RUSSIA LOSES NO MATTER HOW THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003271 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG MARR MNUC IR RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA LOSES NO MATTER HOW THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR CRISIS TURNS OUT REF: A. MOSCOW 3220 ¶B. MOSCOW 3252 Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 ( b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Russia will lose no matter how the Iranian nuclear controversy is resolved, according to analysts who argue that Russia faces either the prospect of a nuclear Iran causing instability in the Middle East, or a negotiated settlement that will lead Iran to "drop" Russia in favor of improved ties with the West, relations with which Iran values more highly than with Russia. Moscow has little to offer Tehran, as demonstrated by the limited nature of current political and economic ties, and sees Russia-Iran relations as an opportunity to portray Russian foreign policy as "independent." If Iran does develop nuclear weapons, analysts do not believe Iran itself would pose a threat to Russia, but the ensuing instability in the Middle East from an arms race, or an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran, would challenge Russian security. The prospect of either result, they contend, means that the GOR would prefer to continue the protracted negotiating process. End summary. Iran Provides Russia an "Independent" Foreign Policy -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) A variety of Russian foreign policy and defense analysts we spoke with recently struck similar chords on what they saw as the bleak outlook for Russia vis-a-vis the Iranian nuclear program. Failure to stop Iran from going nuclear would cause instability that posed a threat to Russia, while a successful outcome to P5 1 efforts would deprive Russia of a chance to play a pivotal diplomatic role and ultimately diminish Russia-Iran ties. Analysts argued that the Russian leadership does not see Iran as a threat, but as a "bargaining chip" in relations with the West, especially the U.S. They were unanimous in telling us that the character of Russia-Iran relations are directly impacted by how Russia perceived its relationship with the U.S. If Moscow felt Washington treated it poorly, or failed to take its opinions into consideration, Moscow countered by appearing to "step-up" ties with Tehran, such as leaving open the prospect of future arms sales. ¶3. (C) Russian relations with Iran were actually rather limited, according to analysts who said that Iran provided Russia an opportunity to appear a player in international affairs. Aleksey Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center said that Iran ties were used to demonstrate that Moscow was capable of maintaining an "independent" foreign policy. Georgi Mirksy, a long-time Middle East expert currently with the Institute of Higher Economics, similarly argued that Russian relations with Iran helped fulfill Moscow's desire to demonstrate that it had a "vigorous" foreign policy. ¶4. (C) Analysts warned against the U.S. attempting to dictate to Russia on Iran, which put Moscow on the defensive and bode poorly for cooperation in other areas. Ruslan Pukhov, Editor of the Moscow Defense Brief, said that the U.S. sanctioning Rosoboronexport for trading with Iran appeared to threaten Moscow's independence, providing succor to anti-American elements in the Moscow political establishment (ref A). The Moscow Carnegie Center's Aleksey Arbatov criticized the sanctions as "feeding Russian paranoia" about U.S. intentions toward Russia. Iran Will Drop Russia for the U.S. -------------- ¶5. (C) Russian analysts understood that Iran placed greater value on improving ties with the West, especially the U.S., than its meager ties to Russia. Malashenko thought that the West offered Iran more political and economic possibilities than Russia, which would ultimately be "put aside" by Iran once it settled the nuclear issue and had an opening with the U.S. and Europe. He predicted slow, but continued progress toward this end by liberal modernizers in Iran. Mirsky said that such an outcome meant that the GOR's Iran diplomacy focused on continuing negotiations, which Moscow argued kept Tehran from feeling cornered by threats and sanctions, but was really intended to prevent Iran from settling with the West, thereby keeping Iran an option in Russia's limited diplomatic tool kit. Arbatov cautioned, however, that if Washington valued relations with Moscow, it should not go "too far" and make its own deal with Tehran, thereby confirming Russian suspicions that the U.S. sought to isolate it. Washington needed to keep Moscow involved in finding a diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue. MOSCOW 00003271 002 OF 002 ¶6. (C) Analysts downplayed the extent of Russia-Iran ties, despite efforts by both sides to make them appear inflated. Russia might see Iran as an important economic partner, but with trade hovering around only $3 billion annually, Russia viewed Iran more for its potential as a consumer of Russian exports (ref B). Military sales were also limited to $100 million in purchases over the last eight years, in the estimation of independent military analyst Ivan Safranchuk, who said that the problem for Moscow was that it wanted to sell Iran more arms than Tehran wanted to buy. Pukhov agreed with this assessment, and pointed to the single weekly flight between Moscow and Tehran as a symbol of the limited nature of Russia-Iran ties. The Consequences of a Nuclear Iran Threaten Russia -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Analysts agreed that a nuclear Iran would not pose a direct threat to Russia, but they thought that extreme reactions by certain countries could destabilize the Middle East and the Muslim world, the repercussions of which would cause serious problems for Moscow. Arbatov said that the basic difference between the Russian and American views of the Iranian nuclear program was that for the U.S. this was an issue of global importance, whereas for Russia a nuclear Iran would be just one more nuclear country near its border and would not make much difference to Russian security. He feared, however, that an Israeli or U.S. strike to prevent Iran from going nuclear would have a devastating impact on the Middle East, which would experience a convulsion of anti-Americanism and the toppling of moderate Arab regimes. This would be a disaster for Russia, which would face a "black hole (on its southern border) from Palestine to the Hindu Kush." Russia feared the impact an increase in Islamic extremism would have on Central Asia, the Caucasus, and its own Muslim population. ¶8. (C) Analysts argued that military action against Iran, whether by Israel or the U.S., would put Russia in a difficult position, as it would have to choose between the West and Iran. Mirsky thought that Russia would ultimately choose the West, with which the political and economic elite saw its future. Arbatov pointed out that an attack would also complicate Russian relations with China, which relied upon Iran for gas. ¶9. (C) Both Mirsky and Arbatov speculated that the Iranian leadership had not yet made a decision to actually build a nuclear bomb, and could choose instead to develop the capability to carry out full-scale enrichment capacity, leaving it about a month away from assembling a weapon, believing this would not prompt an attack. Arbatov thought this an incorrect assumption, as Israel would not let Iran get that close to a nuclear capability and attack. He argued that if Russia delayed completion of the Bushehr nuclear power plant, this would send a signal to Iran that it could not depend upon guarantees allowing it a civilian nuclear reactor and provide more incentive to develop its uranium enrichment capacity. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The analysts' arguments provide one explanation for Russia's preference not to place new sanctions on Iran, as well as its predilection to see the positive side of IAEA reports critical of Tehran. What the analysts do not explain is why, if the consequences of a nuclear Iran would threaten Russian security, the GOR favors the current, protracted negotiating process that could allow Tehran the opportunity to advance its nuclear program. The political benefits for Russia of continuing to play the Iran card do not appear to outweigh the possibility of instability in the Middle East. The answer may lie in the fact that the GOR really does believe that Tehran is a long way from achieving the capacity to develop nuclear weapons, by which time Moscow hopes to have placed itself on a stronger diplomatic footing and will not have to depend upon Iran to demonstrate that it has a vigorous foreign policy. BEYRLE