AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 003201

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER GG IR RS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARY PATRUSHEV: WE NEED TO REBUILD TRUST

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle. Reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary. Russian Security Council Secretary and
former head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) Nikolay
Patrushev told Ambassador October 29 that the U.S. and Russia
need to rebuild trust and confidence. Citing past examples
of U.S.-Russian counterterrorism (CT) cooperation, he
contended that, had the U.S. and Russia shared information
"as we used to," we might have been able to avoid the war in
Georgia. He claimed that "at the highest levels," the GOR
had told the U.S. that Russian forces would not move on
Tbilisi. Russian forces had orders only to destroy Georgian
military installations that threatened Russian troops. He
reiterated Russia's insistence that Georgia should not be
rearmed, claiming Georgia had received money from the U.S.
and military equipment from other countries. Noting that the
U.S. and Russia still had good CT cooperation and faced
common threats, Patrushev asked for additional information on
the U.S. strikes in Syria October 28. While Russia was
concerned about the level of violence in the north Caucasus,
Patrushev claimed it was lower than in the past and more
crime-related due to lack of social and economic development,
rather than terrorism. Russia had taken steps to
significantly tighten its border, and there were now only
"three-four representatives" of international terrorist
organizations in the region, compared to about 30 in the late
1990's. In Chechnya, the situation was "radically changed,"
because of the Kremlin's personal attention to the issue.
Russia was prepared to cooperate with the U.S. on all issues,
including Iran, but we needed to keep each other informed.
End summary.

"We Need to Rebuild Trust and Confidence"
--------------


2. (C) Patrushev told the Ambassador October 29 that both
countries could reap mutual benefits of cooperation and avoid
"unpredictable situations" if we were willing to put aside
our mistrust and overcome the lack of confidence between us.
He pointed to past U.S.-Russian counterterrorism cooperation,
such as the case of the UK citizen who had tried to acquire
MANPADS from the CIS and smuggle them into the U.S. to use
against civilian aircraft. Through cooperation between
Russian, U.S. and UK agencies, we were able to discover and
thwart the plot. Similarly, Patrushev said, when the U.S.
was considering invading Iraq, the President had called
Putin, who had told him Russia would not stand in America's
way, but sought to dissuade the U.S. action. Pointing to
Russia's project on a multinational terrorism database,
Patrushev said the more open we are with each other, the
better. In that vein, he asked for more specific information
on the U.S. airstrikes October 28 in Syria, particularly
which al-Qaeda leader was killed.


3. (C) Cold War legacies, such as the Jackson-Vanik
amendment, hurt the relationship, Patrushev said, pointing
out that Russia now has a visa-free regime with Israel. He
stressed that Russia wanted to have good relations with the
U.S. The Ambassador agreed that the original purpose of the
Jackson-Vanik amendment no longer existed, and there were
areas where it was in both our interests to cooperate. But
there were still many in the Russian press and influential
circles who seemed to believe the U.S. was trying to
instigate a color revolution in Russia, and this undermined
our abilities to establish better trust and confidence.

Georgia
--------------


4. (C) Patrushev contended that if the U.S. and Russia had
shared information prior to the outbreak of hostilities in
Georgia, the war might have been prevented. Moscow had been
conducting negotiations with Tbilisi on a non-use of force
agreement (NUF),but suddenly, without explanation, Georgia
had broken off the talks. Russian analysts had pointed to
the fact that Secretary Rice had visited Tbilisi just before
Georgia had suspended the negotiations and concluded that
Saakashvili had "received orders from the Secretary to stop
the talks." He said Russia had heard that the U.S. had told
Saakashvili not to start a war, but did this mean that the
U.S. knew beforehand that he was planning to do so? If so,
the U.S. should have shared such information with Russia, and
worked together to prevent the conflict from occurring.
Moscow had told the U.S. "at the highest levels" that Russian

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troops would not take Tbilisi, Patrushev said, and had
explained the limits to which the troops would go. Russian
forces had had orders to destroy only those Georgian military
installations which threatened the Russian army, he said.
"We should have talked more," Patrushev insisted.


5. (C) Patrushev reiterated GOR arguments that the West
should not rearm Georgia. Saakashvili was "unpredictable,"
he said, reciting a story that German journalists had been
taken to a house in the suburbs of Tbilisi, where Saakashvili
was "not in his right mind, possibly on drugs," and
accompanied by members of the security service and
prostitutes. Still, the U.S. continued to provide funds and
arms to Georgia.


6. (C) The Ambassador argued that the U.S. had not urged
Saakashvili not to sign a NUF, and had warned him against
using force in South Ossetia. Patrushev needed to remember
that the NUF had been part of a package of measures, some of
which Russia had refused to accept. He added that there had
been repeated provocations by the South Ossetians against the
ethnic Georgian population, and that Russia had not informed
the U.S. prior to Russian troops moving into Georgian
territory. The Ambassador emphasized that the U.S. had only
provided humanitarian and economic assistance to Georgia
following the conflict. Patrushev interjected "you're
providing money; others are providing arms." The Ambassador
urged Russia to work towards a successful meeting in Geneva
on November 18 and to continue the process as long as
necessary to ensure the important issues, such as return of
refugees and increased international monitoring, were
resolved.

North Caucasus
--------------


7. (C) In response to the Ambassador's concern that the level
of violence in the north Caucasus seemed to be increasing,
Patrushev countered that the level of violence had in fact
dropped since the late 1990's. The situation in Chechnya had
been "normalized," due to tightening of the borders, use of
technical and operational border monitoring, and "personal
attention" paid to the region, but Moscow was concerned by
the situation in Ingushetia and the other Republics.
However, in 1999 there had been approximately 30
"representatives" of international terrorist groups in the
area engaged in terrorist activity, receiving financing from
abroad, and seeking to split the northern Caucasus from
Russia. Today, Patrushev said, there were only three or four
international terrorists in the region. The threat was not
fully eliminated, but had been reduced.


8. (C) The level of crime was high, Patrushev said, because
of social and economic backwardness, and thus more attention
needed to be given to economic development. He denied that
there was more nationalism: "nationalism without financing
from abroad doesn't exist." Plus, there was little
identification between the ethnic groups. In one valley in
Dagestan, Patrushev said, there were 120 ethnic groups, many
speaking different dialects. They needed to use Russian to
communicate with each other. So, nationalism and separatism
were unlikely. But, low social and economic conditions and
lack of jobs led to crime. Once these problems were
resolved, the situation would stabilize, Patrushev contended.


Threats from the South: Iran
--------------


9. (C) Patrushev acknowledged that Russia faced threats from
across its southern border. Regarding Iran, he said Russia
was prepared to cooperate with the U.S. in the UN Security
Council and "go as far as you're ready to go." He reiterated
that the degree of confidence between us should be higher and
commented that when we keep each other informed, even if we
do not like what is said, and take actions together, it was
better. He emphasized that Russia was "ready to cooperate on
all issues."

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Despite reports of chronic illness, Patrushev looked
to be in good health and was sharp and focused throughout the

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hourlong meeting. A smaller, slighter man than photos and TV
images led us to expect, he projects a highly controlled
"Putinesque" persona, with occasional flashes of sardonic
humor. The jury is still out whether the Kremlin is giving
the Security Council more influence and stature, or if
Patrushev was sent there because some thought he was becoming
too powerful as head of the FSB and this was a way of
controlling his influence. Not surprisingly, his comments on
the U.S.-Russia relationship tended to reflect the mindset of
an FSB officer rather than the broader worldview of a
National Security Council chief; the Ambassador's effort to
elicit Patrushev's shortlist of strategic challenges facing
both Russia and the U.S. never got further than
counterterrorism. Patrushev's repeated comments that the
U.S. and Russia needed to restore greater trust and
confidence did not prevent him from repeating many of the
most scurrilous allegations about U.S. involvement in Georgia
we have seen in the press.
BEYRLE