RUSSIAN DFM BORODAVKIN ON NORTH KOREA, AFGHANISTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003130 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/23/2018 TAGS: PREL PARM RS KN AF SUBJECT: RUSSIAN DFM BORODAVKIN ON NORTH KOREA, AFGHANISTAN Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In an October 22 meeting with the Ambassador, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin provided a readout of North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun's October 15 meeting with FM Lavrov and expressed concern that the North Korean interpretation of the October 3 verification agreement appeared to differ from that of the U.S. in some key respects. He urged a greater role for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the verification process, as well as closer consultations between the U.S. and Russia on Six Party issues. On Afghanistan, Borodavkin complained that NATO had shown little interest in Russian proposed projects and that the Afghans' failure to attend a September anti-narcotics training program in Domodedevo had left the GOR with "unpleasant feelings." While affirming Russia's commitment to continue to assist in Afghanistan's rebuilding, including a proposed $200 million military aid package, Borodavkin also cited the lack of OSCE capability and the lack of a mandate to assist a non-member as reasons for GOR's recent blocking of two OSCE anti-narcotics programs in Afghanistan. End Summary. Concern about North Korean Interpretation of Agreement -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on October 22 Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Borodavkin stressed that Russia "absolutely shared" with the USG the common goal of ensuring North Korea's denuclearization and welcomed recent progress that persuaded Pyongyang to return to the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facility. However, the GOR had many questions about the October 3 agreement between the U.S. and North Korea, including how the bilateral agreement would be "Six-Partyized" and how the verification mechanism would work in practice. The verification discussion paper that the USG circulated was being reviewed within the Russian interagency. Borodavkin hoped that the GOR would be able to pass to us soon the full list of questions. ¶3. (C) Borodavkin indicated that the GOR was particularly concerned about the seeming gap in the U.S. and North Korean interpretations of the recent agreement. He shared that, during Foreign Minister Lavrov's October 15 meeting with visiting North Korean Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun, Pak adopted a tough stance and seemed to repudiate a number of U.S. positions. These included access to undeclared sites, which personnel could participate in inspection visits, whether sampling and forensic activities would be allowed, and whether the verification protocol would apply to uranium enrichment and proliferation activities. GOR Wants Greater IAEA Role, Closer Consultations with USG -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The GOR continues to advocate that the IAEA play a main role in the verification regime. Asserting that, in some respects, the verification agreement contained weaker provisions than IAEA's standard procedures, Borodavkin urged maximum use of IAEA experience and resources, as well as a joint approach by the Six-Party partners to North Korea on this issue. The IAEA's leading role would assure Pyongyang of the credibility and impartiality of the inspections, leading to a more robust verification protocol, he argued. Borodavkin also pressed us to urge Japan to implement its commitments on heavy fuel oil delivery to North Korea, as the GOR believed that Japan's linking the abductees issue with the Six Party Talks was the wrong approach and risked derailing the denuclearization process. ¶6. (C) Commenting on the Six Party process in general, Borodavkin expressed concern that the United States and North Korea seemed to discuss all issues bilaterally first, and then presented their decisions to the other four countries as fait accompli, leaving Russia little choice but to accept the outcomes. He appealed for closer and more frequent consultations between the USG and the GOR to ensure maximum Russian support for the negotiation efforts. Feeling Rebuffed on Afghanistan -------------- ¶7. (SBU) Shifting gears to Afghanistan, Borodavkin agreed with the Ambassador that this was another area of common interest and cooperation between us. He noted that the situation in Afghanistan was deteriorating despite U.S., NATO, and other partners' efforts, and urged more focus on capacity building for the Afghan government. No amount of MOSCOW 00003130 002 OF 002 outside help could be effective without the Afghan government being able to govern and resolve the country's problems on its own, he stressed. In this regard, he mentioned the Russian proposal to provide a $200 million military aid package to the Afghan National Army, and reaffirmed GOR commitment to assist in Afghanistan's reconstruction. ¶8. (C) Borodavkin said that in the GOR's view, cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan was "positive enough," but noted that at times, ISAF/NATO did not seem keen to work with Russia. According to him, the GOR repeatedly proposed joint projects but received little enthusiasm from NATO. Instead, the U.S. was providing the Afghans money to purchase weapons such as Kalashnikov rifles from third countries that were illegally producing them in violation of Russia's intellectual property rights. In addition, the Afghans failed to show up at a narcotics officers' training program organized by the Russia-NATO Council at Domodedevo this September. While admitting that he did not have hard evidence to back up charges by some GOR officials that the Afghans did not attend because "foreign advisors" (i.e. Americans) in Kabul sought to keep them from getting closely involved with Russia, he indicated that the Domodedevo incident left the GOR "with some unpleasant feelings." ¶9. (C) In response to the Ambassador's inquiry on why Russia this week blocked two OSCE anti-narcotics programs in Afghanistan, Borodavkin stated that Moscow did not believe the OSCE had the capability to carry out the programs, given the security situation there. Moreover, Afghanistan was not an OSCE member. The programs therefore were not in the organization's mandate and would take resources away from training efforts in member countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. While conceding the Ambassador's point that helping Afghanistan to curb drug trafficking would benefit neighboring Central Asian countries, Borodavkin countered that the training should then be done across the border in an OSCE member country or at Domodedevo. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Russia-based experts on North Korea have repeatedly told us that Moscow no longer holds real influence over Pyongyang. Nevertheless, the GOR remains a channel through which the North Koreans express their views, and the Russian MFA appears to be willing to champion the DPRK cause. On Afghanistan, the GOR's blocking of the two OSCE anti-narcotics programs may very well be linked to lingering hurt feelings about the Afghans' non-participation in the September program at Domodedevo. BEYRLE