SUBJECT: GOOD NEWS AND BAD FROM RUSSIAN ELITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003287 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PHUM SOCI RS PINR SUBJECT: SUBJECT: GOOD NEWS AND BAD FROM RUSSIAN ELITE SURVEY Classified By: Acting DCM Alice Wells. Reason: 1.4 (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: A study of the Russian elite, conducted by Mikhail Afanasev of the Niccolo-M consulting firm, found that a majority "second tier" leaders and managers supported a system based upon rule of law and a level playing field for economic competition. Except for respondents from the security services, all opposed the idea of state capitalism. As such, they were receptive to the message of Medvedev's four i's. However, their more progressive approach toward the domestic political and economic system was checked in part by strong approval of the administration's foreign policy. Although relations with the West was not a specific issue for the survey, 20 percent of respondents blamed a Western policy of "keeping Russia weak" as the cause of Russia's problems. This idea resonated primarily with government bureaucrats (more than 35 percent) and entrepreneurs (more than 20 percent). Afanasev said that the entrepreneurs, who have ready access to the internet and whose views are not necessarily shaped by television media, are the most strident in arguing that none of the Western governments want to see a strong Russia and they point to "double standards" in how Russia is treated. End Summary. Methodology -------------- ¶2. (C) On October 8, the director of the Niccolo-M political consulting firm Afanasev explained his research project on elite attitudes, which was funded by "Liberal Mission", a liberal NGO founded by academic director of the State University-Higher School of Economics Yevgeniy Yasin. He told us that he intentionally targeted the second tier of the elite, eschewing the more well-known oligarchs and top government officials. He considered the latter stratum to be a real "oligarchy" separate from society, following its own "uninteresting" logic, which was poorly disposed to answering the kind of questions that the survey was asking. Therefore, instead, Afanasev looked at the second tier, focusing on those who are on the cutting edge of Russian development and whose services are changing the shape of Russia. Thus, he targeted four groups: - Government workers: federal, regional, and municipal. (Bureaucrats and security service officers (silovkiki)); - Business: Entrepreneurs and managers; - "Societal" workers: education, medical, science, and intellectuals; and - Public opinion shapers: journalists and experts. (Afanasev said that also talked to lawyers, but said they did not fit in any one group. He noted that they were also the most reticent about answering his questions.) ¶3. (C) Afanasev underscored that his survey was not designed to be representative of the whole elite. Indeed, he acknowledged that it did not meet the criteria of more scientific general surveys according to sociological norms. Nonetheless, he considered it valuable as a window into the private thinking of an important stratum of society. His survey was conducted among 1,000 respondents across Russia, with slightly less than half from Moscow. (Afanasev views this as about the right balance for the elite as a whole.) Afanasev's surveys were conducted between March and May - a time that corresponded with the end of the Russian presidential election and Medvedev's inauguration. ¶4. (C) There were no questions about support for any specific politician or institution. If there had been, Afanasev said, he doubted that anyone would have taken part. Moreover, the survey was completely anonymous. Ultimately, Afanasev said that his poll did not show any collective position among the particular social groups, but instead gave an idea of their private preferences, were they allowed to choose. Assessments -------------- ¶5. (C) The most surprising result of Afanasev's research was his conclusion that his "elite," which he acknowledged could be categorized as "upper middle class" and professionals, are not wholly satisfied with the current government and its policies. No more than a third of all bureaucrats surveyed supported the administration's state capitalism, with even less support among other groups - except for the silovik respondents. Moreover, the majority of respondents expressed a desire for a level playing field and less government involvement, advocating evolutionary liberalism. ¶6. (C) Disagreement with the direction of Russia's domestic course, however, was checked by strong support for the administration's foreign policy. Afanasev's surveys did not specifically address foreign policy issues. However, in response to a question about the source of Russia's problems, he noted that 20 percent of respondents said that Russia's woes were caused by outside forces in the West - one of the five choices provided by the survey. ¶7. (C) Perhaps most surprising, entrepreneurs tended to see the logic of foreign interference even more so than silovik types. More than a third of the "bureaucrat" respondents chose this answer and more than 20 percent of entrepreneurs. (The siloviki were, according to Afanasev, more pragmatic and less ideological.) Afanasev himself appears to be in this camp as well, and he listed a host of perceived U.S. double standards: Jackson-Vanik, delaying Russian entry into the WTO after Ukraine, and Mittel's problems buying into the U.S. market. He said that the elite give Putin an "A" for his foreign policy and willingness to stand up for Russian interests, including those of business. He underscored that there was no "western-phobia," but implied that his elite held a firm conviction that the West -- particularly the U.S. -- does not want to see a strong Russia. He indicated that he expected that elite support of the regime had strengthened because of the Georgia war, but he admitted that he had no survey data to support this argument. Comment -------------- ¶8. (C) Afanasev's research offers a fresh glimpse into the mindset of Russia's elite, targeting the top opinion influencers and upper management levels in a number of critical fields. Press reports have emphasized the areas of disagreement between this elite and the administration and demonstrated strong, if quiet, support for the progressive policies that Medvedev advocated as a candidate. Moreover, given the growing concern among the business and political elite about the growing economic crisis, this group could be a constituency for reform and change, away from the state-capitalism model. ¶9. (C) Afanasev's thoughts on elite support for the government's foreign policy, however, show that their "liberalism" does not extend to international affairs, raising the question of which aspect has greater salience among the elite. Indeed, Afanasev made clear that his target group backed the administration's policies on the Georgia war as a way of showing Russia's "revival" as a great power. As Russia faces economic slowdown, the risk remains that the Medvedev/Putin tandem will chose to fan the flames of anti-Americanism and skepticism toward the West to offset potential opposition within the elite to economic hardship and domestic policy missteps. End Comment. BEYRLE