RUSSIA LOSES NO MATTER HOW THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003271

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG MARR MNUC IR RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA LOSES NO MATTER HOW THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR
CRISIS TURNS OUT

REF: A. MOSCOW 3220

B. MOSCOW 3252

Classified By: Acting Political M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4 (
b/d).


1. (C) Summary: Russia will lose no matter how the Iranian
nuclear controversy is resolved, according to analysts who
argue that Russia faces either the prospect of a nuclear Iran
causing instability in the Middle East, or a negotiated
settlement that will lead Iran to "drop" Russia in favor of
improved ties with the West, relations with which Iran values
more highly than with Russia. Moscow has little to offer
Tehran, as demonstrated by the limited nature of current
political and economic ties, and sees Russia-Iran relations
as an opportunity to portray Russian foreign policy as
"independent." If Iran does develop nuclear weapons,
analysts do not believe Iran itself would pose a threat to
Russia, but the ensuing instability in the Middle East from
an arms race, or an Israeli or U.S. attack on Iran, would
challenge Russian security. The prospect of either result,
they contend, means that the GOR would prefer to continue the
protracted negotiating process. End summary.

Iran Provides Russia an "Independent" Foreign Policy
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2. (C) A variety of Russian foreign policy and defense
analysts we spoke with recently struck similar chords on what
they saw as the bleak outlook for Russia vis-a-vis the
Iranian nuclear program. Failure to stop Iran from going
nuclear would cause instability that posed a threat to
Russia, while a successful outcome to P5 1 efforts would
deprive Russia of a chance to play a pivotal diplomatic role
and ultimately diminish Russia-Iran ties. Analysts argued
that the Russian leadership does not see Iran as a threat,
but as a "bargaining chip" in relations with the West,
especially the U.S. They were unanimous in telling us that
the character of Russia-Iran relations are directly impacted
by how Russia perceived its relationship with the U.S. If
Moscow felt Washington treated it poorly, or failed to take
its opinions into consideration, Moscow countered by
appearing to "step-up" ties with Tehran, such as leaving open
the prospect of future arms sales.


3. (C) Russian relations with Iran were actually rather
limited, according to analysts who said that Iran provided
Russia an opportunity to appear a player in international
affairs. Aleksey Malashenko of the Moscow Carnegie Center
said that Iran ties were used to demonstrate that Moscow was
capable of maintaining an "independent" foreign policy.
Georgi Mirksy, a long-time Middle East expert currently with
the Institute of Higher Economics, similarly argued that
Russian relations with Iran helped fulfill Moscow's desire to
demonstrate that it had a "vigorous" foreign policy.


4. (C) Analysts warned against the U.S. attempting to dictate
to Russia on Iran, which put Moscow on the defensive and bode
poorly for cooperation in other areas. Ruslan Pukhov, Editor
of the Moscow Defense Brief, said that the U.S. sanctioning
Rosoboronexport for trading with Iran appeared to threaten
Moscow's independence, providing succor to anti-American
elements in the Moscow political establishment (ref A). The
Moscow Carnegie Center's Aleksey Arbatov criticized the
sanctions as "feeding Russian paranoia" about U.S. intentions
toward Russia.

Iran Will Drop Russia for the U.S.
--------------


5. (C) Russian analysts understood that Iran placed greater
value on improving ties with the West, especially the U.S.,
than its meager ties to Russia. Malashenko thought that the
West offered Iran more political and economic possibilities
than Russia, which would ultimately be "put aside" by Iran
once it settled the nuclear issue and had an opening with the
U.S. and Europe. He predicted slow, but continued progress
toward this end by liberal modernizers in Iran. Mirsky said
that such an outcome meant that the GOR's Iran diplomacy
focused on continuing negotiations, which Moscow argued kept
Tehran from feeling cornered by threats and sanctions, but
was really intended to prevent Iran from settling with the
West, thereby keeping Iran an option in Russia's limited
diplomatic tool kit. Arbatov cautioned, however, that if
Washington valued relations with Moscow, it should not go
"too far" and make its own deal with Tehran, thereby
confirming Russian suspicions that the U.S. sought to isolate
it. Washington needed to keep Moscow involved in finding a
diplomatic solution to the nuclear issue.


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6. (C) Analysts downplayed the extent of Russia-Iran ties,
despite efforts by both sides to make them appear inflated.
Russia might see Iran as an important economic partner, but
with trade hovering around only $3 billion annually, Russia
viewed Iran more for its potential as a consumer of Russian
exports (ref B). Military sales were also limited to $100
million in purchases over the last eight years, in the
estimation of independent military analyst Ivan Safranchuk,
who said that the problem for Moscow was that it wanted to
sell Iran more arms than Tehran wanted to buy. Pukhov agreed
with this assessment, and pointed to the single weekly flight
between Moscow and Tehran as a symbol of the limited nature
of Russia-Iran ties.

The Consequences of a Nuclear Iran Threaten Russia
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7. (C) Analysts agreed that a nuclear Iran would not pose a
direct threat to Russia, but they thought that extreme
reactions by certain countries could destabilize the Middle
East and the Muslim world, the repercussions of which would
cause serious problems for Moscow. Arbatov said that the
basic difference between the Russian and American views of
the Iranian nuclear program was that for the U.S. this was an
issue of global importance, whereas for Russia a nuclear Iran
would be just one more nuclear country near its border and
would not make much difference to Russian security. He
feared, however, that an Israeli or U.S. strike to prevent
Iran from going nuclear would have a devastating impact on
the Middle East, which would experience a convulsion of
anti-Americanism and the toppling of moderate Arab regimes.
This would be a disaster for Russia, which would face a
"black hole (on its southern border) from Palestine to the
Hindu Kush." Russia feared the impact an increase in Islamic
extremism would have on Central Asia, the Caucasus, and its
own Muslim population.


8. (C) Analysts argued that military action against Iran,
whether by Israel or the U.S., would put Russia in a
difficult position, as it would have to choose between the
West and Iran. Mirsky thought that Russia would ultimately
choose the West, with which the political and economic elite
saw its future. Arbatov pointed out that an attack would
also complicate Russian relations with China, which relied
upon Iran for gas.


9. (C) Both Mirsky and Arbatov speculated that the Iranian
leadership had not yet made a decision to actually build a
nuclear bomb, and could choose instead to develop the
capability to carry out full-scale enrichment capacity,
leaving it about a month away from assembling a weapon,
believing this would not prompt an attack. Arbatov thought
this an incorrect assumption, as Israel would not let Iran
get that close to a nuclear capability and attack. He argued
that if Russia delayed completion of the Bushehr nuclear
power plant, this would send a signal to Iran that it could
not depend upon guarantees allowing it a civilian nuclear
reactor and provide more incentive to develop its uranium
enrichment capacity.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The analysts' arguments provide one explanation for
Russia's preference not to place new sanctions on Iran, as
well as its predilection to see the positive side of IAEA
reports critical of Tehran. What the analysts do not explain
is why, if the consequences of a nuclear Iran would threaten
Russian security, the GOR favors the current, protracted
negotiating process that could allow Tehran the opportunity
to advance its nuclear program. The political benefits for
Russia of continuing to play the Iran card do not appear to
outweigh the possibility of instability in the Middle East.
The answer may lie in the fact that the GOR really does
believe that Tehran is a long way from achieving the capacity
to develop nuclear weapons, by which time Moscow hopes to
have placed itself on a stronger diplomatic footing and will
not have to depend upon Iran to demonstrate that it has a
vigorous foreign policy.
BEYRLE