GENERAL BUZHINSKIY WARNS DAS BRYZA ABOUT REARMING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003410 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/03/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR GG RS SUBJECT: GENERAL BUZHINSKIY WARNS DAS BRYZA ABOUT REARMING GEORGIA REF: MOSCOW 3290 Classified By: POL M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. In a cordial but firm meeting with EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Matthew Bryza November 1, Ministry of Defense Lt. General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy articulated what are clearly GOR-wide talking points on Georgia, contending that "someone in the USG outside the State Department" had given Saakashvili the green light to launch military operations in South Ossetia; Georgia had been planning military operations in both zones for a long time; and EU observers were the "guarantors of stability," but were not ensuring that Georgia was abiding by the terms of the Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. Buzhinskiy said Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was a fait accompli, similar to the West's recognition of Kosovo, and we should accept it and move on. Bryza pressed hard for access by international observers to the two regions. In response, Buzhinskiy reiterated that Abkhazia and South Ossetia would have to approve such access, and Russia could not instruct them to do so. He warned the U.S. against rearming Georgia, claiming that the U.S. was sending money while others were providing arms. Bryza countered that Moscow had considerable influence over the separatist governments, particularly South Ossetia's, to which several Russian officials had been seconded. End summary. ¶2. (C) Noting that Russia made a mistake in not bringing the U.S. press in to see the destruction in Tskhinvali, First Deputy Chief of the MOD's Main Directorate for International Cooperation Lieutenant-General Yevgeniy Buzhinskiy reiterated Russian accusations that the U.S. had not prevented Saakashvili from launching an attack against the South Ossetian capital to DAS Bryza November 1. Bryza countered that the U.S. had successfully warned Saakashvili against any military action throughout four years of provocations by Russia and the separatists, but that eventually, as he had warned Buzhinskiy last July, the provocations proved to be too much. In response, Buzhinskiy said the GOR knew that the "President and the State Department" had warned the Georgian President, but repeated allegations that "another USG entity" had told him to go ahead, telling Saakashvili that if he wanted a NATO Membership Action Plan in December, he needed to resolve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The U.S. nonetheless, Buzhinskiy argued, had provided military assistance, money, advisors, and training to Georgia. In response to Bryza's noting that Russian actions since April had led to an escalation of the situation, Buzhinskiy argued that Russia had copies of Georgian plans to attack Abkhazia and South Ossetia. ¶3. (C) Likening Russia's recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to the West's recognition of Kosovo, Buzhinskiy said it was a fait accompli and irreversible. He warned the U.S. and the West against rearming Georgia, saying it would send a very bad signal to Russia. Acknowledging that the U.S. was not sending Georgia military assistance at present, he claimed others were, whereas the U.S. was providing funding. Bryza reminded Buzhinskiy of the modest nature of the training and equipment the U.S. had provided Georgia since 2002, recounting how the program began in response to Russia's legitimate complaints about the Pankisi Gorge serving as a haven for terrorists and Chechen fighters. Bryza added that the GOG had purchased its offensive weapons on the open market. Even so, Georgia had a legitimate right to develop its own armed forces. Moreover, Russia itself had used force to protect its own territorial integrity with regard to Chechnya. The U.S. had recognized this right of Russia, though we criticized the specific tactics used by Russia. The U.S. was taking exactly the same approach with regard to Georgia and South Ossetia. ¶4. (C) Buzhinskiy complained that EU observers were not fulfilling their "role as guarantors of security," in the buffer zone, saying there were "terrorists" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Georgian "provocations" there were overheating. Bryza responded by urging Russia to deal with the bands of militants causing violence, and to allow access to both regions for the international monitors. Buzhinskiy said Russia was not opposed to such access but repeated Moscow's contention that the Abkhaz and Ossetian leaders would need to approve it. Russia, he claimed, could not tell them to allow access. MOSCOW 00003410 002 OF 002 ¶5. (C) Buzhinskiy said "what happened, happened," and the U.S. and Russia should move on. We shared too many problems to let our relationship fester over Georgia. Moscow knew the U.S. had difficulties with transit to Afghanistan through Pakistan and was willing to assist with transit, as agreed in the NATO-Russia Council. But, reiterating FM Lavrov's position, he said that the U.S. could not "pick and choose" which issues to work with Russia on, without Moscow's involvement. He added that if Georgia or Ukraine were to receive NATO membership, the relationship could worsen significantly, noting that the General Staff had the authority to take "all necessary measures." Again rehashing Russia's refusal to deal with Saakashvili, Buzhinskiy noted that as long as Saakashvili was in power in Tbilisi, the problems would continue. Bryza replied that for U.S.-Russian relations to return to normal, Russia must fulfill its full range of commitments under the 12 August and 8 September cease fire agreements. Comment -------------- ¶6. (C) While maintaining a cordial tone, Buzhinskiy was more impassioned in his reiteration of Russia's complaints about Georgia and the U.S.'s support for Tbilisi than in previous meetings. Though not as contentious as other interlocutors (reftel),Buzhinskiy's basic message - the U.S. acted wrongly on Georgia; what's done is done and irreversible and it's time to move on; don't rearm Tbilisi - has been heard in meetings throughout the GOR and has clearly been approved and disseminated at senior levels. ¶7. (SBU) DAS Bryza has cleared this cable. BEYRLE