DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003290 NOFORN SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY SECRETARY ZUBAKOV Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: In a November 1 meeting with visiting EUR DAS Matt Bryza, Russian Deputy Security Council Secretary Yuri Zubakov insinuated that Georgia started the August conflict with U.S. acquiescence, arms, and funds. He dismissed Bryza's avowal that Georgia was not prepared for war in August, claiming Saakashvili had told him "only the military way was possible," and called on the U.S. to prove its version of events by sharing its intelligence. For the Geneva process, Zubakov called for security guarantees to ensure that Georgia's "aggression" could not happen again, followed by an arms embargo on Georgia, and an end to threats of renewed violence. Zubakov called on the U.S. to turn the page on the events of August, which he described as the result of "poor cooperation" between the U.S. and Russia. Bryza pushed back on Zubakov's assertions, noting the U.S. had only provided Georgia with basic military support. Bryza said that the international community would not simply put Russia's August aggression aside, and called on Russia to use its sway over the South Ossetians and Abkhaz to make the November 18 Geneva talks a success. End Summary. -------------- Zubakov unplugged -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting November 1, Russian Deputy Secretary to the Security Council Yuri Antonovich Zubakov told visiting DAS Matt Bryza that Georgian president Saakashvili had told him the only way to save Russians in South Ossetia was to "help cut insurgents' heads off." However, because of Georgian control over the mass media, the "fact of Georgian aggression" was still not publicly known. Zubakov insinuated that Saakashvili had a role in the death of former Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania 2005 and Georgian Imedi TV channel owner Badri Patarkatsishvili in 2008. Zubakov claimed that Georgia for 80 years had felt special due to Stalin's Georgian heritage, and continued to exhibit these pretensions through capricious behavior. Zubakov reiterated his call for establishing the facts, in order to understand how the August conflict could have occurred, and suggested Georgia had begun the aggression after having received foreign acquiescence. ¶3. (C) In the course of a sometimes rambling diatribe, Zubakov rejected Ukrainian president Yushchenko's attempts to gain recognition for the Holodomor, and condemned Ukraine's attempts to "rehabilitate Ukrainian Nazi war criminals" who had fought against the Red Army during World War II. -------------- Accusations of U.S. support for aggression -------------- ¶4. (C) Rejecting Zubakov's allegations of Georgian aggression and veiled accusation of U.S. complicity, Bryza opined that Saakashvili had contingency plans for military action in South Ossetia but no clear intention to initiate use of force. He described President Bush's repeated admonitions to Saakashvili not to use force, and said that when the President feared Saakashvili had misunderstood him, Bush called yet again to underscore his point, while Secretary Rice sent Bryza to Tbilisi to deliver the message in person. Bryza argued that some Saakashvili advisors had advocated a pre-emptive military strike on Russian troops in Abkhazia in April, but Saakashvili declined to be drawn into a conflict. However, Bryza noted that Russian provocations continued, such as the introduction of Russian railway troops into Abkhazia and the downing of a Georgian drone over Abkhazia. ¶5. (C) Zubakov interrupted to dismiss Bryza's talk about non-aggressive Georgian intentions, given that Saakashvili had told Zubakov during a visit to Tbilisi that "only the military way was possible." Georgia had "cheated" the U.S., and someone in the U.S. government had failed in his "Saakashvili project" and therefore should quit. "Foreign advisors" in Gori had advised Georgia to stockpile weapons, which subsequently acquired more weapons than it could afford. Zubakov then insinuated the U.S. had supplied the money for Georgia to buy weapons from third countries. He called on the U.S. to share its information on Georgia's pre-conflict intentions and documentation for the funding of Georgia's military supplies, as done elsewhere in U.S.-Russian cooperation on terrorism. ¶6. (C/NF) Bryza pushed back on Zubakov's allegations, noting both sides had accused the other of staging provocations, MOSCOW 00003290 002 OF 002 which deteriorated in August to the point where Georgia felt it had to react. Bryza asserted the U.S. had not supplied offensive weapons to Georgia, only low-level support such as basic training and M4 rifles, but no artillery or tanks. Bryza also stated that other countries had supplied military equipment to Georgia, which paid for them from its own budget. Bryza underlined that the U.S. had the right to provide Georgia with the means to protect its territorial integrity, but chose to limit itself to low-level support. Bryza reminded Zubakov that neither the United States nor its European Allies questioned Russia's own right to use force to protect its territorial integrity with respect to Chechnya, though we did criticize many of Russia's harsh methods. Ambassador Beyrle rejected Zubakov's oblique equation of the Georgian conflict to terrorism, affirming the Georgia issue was not about terrorism. -------------- Geneva talks -------------- ¶7. (C/NF) Refusing to speak on a tactical level about the next round of the Geneva process November 18, Zubakov called for result-oriented talks, and accused Georgia of being hung up over questions of format, in order to avoid substantive talks. In response to the Ambassador's question, Zubakov stated that the main outcome of the Geneva process for Russia was to receive guarantees that Georgia's "aggression" could not happen again, followed by an arms embargo on Georgia, economic development assistance, the return of IDPs, and the observation of human rights. ¶8. (C) Zubakov voiced concern that EU special representative Morel might be replaced once the Czech Republic took over the EU presidency in January. Bryza confirmed Morel would stay on despite the change in EU presidency, and praised Morel's efforts to find a format for the talks that would allow substantive negotiations, including by moving substantive discussions to the working groups. Bryza called for Russia and the U.S. to influence the parties to attend the November 18 working groups. While Bryza acknowledged that the U.S.-Georgia relationship included "sparring" over issues, he suggested Russia could use its sway over the South Ossetians and Abkhaz to ensure that the November 18 meetings would be productive. There was no alternative to the Geneva process, Bryza stated. ¶9. (C) Zubakov expressed surprise at Bryza's characterization of the U.S. relationship with Georgia, and suggested the U.S. "experiment" in order to find out how much influence it still had with Georgia. Calling on the U.S. to move past the events of August, which he described as the result of "poor cooperation" between the U.S. and Russia, Zubakov said both sides could work together despite having different goals. Bryza pushed back against this assertion, saying the U.S. and Russia would continue to disagree over the August conflict and that despite Russia's wish to move past those events and return to pre-war relations, negotiations on Georgia would continue for a long time. ¶10. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable. BEYRLE