RUSSIA RESISTING YUSHCHENKO'S BAIT, MOSTLY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003396

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UP RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA RESISTING YUSHCHENKO'S BAIT, MOSTLY

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Russian political circles see Ukrainian
president Yushchenko attempting to bait Russia in order to
improve his domestic popularity and gain support from the
West. However, mindful of the strong economic ties between
the countries, Russia has so far limited itself to sniping
back. In recent days, Putin called for the two countries to
join forces to combat the global financial crisis, with the
MFA denying allegations it sought to unilaterally shift its
borders with Ukraine, and downplaying differences over the
Black Sea Fleet, although gas arrears remain a point of
contention (septel). The MFA posted a lengthy refutation of
Ukraine's purported claims of Russian responsibility for the
Holodomor, while Lavrov urged the UN not to recognize it as
genocide. While calling Ukrainian media regulators who shut
down Russian language stations duplicitous, Russia called for
dialogue on the issue. However, on NATO membership and
Ukrainian arms sales to Georgia, Russia's reactions remain
visceral. As a result of the Georgia conflict, some analysts
now increasingly speak of the possibility of armed conflict,
were Ukraine to join NATO. End Summary.

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Baiting the Bear?
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2. (C) Russian analysts and officials term Ukrainian
president Yushchenko's recent string of statements and
actions as inflammatory and designed to bait Russia. The
list of grievances includes Ukraine's NATO aspirations, arms
sales to Georgia, the 2017 expiration of the Black Sea Fleet
(BSF) lease of Sevastopol facilities, border disputes in the
Kerch Strait, Holodomor recognition, and ban of Russian
television stations. Analysts surmise that Yushchenko is
trying to provoke a Russian overreaction in order to boost
his domestic popularity and gain Western support. So far,
the GOR has been mostly restrained on economic issues and
limited itself to sniping back on others, even on the BSF
lease, but continues to react strongly to condemn Ukraine's
NATO aspirations and denounce its arms sales to Georgia.

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Economics remain the foundation of relations
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3. (SBU) Stressing the importance of a stable and
economically sound Ukraine for Russia, the GOR has kept a
mostly low profile on the coalition and financial crisis in
Ukraine. On November 14, Putin suggested that Russia and
Ukraine should coordinate their response to the global
financial crisis, given the interdependence of their
economies. Chairman of the State Duma Committee for CIS
Affairs and Compatriots Alexei Ostrovsky said on October 21
that Russia was interested in ending the political crisis in
Ukraine, stating that a "stable Ukraine is extremely
important and advantageous for Russia." Energy relations
continue the usual pattern with Russian threats to shut off
gas supplies to Ukraine (septel). On November 20, Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev ordered Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller
to exact from Ukraine USD 2.4 billion in gas debt. Not much
has come of First DPM Shuvalov's announcement September 1
that Russia was engaged in a wholesale review of its free
trade relationship with Ukraine -- a move that was widely
viewed as retaliation for Ukraine's support of Georgia --
although Russia and Ukraine have not engaged in serious talks
on trade since Shuvalov's statement.

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Russia snipes back: Borders, Holodomor, TV
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4. (SBU) With the exception of NATO membership and Ukraine's
arms sales to Georgia, Russia has mostly limited itself to
sniping back on political issues, reflecting Russia's desire
not to be drawn into another conflict in the neighborhood,
particularly with its closest and most interconnected
neighbor. Rejecting Ukrainian allegations that Russia was
trying to unilaterally redraw the border with Ukraine, Lavrov
stated November 10 that Russia was negotiating with Ukraine
over the borders in the Strait of Kerch and the Sea of Azov,
and called accusations Russia was acting unilaterally
"unprofessional." On November 15, the MFA posted on its
website a "reminder" that the 2003 Russia-Ukraine agreement
on state borders left the question of the sea borders to
later negotiation.


5. (SBU) On the issue of the Holodomor recognition, Medvedev
declined to take part in Ukraine's commemoration of the 75th
anniversary of the Holomodor, calling for a common CIS-wide
approach to the "famine." However, in a letter to UN foreign

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ministers, Lavrov urged his counterparts not to recognize the
Holodomor as genocide, charging the GOU with politicizing the
issue, while on November 14, the MFA posted a message from
Medvedev to Yushchenko, laying out Russia's views on why
Ukraine's Holomodor claims were unjustified, including by
pointing to the larger geographical spread of the 1932
famine, and the inflated number of victims the GOU claimed.


6. (SBU) Russia has used Ukrainian media restrictions to
question Kyiv's commitment to free press, disingenuously
disregarding its own Soviet-style TV policy. Russian
Telecommunications and Media Minister Igor Shchyogolev
October 24 urged Ukraine not to "politicize the issue" of
banning Russian broadcasts in Ukraine, but also called
Ukrainian regulators "duplicitous." Lavrov in a press
conference November 1 said Russia would defend the Russian TV
channels' rights to resume broadcasting in Ukraine, but
argued that "if there are no political aspects in the
decision of the Ukrainian authorities, the problem can be
settled with the help of talks."

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Black Sea Fleet
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7. (C) For now, Russia is ignoring the line in the sand
drawn by Yushchenko on the Black Sea Fleet (BSF). Building
on earlier statements by Deputy PM Ivanov, Lavrov used an
October 22 press conference to stress that Russia would "at a
later stage, closer to 2017" discuss with the "Ukrainian
government that the country will have by that time" the
renewal of the BSF lease. Vyacheslav Yelagin, Director of
the Ukraine desk in the 2nd CIS Department at the MFA,
proposed that Russia and Ukraine begin a dialogue about the
BSF in an intergovernmental commission, "which is where the
issue belongs."


8. (C) However, some experts warn that Russia could take the
bait on the BSF. The lesson of August, Nikolay Petrov from
the Carnegie Center insisted, is that Russia showed it would
react to anything it considered negative to its own
interests. United Russia Duma member Sergey Markov accused
Yushchenko of attempting to cause Ukraine and Russia to clash
over the BSF, hoping that the U.S. would come to Ukraine's
aid. Boris Makarenko from the Center for Political
Technology agreed on Russia's probable aggressive reaction.
Georgia was serious, but Ukraine was "absolutely essential."

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NATO Membership
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9. (C) On NATO membership for Ukraine, Russia continues to
strongly oppose any efforts to draw Kyiv closer to NATO,
including by granting a Membership Action Plan. Deputy PM
Ivanov told the BBC October 17 that Russia felt encircled by
NATO's expansion, and was convinced the West wanted Russia to
be weak. An unnamed source in the MOD suggested to Interfax
November 14 that NATO MAP for Ukraine and Georgia would spell
Russia's full withdrawal from the CFE treaty. While Chairman
of the international affairs committee of the Federation
Council upper house of parliament Mikhail Margelov stated
Russia "will not fight Ukraine" over NATO membership, United
Russia Duma member Sergey Markov was less sanguine. Markov
asserted that Ukraine was a "crisis ready to blow up at any
time." Ukraine and Russia remained "one people," and the
Kremlin would have no choice but to "follow the reaction of
the people" if Ukraine received NATO membership -- right down
to war, he claimed. Markov noted that, "no Russian leader
wanted to go down in history as the one who lost Ukraine."


10. (U) Experts agree in their condemnation of Ukraine's
NATO aspirations, and since the Georgia crisis have even
begun to consider a possible military response to NATO
membership for Ukraine. Kremlin-connected consultant
Vyacheslav Nikonov reiterated to HFAC Chairman Berman that
Ukrainian NATO membership was an "existential threat" for
Russia; Russia would never allow Ukraine into NATO and would
do whatever it took to prevent it. The West, he said, would
"face the prospect of war with Russia in some form." In a
Spiegel online interview October 16 Nikonov further said that
NATO membership for Ukraine would deprive Russia of "its last
defense against a military emergency." In case of a civil
war, he suggested Russia would intervene if Russian citizens
were threatened, and did not rule out Ukraine's losing its
territorial integrity. Carnegie's Petrov agreed Russia would
take measures to punish Ukraine if it were to receive MAP,
but asserted that more importantly, the ethnic Russian
population in Crimea would "rise up in protest." Even
marginalized liberals, such as former Duma member Vladimir
Ryzhkov, continue to insist to us NATO MAP is a mistake for

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Ukraine, and neutrality the only stable outcome.

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Arms sales to Georgia
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11. (SBU) In addition to NATO membership, Russia has lashed
out against Ukraine regarding its arms sales to Georgia. In
a November 1 statement, MFA spokesman Nesterenko laid out the
GOR view that Ukraine violated point 4(b) of the 1993 OSCE
principles on arms sales, which precludes arms sales that
assist in existing armed conflicts or threaten peace, and
repeatedly demanded OSCE investigation of the issue.
Separately, he accused Ukraine of violating its Wassenaar
Agreement obligations on exports of conventional arms and
dual-use goods and technologies. On October 8, Russian
Ambassador to NATO Dmitry Rogozin charged Ukraine with
supplying Georgia with weapons through August 8. On the same
day, Russian 1st DFM Andrey Denisov suggested Ukraine's arms
supplies to Georgia provoked Tbilisi to start military
action, which would be "taken into account in building
relations" between Moscow and Kyiv.

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Comment
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12. (C) Ukraine's aspirations to NATO membership, arms sales
to Georgia, dispute over stationing of the Black Sea Fleet,
accusations that Russia is seeking to redraw its border with
Ukraine, commemoration of the Holodomor famine, and efforts
to discredit Russian media and culture are seen here as
intentional provocations by Yushchenko. Russia -- and most
Russians we have talked to, of all political persuasions,
tend to agree on this -- remains emotionally invested and
unhealthily obsessed with Ukraine. The GOR undoubtedly hopes
that the new U.S. administration will review the knot of
Russian-Ukrainian issues at the center of U.S.-Russian
bilateral relations, but we believe most knowledgeable
Russian policymakers realize that U.S. policy on Ukraine
reflects a strong bipartisan consensus dating back nearly 20
years.
BEYRLE