RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OVERCOMES BARRIERS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003362 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PREL RS SUBJECT: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH OVERCOMES BARRIERS, SOLIDIFIES DOMESTIC ROLE Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for reason 1.4(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. Uncertain economic and political circumstances are having an impact on the role that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) plays and steps it must take to ensure its activities continue. In addition to domestic challenges facing the ROC, the financial crisis has compelled Patriarch Aleksey II to appeal for government financial support and encouraged Orthodox social groups to seek government favors. As a result of calls from the West for greater respect for human rights in Russia, the Church provided an official explanation of its view on human rights, which urged less western intervention. Radical Bishop Diomid from Chukhotka continued to call for the removal of the ROC leadership, but there is little possibility of a significant schism especially after the ROC defrocked him on October 6. Aleksey II, in a reversal of past ROC opinion, sanctified the family of Tsar Nicholas II as martyrs, officially restoring them to the Church. Orthodox leaders also pushed for greater ties with the Russian military, aiming to reintroduce chaplains into the shrinking military forces. End Summary. Financial Crisis: Medvedev, Luzhkov to Provide Alms to ROC? -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) Against the backdrop of the global economic crisis, the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) recently took steps to preserve its own place in Russian society. According to press reports, Patriarch Aleksey II appealed to Medvedev in a letter on November 4 for a guarantee of financial security and preferential treatment for the financial accounts of the ROC in the wake of the economic crisis in Russia. Immediately after the story leaked, a Moscow Patriarchate spokesperson unconvincingly denied its authenticity, according to Russian news daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta's Andrey Melnikov. Aleksey supposedly argued in the letter that the ROC, unlike corporations, could not earn a profit from their financial holdings, nor could it take out insurance to lower risks, and therefore needed special consideration from the state. The ROC also pushed to receive tax-free status on all church properties utilized in carrying out its fundamental activities. ¶3. (SBU) Official and unofficial ROC members also presented ideas to Russian leaders to benefit the Church financially. As reports circulated about Aleksey's letter to Medvedev, ROC Bishop Dmitriy Smirnov gave a well-publicized sermon on November 8 calling on Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov to finance the construction of Orthodox churches in the outlying areas of the city. Smirnov appealed to Luzhkov's concern for public welfare, adding that Muscovites need new churches no less than they need better roads and bridges. On the same day, the social organization Union of Orthodox Citizens (UOC) proposed that the Russian government develop a special Orthodox network of food markets adjoining Orthodox parishes throughout the country, thus providing special commercial opportunities for the ROC. So far, the GOR has not responded to these requests at any level. Human Rights Concept Differs from Western Ideals -------------- --- ¶4. (SBU) On June 26, the Russian Orthodox Church presented its human rights concept which, in part, served as an alternative medium for official Kremlin resistance to Western criticism of Russia's human rights situation. In this thinly-veiled rebuke of Western ideals, the ROC used a page from Putin's playbook and suggested that "some civilizations should not impose their own way of life on other civilizations under the pretext of human rights protection," and human rights should account for different cultural and religious traditions. In his statement, Head of ROC External Relations Metropolitan Kirill claimed that public institutions often have forced Christians to act in ways that contradict God's commandments, preventing them from finding salvation. Kirill cited the right to life, the freedom of conscience and expression, the right to education, and socio-economic, political, civic, and collective rights as part of the ROC's human rights concept, while condemning homosexuality, abortion, and suicide. ¶5. (C) Owner and director of the analytical religion website www.Portal-Credo.ru Aleksander Soldatov told us on November 14 that Kirill managed to manipulate both the liberal and conservative wings of the ROC, and used the human rights concept to pacify those on the far right. The Church linked patriotism to the teachings of Jesus Christ, explaining that the love a Christian feels for family and friends naturally carried over into love for the homeland. According to Soldatov, by playing the patriotic card as part of the human rights concept, Kirill controlled the conservative elements in the Church. Kirill supplemented this tactic by connecting human dignity and morality, saying that a Christian must live in accordance with moral norms by asserting personal responsibility. Going further, Kirill added that while the ROC recognized the value of freedom of choice in society as a human rights concept, a Christian's evil choices eroded the value of that very freedom and, therefore, human rights cannot be superior to spiritual values. Head of the human rights organization "Memorial" Valentin Gefter contradicted Kirill's statement, telling the press on June 27 that "morals must not be the exclusive criteria for evaluating human rights." Bishop Diomid, Old Believers: Little Chance for Schism -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) As the Church strove to unite adherents under a singular values system, it also struggled with internal dissent from Bishop Diomid. At the October 6 gathering of the Holy Synod, the ROC officially defrocked the highly controversial former bishop, infamous for his condemnations of Patriarch Aleksey II's acknowledgment of Orthodox spiritual commonalties with Judaism, the ROC's cooperation with the government, and for the Church's failure to advocate for the rehabilitation of the Romanov dynasty. Diomid continued to receive encouragement from ultranationalists and hardliners after his demotion; however, only 15 protesters picketed outside of the patriarch's residence at Danilovsky Monastery as the Holy Synod deposed him. On October 6, Vsevolod Chaplin told us that Diomid maintained support from followers in the Russian Far East and St. Petersburg, but he could not provide specific parishes or numbers. Even though the ROC demoted Diomid from the rank of bishop to an ordinary monk, Kirill expressed hope that Diomid would repent and return to the fold, and that the ROC would restore him as a bishop once again should he recant his criticism. Diomid announced in July his intent to create a rival Orthodox Church in Moscow, one that opposed association with the Russian government. ¶7. (C) On October 17, the Convocation of the Russian Church of Old Believers voted to continue contacts with the ROC Moscow Patriarchate, despite the threat of a resulting schism among Old Believers, because of the "growing public interest in ancient church tradition." Old Believers head Metropolitan Korniliy called on the twenty members who had broken with the Old Believers in protest against Korniliy's contact with the ROC to return to the fold of the main church. Soviet dissident and defrocked priest Gleb Yakunin told us on November 14 that the situation with both the Old Believers and Bishop Diomid remained unclear, but he expected greater ROC contact with the Old Believers leadership, yet did not expect that Diomid would return to the Russian Orthodox Church-Moscow Patriarchate after the ROC's "propaganda campaign against him." ROC Opposes Communist Legacy -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Incidentally defusing one of Diomid's complaints, the ROC formally acknowledged on October 2 the family of Russia's last tsar as martyrs of the Church. Deputy Head of the ROC's Department of External Relations Vsevolod Chaplin announced that the ROC sanctified Emperor Nicholas II and his family as regal martyrs, and believed that the government's admission of unfounded repression against the Russian royal family would promote a "moral rebirth in Russia." On October 1, the Presidium of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation had recognized the royal family as "unjustifiably repressed and subject to rehabilitation," satisfying a complaint from House of the Romanovs attorney German Lukyanov challenging a 2007 Supreme Court resolution that refused to rehabilitate the family of the last Russian emperor. According to a VTsIOM poll released on November 17, 69% of Russians surveyed positively viewed the Church's rehabilitation of the tsar and his family, and 44% expressed sympathy for his actions before the 1917 revolution. The Romanov's elicited higher support than Lenin (42%),NKVD Chief Feliks Dzherzhinskiy (40%),and Stalin (28%). The adjustment in official Church policy followed Vsevolod Chaplin's call to remove the Communist stars from the Kremlin spires in September as well as the UOC's push to block the restoration of a statue dedicated to KGB Director Feliks Dzherzhinsky in front of FSB headquarters across from Lyubyanka Square. Church-Military Relations Strengthening? -------------- ¶9. (SBU) As reports circulated about reduced interest in military service, the ROC has coordinated with the Russian Army over the past several months on increased spiritual education for military personnel, a throwback to pre-Communist times. Head of the Public Chamber Commission on War Veterans Alexander Kanshin stated on November 11 that the ROC and Russian Armed Forces should legally establish closer contacts, proven as an "efficient way to boost the moral and psychological state of army and navy personnel." Kanshin questioned the efficacy of Russia's national defense considering that most conscripts joined the military for purely financial motives, without spiritual direction. One suggestion for building stronger ties has been the restoration of regimental priests, a practice introduced in 1716 by Peter the Great. Patriarch Aleksey II provided his blessing to an experiment in 2006 to reintroduce military chaplains at the troop level, yet no formal legislation passed in the interim. However, in September 2008 religious officials of all four officially recognized religions -- Orthodoxy, Judaism, Buddhism, and Islam -- participated in the Tsentr-2008 military exercise located in the Volga-Ural military district. While ROC officials drove the initiative over the past several years, other religious leaders planned to ride on the coattails of the ROC. Jewish representatives from the Federation of Jewish Communities in Russia (FEOR) introduced a mobile synagogue and chaplains at the Tsentr-2008 military exercises, and Muslim leaders softened their tone, planning to monitor the ROC's "forward approach" after criticizing the Church's 2006 suggestion for multi-confession chaplains as a violation of the Russian Constitution. Religious organizations continue to devote attention to this issue considering that 64 percent of all Russian servicemen are believers, according to an Armed Forces Sociological Center poll (Note: 83% are Orthodox, 8% are Muslim, 9% are Jewish, Buddhists, or worshippers of other religions. End Note). Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Despite the fact that less than 10% of Russians actively participate in Russian Orthodox life, over 70% of the population identifies themselves as Orthodox and, in turn, identifies with Orthodox beliefs. The ROC's human rights concept not only represents the general Russian preference for financial security over personal rights, it also neatly overlaps with Kremlin ideology against the violation of a sovereign country's beliefs. As the financial crisis impacts Russian institutions more severely, the Church's dependence on support from the Kremlin will increase. In order to mollify growing concern about a longer economic downturn, the GOR will expect the ROC to stay on message, rallying public opinion in its favor. BEYRLE