RUSSIA'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE BALKANS ON BOSNIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 000319 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/07/2018 TAGS: PGOV BK EU RS SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S SPECIAL ENVOY FOR THE BALKANS ON BOSNIA REF: MOSCOW 302 Classified By: M/C for Political Affairs Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d) ¶1. (C) In a February 6 meeting (other subjects reftel),MFA Special Envoy for the Balkans Alexander Botsan-Kharchenko told us that High Representative and EU Special Representative Lajcak's January 31 visit to Moscow had "opened the door" to a compromise on closing the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and beginning its transformation into an EU mission. Botsan-Kharchenko said the GOR would prefer to close the mission in June, but would endorse Lajcak's "benchmarks" approach. Including time for the technical closure and transformation of the mission, the GOR believed this should result in closure of the OHR by the end of 2008. Botsan-Kharchenko stressed that the GOR was not asking for a "concrete" date, but that the PIC's statement should reflect the expected achievement of the benchmarks by the year's end. ¶2. (C) Botsan-Kharchenko noted that the benchmarks proposed by Lajcak were "not that difficult to achieve," but said that the laundry list of requirements would need to be negotiated and "new requirements may be harder." He listed military reform, state property, taxation, and the signing of a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU as possible steps -- the last of which the GOR believed would cover many of the preconditions for the transformation of the mission. ¶3. (C) We expressed concern over Democratic Action Party Milrad Dodik's statements asserting the Republika Srpska's right to self-determination. Botsan-Kharchenko predicted that Dodik would continue to push for more sovereignty for the entities, but said Dodik had promised Lajcak to be "more flexible." Botsan-Kharchenko said there was no intention in Belgrade or Banja Luka to "initiate the dismemberment" of Bosnia, but warned that a Kosovar CDI could force Dodik to be "more radical than he is." ¶4. (C) Comment: Although the GOR maintains that it does not believe the Republika Srpska will split with Bosnia, and that it is not in Russia's interest that it do so, Botsan-Kharchenko repeatedly underscored the "unforeseeable" impact of a Kosovo CDI on Bosnia and the Balkans. BURNS