RUSSIA INCHES AWAY FROM ARMENIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003364 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON AM AZ RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA INCHES AWAY FROM ARMENIA Classified By: POL M/C Alice Wells for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In the aftermath of the Georgia conflict, Russian and Armenian officials assert there has been no change in Russian-Armenian relations, and see no detrimental impact of possible improved relations between Turkey and Armenia. Experts however argue that Russia is able to use the leeway it has with Armenia -- due to Armenia's dependence on Russia -- to pursue increased ties with the geostrategically more wily Aliyev. Russia sees Armenia's relations to Turkey as limited to practical cooperation, while the GOT's proposed cooperation platform is still too vague to be a factor. Strong domestic lobbies within the Kremlin mitigate against any abrupt change of Russian course. End Summary. -------------- Bilateral ties -------------- ¶2. (C) MFA Armenia desk counselor Sergei Vinogradov told us in an October 31 meeting that bilateral relations between Russia and Armenia remained unchanged. He took pains to explain that Medvedev's first visit to Armenia as president October 20-21, long after his July 2008 visit to Azerbaijan, was not a slight to Armenia. Vinogradov noted that there were 12 presidential visits between the two countries since 2005, including four visits in 2008 by Armenian president Sargsian to Russia in March, June, September, and November. There was no reason to believe that the GOR was seeking Azerbaijan's favor, to Armenia's detriment. ¶3. (C) Vinogradov stressed that bilateral ties between Russia and Armenia remained significant. Russia continued to be Armenia's largest trade partner in both exports and imports, and trade with Armenia had increased sharply in the past months, even though Armenia's access to Georgian ports had been interrupted in the conflict. Vinogradov noted Russian investments in Armenia helped "keep that country afloat," as did the remittances from Armenian guest workers in Russia, in addition to improving Armenia's tech level. Vinogradov also pointed to Russian military support for Armenia, positing that the 2000 agreement to locate the 102nd Russian military base in Armenia in order to guard its borders was part of Russia's contribution to guarantee stability in the Caucasus. -------------- Turkey -------------- ¶4. (C) Vinogradov noted Turkey's recent favorable politics ;toward and interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, but stated that Armenia's geographical position -- a Christian country almost surrounded by Muslim neighbors -- naturally ensured that Armenia would continue to maintain close ties with Russia. Vinogradov saw Armenia seeking ties with Turkey for pragmatic reasons only -- to improve Armenia's international transport and communications ties, which had suffered during the Georgian conflict. Vinogradov said Russia had no formal position on Turkey's proposal for a stability and cooperation platform, but was willing to consider the GOT's plans once they were fleshed out. -------------- Nagorno-Karabakh -------------- ¶5. (C) Vinogradov affirmed that Russia's support for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict within the Minsk Group remained unchanged. It was a success in itself to get Sargsian and Aliyev to talk together again at the November 2 summit, after their first meeting in June. Vinogradov painted Russia as an impartial mediator whose offer to assist had been welcomed by both sides. -------------- Armenian Embassy -------------- ¶6. (C) Armenian counselor Ruben Ananyan similarly insisted November 8 that Armenia did not feel Russia was letting down Armenia by courting Azerbaijan, noting the traditionally close ties between the two Christian countries. In the same vein, Armenia had no intention of moving closer to Turkey at Russia's expense. Any improvement in relations with Turkey would only be for purely "practical" reasons. Given Armenia's near-isolation, Ananyan said Armenia needed to speak with all its neighbors, including Iran, but did so openly so as not to antagonize its other neighbors. MOSCOW 00003364 002 OF 002 -------------- Experts -------------- ¶7. (C) Despite the official denials, analysts detect a shift in Russian-Armenian relations in favor of a Russian-Azerbaijani rapprochement. An editorial in the November 17 Caucasian Review of International Affairs claims Moscow is inching away from Armenia and toward Azerbaijan, reflecting the view that Russia offered Azerbaijan a Karabakh resolution -- which would require Russia to abandon its traditional pro-Armenian bias -- in return for access to Azeri gas. Others suggest Russia was now starting to use the leeway it already possesses in its relations to Armenia, due to Armenian dependence on Russia. Sergei Markedonov from the Institute for Political and Military Analysis asserted that the recent warming of relations between Moscow and Baku -- including via statements such as chairman of the State Duma Committee for the CIS Aleksey Ostrovskiy's recent support for the principle of territorial integrity as a "governing principle of international law" -- were a cause for alarm in Yerevan. Pavel Sheremet from ORTV credited Russia's new friendliness to Azerbaijan, including offers on energy cooperation, to the strong Azerbaijani lobby in Russia, which "influenced the Kremlin." -------------- Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) While Russia may be pocketing its close relations with Armenia, investing more time and diplomacy in the geostrategically more wily Aliyev, there are strong Armenian and Azerbaijani lobbies in the Kremlin that mitigate the chances of an abrupt change in GOR policy. BEYRLE