MFA ON AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003372 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR AF IR PK RS SUBJECT: MFA ON AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND IRAN Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 b/d. 1.(C) Summary: On November 14, MFA Second Asia Director Aleksandr Maryasov provided SCA DAS Krol an overview of Russian concerns regarding the need to stabilize Afghanistan and Pakistan, while engaging with Iran in order to dissuade it from making trouble in the region. Maryasov reiterated that the GOR hoped to resume military assistance to Afghanistan, and was ready to train Afghan counter-narcotics officials in Moscow. Russia had concerns about sources of financing for the upcoming Afghan election, and remained opposed to allowing the Taliban into the government. Maryasov expressed Russian concern with the Pakistani government's inability to control its border with Afghanistan, and thought Iran was in a "strong position" to influence events in Afghanistan. End summary. Stabalizing Afghanistan -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Second Asia (South Asia) Director Maryasov explained to DAS Krol Russian concerns regarding the stabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan, the failure of which threatened to destabilize the wider region. Maryasov stressed the need for Afghanistan's neighbors to assist in gaining control of the country,s borders, especially Pakistan. He reiterated Russian concern with Kabul's lack of control of large swaths of southern and eastern Afghanistan. ¶3. (C) Maryasov said that the GOR understood that stabilizing Afghanistan required strengthening the Afghan National Army (ANA) and police, both of which Russia was ready to assist. He noted that past Russian arms donations to the ANA were halted after the GOR learned that the weapons were not being used by the Afghans and simply sat in warehouses. Medvedev and Karzai agreed during their August meeting that military aid should be resumed, and the GOR hoped to send a delegation to the U.S. in order to discuss the matter in detail. ¶4. (C) Maryasov reiterated that Russia was ready to train Afghan and Central Asian counter-narcotics officials at its Domodedova facility, and expressed Moscow's pique at the recent failure of Afghans to appear for training. He explained Russian opposition to two OSCE training programs intended to train counter-narcotics officers near the Afghan border by asking how security could be guaranteed at remote locations when the Taliban were capable of carrying out an attack on the police academy in Kabul. Maryasov spoke of the need for closer cooperation on security and anti-narcotics between NATO/ISAF and the CSTO, although the GOR understood that NATO was constrained legally from working with the regional organization. ¶5. (C) Maryasov asked about the prospect for the upcoming Afghan election, including whether Ambassador Khalilzad would be a candidate. He raised the issue of election funding, the sources for which might be diminished by the international financial crisis. He added that while Russia understood the idea behind the Afghan reconciliation process, the GOR did not support allowing the Taliban into power by taking a role in the current government. Pakistan -------------- ¶6. (C) Maryasov observed that the new Pakistani government had taken some action against the Taliban, but needed to do more both to strengthen Pakistan,s internal security and stop the flow of fighters and weapons into Afghanistan. He raised Russian concern with the seemingly contradictory approach taken by Islamabad that included talking to extremists and fighting them simultaneously. Maryasov questioned the wisdom of democratizing Pakistan when stabilizing the country was the priority, drawing parallels between the difficulty both Islamabad and Kabul had fighting extremists. Iran -------------- ¶7. (C) In response to DAS Krol's question about Russia's assessment of Iranian influence in Afghanistan, Maryasov said that Iran was in a "strong position" helped by its ethnic ties to Afghanistan, as well as the funding Iran provided for Afghan infrastructure projects. Tehran enjoyed "normal relations" with Karzai, but also took seriously the fact that Afghanistan provided the U.S. a "base" from which to carry out anti-Iranian activity. ¶8. (C) Maryasov stressed that the GOR thought it necessary to engage in an effective dialogue with Iran, which had the ability to impact the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East. This required settling the Iranian nuclear issue without additional sanctions that would only make Iran "feel cornered." Maryasov said that a new administration in Washington offered a "great chance" to change the U.S. approach toward Iran. He advised that doing so would offer support to the reformers in Tehran that were crucial to diminishing the influence of Ahmedinijad and other radicals. ¶9. (U) DAS Krol has cleared this cable. BEYRLE