DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003290

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/08/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: DAS BRYZA'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL DEPUTY
SECRETARY ZUBAKOV

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: In a November 1 meeting with visiting EUR
DAS Matt Bryza, Russian Deputy Security Council Secretary
Yuri Zubakov insinuated that Georgia started the August
conflict with U.S. acquiescence, arms, and funds. He
dismissed Bryza's avowal that Georgia was not prepared for
war in August, claiming Saakashvili had told him "only the
military way was possible," and called on the U.S. to prove
its version of events by sharing its intelligence. For the
Geneva process, Zubakov called for security guarantees to
ensure that Georgia's "aggression" could not happen again,
followed by an arms embargo on Georgia, and an end to threats
of renewed violence. Zubakov called on the U.S. to turn the
page on the events of August, which he described as the
result of "poor cooperation" between the U.S. and Russia.
Bryza pushed back on Zubakov's assertions, noting the U.S.
had only provided Georgia with basic military support. Bryza
said that the international community would not simply put
Russia's August aggression aside, and called on Russia to use
its sway over the South Ossetians and Abkhaz to make the
November 18 Geneva talks a success. End Summary.

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Zubakov unplugged
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2. (C) In a meeting November 1, Russian Deputy Secretary to
the Security Council Yuri Antonovich Zubakov told visiting
DAS Matt Bryza that Georgian president Saakashvili had told
him the only way to save Russians in South Ossetia was to
"help cut insurgents' heads off." However, because of
Georgian control over the mass media, the "fact of Georgian
aggression" was still not publicly known. Zubakov insinuated
that Saakashvili had a role in the death of former Georgian
Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania 2005 and Georgian Imedi TV
channel owner Badri Patarkatsishvili in 2008. Zubakov
claimed that Georgia for 80 years had felt special due to
Stalin's Georgian heritage, and continued to exhibit these
pretensions through capricious behavior. Zubakov reiterated
his call for establishing the facts, in order to understand
how the August conflict could have occurred, and suggested
Georgia had begun the aggression after having received
foreign acquiescence.


3. (C) In the course of a sometimes rambling diatribe,
Zubakov rejected Ukrainian president Yushchenko's attempts to
gain recognition for the Holodomor, and condemned Ukraine's
attempts to "rehabilitate Ukrainian Nazi war criminals" who
had fought against the Red Army during World War II.

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Accusations of U.S. support for aggression
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4. (C) Rejecting Zubakov's allegations of Georgian
aggression and veiled accusation of U.S. complicity, Bryza
opined that Saakashvili had contingency plans for military
action in South Ossetia but no clear intention to initiate
use of force. He described President Bush's repeated
admonitions to Saakashvili not to use force, and said that
when the President feared Saakashvili had misunderstood him,
Bush called yet again to underscore his point, while
Secretary Rice sent Bryza to Tbilisi to deliver the message
in person. Bryza argued that some Saakashvili advisors had
advocated a pre-emptive military strike on Russian troops in
Abkhazia in April, but Saakashvili declined to be drawn into
a conflict. However, Bryza noted that Russian provocations
continued, such as the introduction of Russian railway troops
into Abkhazia and the downing of a Georgian drone over
Abkhazia.


5. (C) Zubakov interrupted to dismiss Bryza's talk about
non-aggressive Georgian intentions, given that Saakashvili
had told Zubakov during a visit to Tbilisi that "only the
military way was possible." Georgia had "cheated" the U.S.,
and someone in the U.S. government had failed in his
"Saakashvili project" and therefore should quit. "Foreign
advisors" in Gori had advised Georgia to stockpile weapons,
which subsequently acquired more weapons than it could
afford. Zubakov then insinuated the U.S. had supplied the
money for Georgia to buy weapons from third countries. He
called on the U.S. to share its information on Georgia's
pre-conflict intentions and documentation for the funding of
Georgia's military supplies, as done elsewhere in
U.S.-Russian cooperation on terrorism.


6. (C/NF) Bryza pushed back on Zubakov's allegations, noting
both sides had accused the other of staging provocations,

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which deteriorated in August to the point where Georgia felt
it had to react. Bryza asserted the U.S. had not supplied
offensive weapons to Georgia, only low-level support such as
basic training and M4 rifles, but no artillery or tanks.
Bryza also stated that other countries had supplied military
equipment to Georgia, which paid for them from its own
budget. Bryza underlined that the U.S. had the right to
provide Georgia with the means to protect its territorial
integrity, but chose to limit itself to low-level support.
Bryza reminded Zubakov that neither the United States nor its
European Allies questioned Russia's own right to use force to
protect its territorial integrity with respect to Chechnya,
though we did criticize many of Russia's harsh methods.
Ambassador Beyrle rejected Zubakov's oblique equation of the
Georgian conflict to terrorism, affirming the Georgia issue
was not about terrorism.

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Geneva talks
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7. (C/NF) Refusing to speak on a tactical level about the
next round of the Geneva process November 18, Zubakov called
for result-oriented talks, and accused Georgia of being hung
up over questions of format, in order to avoid substantive
talks. In response to the Ambassador's question, Zubakov
stated that the main outcome of the Geneva process for Russia
was to receive guarantees that Georgia's "aggression" could
not happen again, followed by an arms embargo on Georgia,
economic development assistance, the return of IDPs, and the
observation of human rights.


8. (C) Zubakov voiced concern that EU special representative
Morel might be replaced once the Czech Republic took over the
EU presidency in January. Bryza confirmed Morel would stay
on despite the change in EU presidency, and praised Morel's
efforts to find a format for the talks that would allow
substantive negotiations, including by moving substantive
discussions to the working groups. Bryza called for Russia
and the U.S. to influence the parties to attend the November
18 working groups. While Bryza acknowledged that the
U.S.-Georgia relationship included "sparring" over issues, he
suggested Russia could use its sway over the South Ossetians
and Abkhaz to ensure that the November 18 meetings would be
productive. There was no alternative to the Geneva process,
Bryza stated.


9. (C) Zubakov expressed surprise at Bryza's
characterization of the U.S. relationship with Georgia, and
suggested the U.S. "experiment" in order to find out how much
influence it still had with Georgia. Calling on the U.S. to
move past the events of August, which he described as the
result of "poor cooperation" between the U.S. and Russia,
Zubakov said both sides could work together despite having
different goals. Bryza pushed back against this assertion,
saying the U.S. and Russia would continue to disagree over
the August conflict and that despite Russia's wish to move
past those events and return to pre-war relations,
negotiations on Georgia would continue for a long time.


10. (U) DAS Bryza cleared this cable.
BEYRLE