UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' LUNCH WITH DFM RYABKOV:

S E C R E T MOSCOW 003352


E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR KNNP KACT MNUC EFIN AF GG AM
AJ, MD, IR, RS

SUBJECT: UNDERSECRETARY BURNS' LUNCH WITH DFM RYABKOV:
US-RUSSIA RELATIONS, POST-START, MISSILE DEFENSE, IRAN,
NATO, AFGHANISTAN, INDIA, NORTH KOREA, BALKANS

REF: A. MOSCOW 3243

B. MOSCOW 3153

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (S) Summary. DFM Ryabkov November 12 reiterated FM
Lavrov's message to U/S Burns and the Ambassador that Russia
saw the Sochi Strategic Declaration as the basis for future
U.S.-Russian relations, and Medvedev's state of the union
address had not been intended as a deliberate slap at
President-elect Obama, but so Washington understood how
negatively Moscow viewed U.S. missile defense plans. The
bulk of the speech had been addressed at domestic reforms.
Ryabkov repeated that Moscow wanted to meet to discuss
missile defense and post-START before the end of the year,
but would need until the middle of December to prepare.
Negotiation of a post-START Agreement would be the "core
task" between the two countries for 2009, and he urged the
U.S. to focus on substance in seeking to narrow the
differences. In response to U/S Burns' preview of the
November 13 P5-plus-1 discussions on Iran, Ryabkov said
Russia was concerned about the direction of the pressure
track and the elements for a possible UN sanctions resolution
circulated in September by the UK which focused on measures
targeting Iran's economy and financial sector. He reiterated
that Russia could not agree to measures that would punish the
Iranian people. Such measures would just harden Iran's
defiance, and reduce the chances that Iran would respond
positively to the P5-plus-1 offer. In response to Ryabkov's
question how Iran could establish confidence that it was
pursuing a peaceful nuclear program, Burns responded that
answering IAEA DG ElBaradei's questions would be a way to
start. Ryabkov reiterated Russia's strong opposition to NATO
granting a Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine, and
expressed the hope that a "normal process" would resume soon
in the NATO-Russia Council. The groups also discussed
Afghanistan, Medvedev's trip to Latin America December 6-7,
India and civil nuclear cooperation, North Korea, and the
Balkans. End summary.

U.S.-Russia Relations, Medvedev's Speech
--------------


2. (C) At lunch November 12 in Moscow with Under Secretary
for Political Affairs Bill Burns and the Ambassador, Deputy
Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov reiterated points made by FM
Lavrov earlier (septel) that Russia saw the Sochi Strategic
Declaration as the basis for moving the U.S.-Russia
relationship forward, and that President Medvedev's state of
the union address (ref A) should not be seen as a deliberate
affront to President-elect Obama, but as presenting a clear
picture of Russia's concerns. While Moscow considered events
in the U.S., the timing of the speech had been driven by the
domestic schedule. Ryabkov stressed that, as subsequently
stated by Medvedev and FM Lavrov, Russia would only put
Iskander missiles in Kaliningrad if the U.S. deployed its
missile defense system (MD) in Eastern Europe.


3. (C) Medvedev's state of the union speech had focused on
the following four major themes, Ryabkov said, noting that
international issues had been a small part of it:
-- 1) the common responsibility of the entire international
community to resolve issues such as the global financial
crisis and aftermath of the conflict in Georgia. The need to
strengthen the international system, and promote the rule of
law;
-- 2) an "unexpectedly" strong criticism of Russia's
political system, saying it was unbalanced, and lacked the
basic elements for democracy to perform;
-- 3) a "huge part" devoted to the judicial system and the
inability of the judiciary to act effectively. The lack of
proper implementation of verdicts, for instance, was a major
problem for Russia in the Council of Europe where many cases
were lost because of the inability to pay fair compensation
for the misdeeds of government authorities; and
-- 4) a small part on international issues, mostly focused on
the financial crisis and failure of the global economic
system.


4. (C) U/S Burns noted that Medvedev's speech had been viewed
quite negatively, especially given the timing of it and its
gratuitously sharp tone. He urged the GOR to look for
constructive ways to get its message across; to remind people
of the benefits and importance of the U.S. and Russia working
together on key issues and through existing mechanisms such
as the Six-Party talks on North Korea or the P5-plus-1 on
Iran. Ambassador Beyrle added that Medvedev had a good
opportunity to do so through his press conference and meeting
with the Council on Foreign Relations on the margins of the
G20 meeting in Washington the following weekend.

Post-START and Missile Defense
--------------


5. (C) Ryabkov reiterated that Moscow wanted to hold MD and
post-START discussions with U/S Rood and his delegation "in
the usual format" before the end of the year, but the Russian
interagency needed more time to prepare for the meeting. The
first week of December was too soon, but perhaps sometime
between December 10-15 would work. The GOR may provide
additional comments and views prior to the meeting.


6. (C) Negotiation of a post-START agreement would be the
U.S. and Russia's "core task" in 2009, Ryabkov said. While
Moscow agreed that a decision on whether to extend the START
Treaty did not have to be taken at the pre-December 5, 2008,
meeting, the pressure on both countries from the rest of the
world to reach an agreement would grow, especially as we
neared the 2010 review conference of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty. Noting that the differences between us were "huge,
and well-known," Ryabkov suggested that we seek to reach
agreement on the areas where the possibility of reaching
agreement was greater, whittling down the number of
differences, until we had "3-4 key issues" to resolve. It
was important, however, to focus on substance, not on scope
and parameters.


7. (C) U/S Burns agreed it was important to continue as soon
as possible the discussions and the efforts to narrow our
differences. He added that we should also look at post-START
in the context of a wider review of non-proliferation goals.

Iran
--------------


8. (S) U/S Burns previewed some of the discussion that would
be held the following day at the P5-plus-1 political
directors' meeting in Paris, emphasizing the need for a
two-track strategy given that Iran had shown no indication
that it was serious about accepting the P5-plus-1 offer or
"freeze for freeze" proposal. Burns observed that Iran was
simply stalling while making rapid technical progress. Thus,
while it was important to continue the diplomatic track, it
was also important to consider measures that would
demonstrate to Iran that the price would rise, if it did not
accept the diplomatic efforts. In response to Ryabkov's
question how Iran could establish confidence that it was
pursuing a peaceful nuclear program, Burns responded that
answering ElBaradei's questions would be a way to start.


9. (S) Saying that the issue was "deadlocked to a degree I've
never seen before," Ryabkov emphasized the need for another
meeting between Cooper and Bagheri or between Solana and
Jalili. He said he had pressed Iranian officials strongly to
accept the P5-plus-1 offer during his recent visit to Tehran
(ref B),but they were non-committal. Perhaps the absence of
such pressure would help. Although Russia had agreed to
three UN Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions and
acknowledged that it bothered Iran when the UNSC acted,
Moscow could not agree to measures that would punish the
Iranian people. Such measures would simply push the Iranians
away and eliminate their incentive to engage in dialogue,
Ryabkov claimed. "I see only minuses" in adopting another
sanctions resolution that targets Iran's economy and
financial sector, he said, and it went "far beyond what
Ministers had agreed to do." He added that independent
actions by the U.S. and Europe, such as unilateral sanctions
(including the sanctions on Russian firm Rosoboronexport)
were unhelpful. Efforts to reinforce the "hard approach"
would be "disastrous," Ryabkov insisted. If the Iranians
thought they were being pushed into a corner, they would
never give up but would seek ways to cause more trouble.

NATO
--------------


10. (C) Ryabkov reiterated Russia's strong opposition to NATO
granting a Membership Action Plan to Georgia and Ukraine, and
expressed the hope that a "normal process" would resume soon
in the NATO-Russia Council. U/S Burns said he understood the
depth of Russia's views on NATO membership for Ukraine and
Georgia. He stressed that a hard public posture by Russia
could be counterproductive. Ryabkov noted that if Russia was
"too quiet," it got criticized from inside; if it was "too
loud," it was called counterproductive. Russia did not pay
lip service to anyone; it just wanted to be heard.

Afghanistan
--------------


11. (C) Ryabkov said Moscow welcomed thoughts from the U.S.
on how to deal with the situation in Afghanistan and engaging
with the Taliban. There were concerns that the Taliban could
return to power, while some of the local leaders were
overambitious. Moscow had simply noted that all should
"exercise vigilance and restraint" in contacts with people on
the UNSC 1267 Taliban sanctions list. Burns said that while
it was a good idea in principle to consider engaging
"reconcilable" Taliban leaders, however, it was harder to
find any.

Other Issues
--------------


12. (C) Ryabkov said that Medvedev would follow the APEC
Summit and bilateral meetings in Lima with visits to Brazil
and Venezuela. In Rio de Janeiro, Medvedev would look at
centers of innovation, meet with businesses and sign some
agreements. Biofuels was an important issue. Russia thought
too much emphasis had been placed on biofuels at the expense
of food supply security and the environment. In the G8,
Russia was considering convening a meeting in Moscow in 2009
to address these issues.


13. (C) Confirming that Medvedev would travel to India
December 5-6, Ryabkov said Russia was very interested in
cooperation with India on civil nuclear issues, and expected
Russian companies to be quick to engage.


14. (C) U/S Burns said China was considering when to hold
another Six Party heads of delegation meeting. Rumors about
Kim Jong-Il's poor health also complicated the effort.
Ryabkov agreed, noting that it had been possible to agree on
a detailed framework for resolution on North Korea, even
though the North Koreans were "no easier than the Iranians."


15. (C) U/S Burns expressed concerns about increasing
tensions in Serbia, especially between Dodik and Siladjik.
Ryabkov agreed. He asked what was happening with the
transfer of peacekeeping in Kosovo from the UN to EULEX. If
the Kosovars agreed, he said it seemed there was a good
chance to have a chairman's statement closing out all open
issues.


16. (SBU) U/S Burns has cleared this cable.
BEYRLE


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