admission that Russia faces some real challenges in the year ahead -- there are indications that the deteriorating economic conditions are stressing the political fabric and changing the tandem's focus. Current trends suggest that those pressures could lead to a tightening of the already constrained political freedoms in Russia, with little pushback from a society focused more on pocketbook issues and a loss of economic opportunity. We see this as a likely scenario which will reinforce the near-term trends toward, and public acceptance of, a "Pinochet" model of political and economic development directed by the tandem in order to convey an image of national stability. End comment. BEYRLE