KEEPING A WARY EYE ON THE STREETS: THE CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003476 SIPDIS STATE FOR EUR/RUS, EEB/IFD TREASURY FOR TOGERSON DOC FOR 4231/MAC/EUR/JBROUGHER NSC FOR NELSON E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018 TAGS: EFIN ECON ELAB SOCI RS SUBJECT: KEEPING A WARY EYE ON THE STREETS: THE CRISIS HITS THE REAL ECONOMY Classified By: Ambassador JBeyrle, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) -------------- Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) Government statements and measures to contain the effects of the economic crisis are beginning to reflect official concern that a prolonged economic downturn could lead to social unrest as was the case in 1998. Senior analysts at two of Russia's leading research institutes claim that a sharp increase in unemployment could trigger social turmoil, but noted many Russians had learned to adapt to adverse economic conditions in the late 1990's and were preparing to adjust their life styles and consumption habits to the present situation. Psychologically, however, it was important for Russians to have to least nominal employment. Thus, instead of laying off workers, many companies were placing workers on administrative leave, delaying salary payments and reducing hours. Depending on the duration of the crisis, the analysts predicted that more Russians would end up at or below the poverty threshold. In the meantime, defaults on consumer credits would aggravate the liquidity crisis, and domestic demand for dollars - as a hedge against popular fears of a 1998-style banking collapse - will continue to put pressure on the ruble. End Summary. -------------- The Ghost of 1998 -------------- 2 (C) In recent weeks, Prime Minister Putin and other senior Russian officials (CB Chairman Ignatiev/Finance Minister Kudrin) have reinforced their message to the public that Russian economy will survive the economic crisis - owing in large part to distribution throughout the "real economy" of a multi-billion dollar bail out package financed out of state reserves (see septels). Putin unveiled new measures to cushion the effects of the crisis on broad segments of the population, including corporate tax cuts, higher welfare payments, and promises to defend the ruble. In both its statements and actions, the government appeared determined to avoid a repeat of 1998, when the country nearly defaulted on its domestic debt, banks collapsed, and industrial production came to a standstill, forcing unemployed workers and bankrupt depositors to take to the streets. ¶3. (C) Behind Putin's public bravado lies a concern that prolonged economic crisis could trigger social unrest, particularly if slow or negative growth leads to a dramatic growth in unemployment. Consequently, both Medvedev and Putin have called for more state control over the flow of funds to ensure they reach key sectors, and have threatened punitive sanctions against banks hoarding state funds (or trading them for dollars) instead of investing them in domestic assets. Moreover, Medvedev has ordered law enforcement authorities to clamp down on any social unrest or crimes arising from the financial crisis. -------------- Dim Public Awareness of the Crisis -------------- ¶4. (C) To get a better understanding of public attitudes towards the crisis and what economic tripwires may in fact trigger social unrest, we met with Maria Krasilnikova, Senior Economist of the independent Levada Polling and Analytical Center, and separately with Irina Denisova, Senior Researcher of the Center of Financial and Economic Research (CEFIR), affiliated with the Academy of Sciences. According to Krasilnikova, as of September and October, the financial crisis had yet not affected the majority of Russians; less than five percent Russians were involved in either the stock exchange or mortgage markets. Furthermore, her research indicated that only one fifth of the population had savings in banks. Inflation - rather than the financial crisis per se - remained the chief concern of most Russians as late as the end of the October, but, she added, expectations of high inflation were always considerable - particularly in the period of rapid economic growth preceding the crisis. (Note. A separate poll by the government's VTsIOM public opinion agency, released in early November, appeared to substantiate Krasilnikova's findings: more than 60 percent of the 1,600 Russians surveyed stated they were not directly affected by the crisis nor had no idea of its causes - and nearly 20 percent of the respondents were sold on to the government's line that the crisis was brought about by the U.S. and the world superpowers' mismanagement of social and economic policy.) -------------- Unemployment - Recipe for Social Unrest -------------- ¶5. (C) Krasilnikova stated that the most likely tripwire for social unrest would be widespread unemployment - or when unemployment became a "personal, household issue". Irina Denisova - in a separate conversation - came to the same the conclusion. Both analysts maintained, however, that even if unemployment increased dramatically, the population's threshold for tolerating economic hardship was now higher than was the case in 1998. Krasilnikova explained that the population had developed a certain degree of resistance to hard economic times during the 1990s and in one way or another had learned to adapt to adverse conditions. This time, therefore, people (at least the Muscovites) would adapt to the crisis by adjusting their consumption habits (i.e., taking fewer vacations abroad) or supplementing food purchases with "potatoes grown on their private dacha plots (ogorody)." Psychologically, however, it was important for people to have at least nominal employment. Most companies, she pointed out, understood this: thus, in lieu of lay-offs, companies tended to place workers on administrative leave, reduce hours, delay salary payments or even cut salaries. ¶6. (C) According to what we are hearing from our contacts, an increasing number of companies are in fact sending their employees on unpaid vacations, slashing salaries or delaying payments. One investment banker told us that the credit crunch has forced numerous firms to resort to barter (as they did on the 1990s) to effect payments. Ilya Yurov, principal shareholder of Moscow's National Bank Trust told us that many of his clients (particularly in the regions) are radically scaling down their production plans and forcing employees to take leave without pay. ¶7. (C) We note that the problems of wage arrears and reduction of work hours have been the cause celebre of the Federation of Independent Trade Unions in Russia. The Federation is calling on the government to cut the migration quota for 2009 and is monitoring the situation very closely in single-company towns - i.e., the steel-producing Magnitogrosk in the Urals or coal mining areas in the Kuzbass. As for actual unemployment, Klaus Roland, Director of the World Bank's Moscow office, told us that figure was expected to increase slightly in 2009 (from 5.3 to 5.9 percent) with lost jobs mostly in the labor intensive industries, such as construction, and in the white collar professions, i.e., banking and finance. -------------- Low Sense of Material Well-Being -------------- ¶8. (C) While the employment situation was unlikely to drive people to the streets any time soon, Krasilnikova reported that the so-called "index of societal mood" - a measure of people's sense of material well-being - had decreased significantly in September-October, as compared to the beginning of the summer. Respondents had most recently described the economic situation as "sluggish"- rather than "stable" - and expressed pessimism that the situation would improve. Her polling data also revealed that Russians continued to favor a paternalistic state, and 83 percent of Russians supported state intervention to support the economy - even though paradoxically the majority of Russians distrusted the government as an institution. 9 (C) CEFIR's Denisova suggested that the most acute phase of the crisis would be over in a year - without major social unrest - but the recession, with all of its attendant socio-economic consequences, would continue for at least three years. In her view, one of the direct effects of the crisis would be the increase in percentage of the population at or near the poverty line - from about 10 to 15 percent. (Note: The World bank predicts in its November report on the Russian economy that with a 3.5 percent growth rate in 2009 - scaled down from 6.5 percent in 2008 - the percent of the population at or below the poverty line would be about 10.4 percent.) ¶10. (C) Denisova said "social cushions" protecting the poorest of the poor were underdeveloped or, in some regions, non-existent. Monetization of social benefits, she claimed, had been poorly implemented and had failed to keep pace with the rising cost of most public services. Another problem associated with an extended period of economic contraction, she noted, would be the "vicious liquidity circle"; that is, as people's salaries and incomes decreased, fewer would be able to pay their debts to the banks, thereby aggravating the liquidity crisis. An official of Russkiy Standart Bank -- Russia's largest issuer of credit cards -- told us that the rate of defaults on consumer loans has increased significantly over the past several months - a trend that is likely to continue. Denisova also observed that the lack of a credible public policy in dealing with the crisis and rumors of an impending major devaluation of the ruble were forcing ordinary Russians to convert whatever ruble savings they had into dollars as a "hedge against uncertainty", thus putting downward pressure on the ruble. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) It is too early to gauge the full socio-economic impact of the economic downturn - much of that would on the duration of the crisis. There are few indications that economically motivated social unrest - characteristic of the late 1990's - is on the near horizon. That said, the fact that the government is burning through billions in reserves to forestall a sharp ruble devaluation shows that the "mood on the street" is still a worry. And with reason: we are now seeing the symptoms of a deep recession. Much of Moscow's previously booming construction activity looks to be at a standstill, a situation mirrored in cities like Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok; major retail chains have no access to credit and are reducing their inventories; and Russians are feverishly changing their rubles into dollars in anticipation of an imminent currency devaluation. In 1998, the economic slump dragged on for five successive quarters. The current economic slowdown, by Finance Minister Kudrin's own admission, is likely to continue through 2010. Short-term macroeconomic stabilization measures, financed out of ever shrinking reserves, may not be sufficient to cushion the population - or at least the more vulnerable segments - from the adverse socio-economic consequences of recession: poverty and unemployment. BEYRLE