GENERAL BUZHINSKIY WARNS DAS BRYZA ABOUT REARMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003410

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GG RS
SUBJECT: GENERAL BUZHINSKIY WARNS DAS BRYZA ABOUT REARMING
GEORGIA

REF: MOSCOW 3290

Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a cordial but firm meeting with EUR Deputy
Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza November 1, Ministry of
Defense Lt. General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy articulated what are
clearly GOR-wide talking points on Georgia, contending that
"someone in the USG outside the State Department" had given
Saakashvili the green light to launch military operations in
South Ossetia; Georgia had been planning military operations
in both zones for a long time; and EU observers were the
"guarantors of stability," but were not ensuring that Georgia
was abiding by the terms of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan.
Buzhinskiy said Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia was a fait accompli, similar to the West's
recognition of Kosovo, and we should accept it and move on.
Bryza pressed hard for access by international observers to
the two regions. In response, Buzhinskiy reiterated that
Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have to approve such access,
and Russia could not instruct them to do so. He warned the
U.S. against rearming Georgia, claiming that the U.S. was
sending money while others were providing arms. Bryza
countered that Moscow had considerable influence over the
separatist governments, particularly South Ossetia's, to
which several Russian officials had been seconded. End
summary.


2. (C) Noting that Russia made a mistake in not bringing the
U.S. press in to see the destruction in Tskhinvali, First
Deputy Chief of the MOD's Main Directorate for International
Cooperation Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy reiterated
Russian accusations that the U.S. had not prevented
Saakashvili from launching an attack against the South
Ossetian capital to DAS Bryza November 1. Bryza countered
that the U.S. had successfully warned
Saakashvili against any military action throughout four years
of provocations by Russia and the separatists, but that
eventually, as he had warned Buzhinskiy last July, the
provocations proved to be too much. In response, Buzhinskiy
said the GOR knew that the "President and the State
Department" had warned the Georgian President, but repeated
allegations that "another USG entity" had told him to go
ahead, telling Saakashvili that if he wanted a NATO
Membership Action Plan in December, he needed to resolve the
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The U.S.
nonetheless, Buzhinskiy argued, had provided military
assistance, money, advisors, and training to Georgia. In
response to Bryza's noting that Russian actions since April
had led to an escalation of the situation, Buzhinskiy argued
that Russia had copies of Georgian plans to attack Abkhazia
and South Ossetia.


3. (C) Likening Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia to the West's recognition of Kosovo, Buzhinskiy said
it was a fait accompli and irreversible. He warned the U.S.
and the West against rearming Georgia, saying it would send a
very bad signal to Russia. Acknowledging that the U.S. was
not sending Georgia military assistance at present, he
claimed others were, whereas the U.S. was providing funding.
Bryza reminded Buzhinskiy of the modest nature of the
training and equipment the U.S. had provided Georgia since
2002, recounting how the program began in response to
Russia's legitimate complaints about the Pankisi Gorge
serving as a haven for terrorists and Chechen fighters.
Bryza added that the GOG had purchased its offensive weapons
on the open market. Even so, Georgia had a legitimate right
to develop its own armed forces. Moreover, Russia itself had
used force to protect its own territorial integrity with
regard to Chechnya. The U.S. had recognized this right of
Russia, though we criticized the specific tactics used by
Russia. The U.S. was taking exactly the same approach with
regard to Georgia and South Ossetia.


4. (C) Buzhinskiy complained that EU observers were not
fulfilling their "role as guarantors of security," in the
buffer zone, saying there were "terrorists" in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and Georgian "provocations" there were
overheating. Bryza responded by urging Russia to deal with
the bands of militants causing violence, and to allow access
to both regions for the international monitors. Buzhinskiy
said Russia was not opposed to such access but repeated
Moscow's contention that the Abkhaz and Ossetian leaders
would need to approve it. Russia, he claimed, could not tell
them to allow access.

MOSCOW 00003410 002 OF 002




5. (C) Buzhinskiy said "what happened, happened," and the
U.S. and Russia should move on. We shared too many problems
to let our relationship fester over Georgia. Moscow knew the
U.S. had difficulties with transit to Afghanistan through
Pakistan and was willing to assist with transit, as agreed in
the NATO-Russia Council. But, reiterating FM Lavrov's
position, he said that the U.S. could not "pick and choose"
which issues to work with Russia on, without Moscow's
involvement. He added that if Georgia or Ukraine were to
receive NATO membership, the relationship could worsen
significantly, noting that the General Staff had the
authority to take "all necessary measures." Again rehashing
Russia's refusal to deal with Saakashvili, Buzhinskiy noted
that as long as Saakashvili was in power in Tbilisi, the
problems would continue. Bryza replied that for U.S.-Russian
relations to return to normal, Russia must fulfill its full
range of commitments under the 12 August and 8 September
cease fire agreements.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) While maintaining a cordial tone, Buzhinskiy was more
impassioned in his reiteration of Russia's complaints about
Georgia and the U.S.'s support for Tbilisi than in previous
meetings. Though not as contentious as other interlocutors
(reftel),Buzhinskiy's basic message - the U.S. acted wrongly
on Georgia; what's done is done and irreversible and it's
time to move on; don't rearm Tbilisi - has been heard in
meetings throughout the GOR and has clearly been approved and
disseminated at senior levels.


7. (SBU) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable.
BEYRLE