RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003429 SIPDIS DEPT FOR ISN/RA (R.NEPHEW; J.DANIEL),IO/T (H.VONBEHREN), EUR/PRA (M.NASH) E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018 TAGS: KNNP MNUC PARM IAEA TRGY IR SY RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S VIEWS ON THE IAEA REPORT ON IRANIAN AND SYRIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMS REF: STATE 123074 Classified By: DCM ERIC RUBIN FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D) ¶1. (C) On November 25, ESToff delivered reftel points on the IAEA reports on the Iranian and Syrian nuclear programs to Alexander Bolichiov, Second Secretary in the MFA Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs. Syria -------------- ¶2. (C) Bolichiov was dismissive regarding the points on Syria's refusal to allow IAEA inspectors to re-visit the site of the destroyed facility or the three potentially associated sites nearby. Why, he asked, should an "NPT-signatory country be cooperative when a non-NPT-signatory country attacks its infrastructure?" Bolichiov was also argumentative regarding the other sites, saying "the IAEA will visit those and then ask to see five more, then ten... when does it stop?" Bolichiov stated that any sort of resolution at the November 27 - 28 Board of Governor's meeting would be "unlikely" to succeed as it would be difficult to generate sufficient support. ¶3. (C) Regarding the Technical Cooperation (TC) project requested by Syria in the IAEA's Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (TACC),Bolichiov was non-committal. He did say that Russia could not see the connection between the ongoing IAEA investigation of "something that probably was not a nuclear facility" and the "proper" request for IAEA assistance in helping Syria move forward towards a peaceful use for nuclear energy. Iran -------------- ¶4. (C) Bolichiov agreed, somewhat grudgingly, that Iran continued to defy the UNSC and had not cooperated with the IAEA. He paid close attention to the suggested key points for the Russian Federation to include in their national statement (reftel),but did not give any indication they would be used. Bolichiov was particularly skeptical on the heavy-water reactor under construction in Arak. With respect to the Iranian's refusal to allow the IAEA to conduct a Design Information Verification inspection of the site, he countered "perhaps there is nothing to see." ¶5. (C) Comment: As the points on Iran were being presented, Bolichiov asked if these issues were "coming from the old administration, or the new one?" Earlier in the meeting, he had asked questions about the transition to a new administration. In previous meetings, Bolichiov had not displayed such curiosity, which could reflect increased MFA interest on the future direction of USG policy regarding Iran. End Comment. BEYRLE