Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
08MOSCOW3114
2008-10-22 13:30:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Moscow
Cable title:
RUSSIA'S "AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE" TO ABKHAZIA
VZCZCXRO1424 OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHMO #3114/01 2961330 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 221330Z OCT 08 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0465 INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003114
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S "AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE" TO ABKHAZIA
REVIEWS OCTOBER 15 CONFERENCE, SECURITY CONCERNS
Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003114
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S "AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE" TO ABKHAZIA
REVIEWS OCTOBER 15 CONFERENCE, SECURITY CONCERNS
Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
1. (C) Summary. While noting concerns over the collapse of
the October 15 talks, the newly-named Russian "Ambassador" to
Abkhazia sees the fact the meeting took place at all as
positive and a step towards fulfilling point six of the
Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. The GOR is concerned that the
security situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not
improving, and has invited EU envoy Morel to visit Moscow by
the end of the month to discuss coordination of the different
peacekeeping and monitoring missions in the area, with the
intent of continuing the talks during the November 18
meeting. As Russian troops in the two zones are not trained
in peacekeeping or policing and have no experience in working
with international observers, the MOD is considering creating
small "contact groups" of Russian troops, peacekeepers and
civilians to interact with the EU and other monitors. While
noting that some ethnic Georgian refugees are returning to
their homes in the conflict zones, the MFA notes the issue of
refugee property in Abkhazia is a major problem, and is
advising Russians not to invest in it and urging the Abkhaz
leaders to address the issue. End summary.
New "Ambassador" to Abkhazia, Abkhaz Property
--------------
2. (C) MFA Deputy Director for the 4th CIS Department Semyon
Grigoriev told us October 21 that press reports about his
appointment as Russia's "ambassador" to Abkhazia were a bit
premature, as the decree had not yet been finalized. Still,
he acknowledged the appointment was likely to go through and
he expected to take up his post in Sukhumi at the beginning
of the new year, as Moscow still needed to find a location
for the new EMBASSY and acquire staff. In response to our
question about press reports that Russians were buying
property in Abkhazia that belonged to Georgian refugees, he
insisted the GOR was scrupulously avoiding any property that
had questionable ownership, and was advising Russian
businesses and individuals not to invest in such properties.
Characterizing this as "the main issue" in Abkhazia,
Grigoriev said the GOR had urged the Abkhaz leadership to
make a full analysis of all property and sort it into
property belonging to refugees and other property.
October 15 Meeting Seen as More Positive than Initially
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Grigoriev said that, a week after the October 15
meeting in Geneva, "emotions had cooled," and Russia now had
a more positive assessment of the conference. Noting that it
had been very difficult to hold the meeting at all, Grigoriev
said Moscow believed it was important that the process had
started and was satisfied the meeting had taken place. It
had begun the realization of point six of the
Medvedev-Sarkozy plan.
4. (C) Commenting that Russia believed the issue of
representation at the meeting had been worked out with the EU
and the other participants, Grigoriev said DFM Karasin and
4th CIS Director Kelin had been "surprised" by the Abkhaz and
South Ossetian positions on participation. He stressed that
the GOR had not promised the two delegations that they would
be represented at the same level as the other delegations.
November 18 Meeting - Security Issues, Format, Arms Embargo
-------------- --------------
5. (C) While acknowledging the challenge of finding a
workable format for the November 18 meeting, Grigoriev said
it was essential because of the need to resolve security
issues in the two zones. Russia was distressed that the
working group had not taken place in Geneva on October 15
because the security situation was not improving. After the
failure in Geneva, FM Lavrov had proposed to Solana and Morel
that Morel visit Moscow by the end of the month to begin the
discussion. The main problem was that Russia had no more
peacekeepers in the zones, and the Russian troops there were
not trained in peacekeeping or policing and had no experience
in working with international observers. The Russian MOD was
considering creating small "contact groups" of Russian
troops, peacekeepers and civilians to interact with the EU
and other monitors. The EU monitors, he noted without irony,
were "just observing, not intervening." (note: at a news
conference October 22, FM Lavrov said the EU observers, "as
MOSCOW 00003114 002 OF 002
guarantors of the non-use of force against South Ossetia and
Abkhazia," should work more actively to prevent "acts of
provocation from Georgia.") Grigoriev said the GOR wanted to
discuss these issues, as well as coordination of all the
different peacekeeping and monitoring missions in the area,
with the EU.
6. (C) As to format, the GOR had told Morel that if the
Georgian participants were characterized as representatives
of a state, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians should be too.
This would solve another issue with the October 15 meeting;
the participation of the "Abkhaz and South Ossetian
representatives in exile." If all three participated as
independent "states," Georgia could include in its delegation
whomever it wished. In response to our question how this was
possible, given that none of the other participants had
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "states," Grigoriev
admitted he did not know. He said the GOR would nonetheless
continue to work with the two regions' leaders to make their
approach "more balanced." But Russia expected Georgia also
to take steps to compromise, e.g., by not including "Georgian
exiles" in their delegations. Russia accepted that, given
the break-down of the October 15 meeting, the series of talks
might not conclude before the end of the year.
7. (C) When asked about press reports on Russia's call for an
arms embargo on Georgia, Grigoriev said Russia had some
proposals on the non-militarization of Georgia, which it
intended to raise in Geneva.
Return of Refugees/IDPs
--------------
8. (C) Agreeing that one of the working groups should address
refugee/IDP return, Grigoriev said he had received reports
that about 300 ethnic Georgians had returned to their homes
in the Kodori region in Abkhazia. In South Ossetia, there
were some ethnic Georgians returning to their villages, but
it was a problem because there was no functioning government
in South Ossetia to assist with refugee returns. The GOR,
Grigoriev said, had tried to persuade the South Ossetian
leaders to accept international aid and refugee agencies'
assistance, including that coming in from the Georgian as
well as the Russian sides. But, they would only accept aid
targeted for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not assistance that
was designated as "aid for Georgia."
BEYRLE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV GG RS
SUBJECT: RUSSIA'S "AMBASSADOR-DESIGNATE" TO ABKHAZIA
REVIEWS OCTOBER 15 CONFERENCE, SECURITY CONCERNS
Classified By: Acting POL M/C David Kostelancik. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d).
1. (C) Summary. While noting concerns over the collapse of
the October 15 talks, the newly-named Russian "Ambassador" to
Abkhazia sees the fact the meeting took place at all as
positive and a step towards fulfilling point six of the
Medvedev-Sarkozy plan. The GOR is concerned that the
security situation in South Ossetia and Abkhazia is not
improving, and has invited EU envoy Morel to visit Moscow by
the end of the month to discuss coordination of the different
peacekeeping and monitoring missions in the area, with the
intent of continuing the talks during the November 18
meeting. As Russian troops in the two zones are not trained
in peacekeeping or policing and have no experience in working
with international observers, the MOD is considering creating
small "contact groups" of Russian troops, peacekeepers and
civilians to interact with the EU and other monitors. While
noting that some ethnic Georgian refugees are returning to
their homes in the conflict zones, the MFA notes the issue of
refugee property in Abkhazia is a major problem, and is
advising Russians not to invest in it and urging the Abkhaz
leaders to address the issue. End summary.
New "Ambassador" to Abkhazia, Abkhaz Property
--------------
2. (C) MFA Deputy Director for the 4th CIS Department Semyon
Grigoriev told us October 21 that press reports about his
appointment as Russia's "ambassador" to Abkhazia were a bit
premature, as the decree had not yet been finalized. Still,
he acknowledged the appointment was likely to go through and
he expected to take up his post in Sukhumi at the beginning
of the new year, as Moscow still needed to find a location
for the new EMBASSY and acquire staff. In response to our
question about press reports that Russians were buying
property in Abkhazia that belonged to Georgian refugees, he
insisted the GOR was scrupulously avoiding any property that
had questionable ownership, and was advising Russian
businesses and individuals not to invest in such properties.
Characterizing this as "the main issue" in Abkhazia,
Grigoriev said the GOR had urged the Abkhaz leadership to
make a full analysis of all property and sort it into
property belonging to refugees and other property.
October 15 Meeting Seen as More Positive than Initially
-------------- --------------
3. (C) Grigoriev said that, a week after the October 15
meeting in Geneva, "emotions had cooled," and Russia now had
a more positive assessment of the conference. Noting that it
had been very difficult to hold the meeting at all, Grigoriev
said Moscow believed it was important that the process had
started and was satisfied the meeting had taken place. It
had begun the realization of point six of the
Medvedev-Sarkozy plan.
4. (C) Commenting that Russia believed the issue of
representation at the meeting had been worked out with the EU
and the other participants, Grigoriev said DFM Karasin and
4th CIS Director Kelin had been "surprised" by the Abkhaz and
South Ossetian positions on participation. He stressed that
the GOR had not promised the two delegations that they would
be represented at the same level as the other delegations.
November 18 Meeting - Security Issues, Format, Arms Embargo
-------------- --------------
5. (C) While acknowledging the challenge of finding a
workable format for the November 18 meeting, Grigoriev said
it was essential because of the need to resolve security
issues in the two zones. Russia was distressed that the
working group had not taken place in Geneva on October 15
because the security situation was not improving. After the
failure in Geneva, FM Lavrov had proposed to Solana and Morel
that Morel visit Moscow by the end of the month to begin the
discussion. The main problem was that Russia had no more
peacekeepers in the zones, and the Russian troops there were
not trained in peacekeeping or policing and had no experience
in working with international observers. The Russian MOD was
considering creating small "contact groups" of Russian
troops, peacekeepers and civilians to interact with the EU
and other monitors. The EU monitors, he noted without irony,
were "just observing, not intervening." (note: at a news
conference October 22, FM Lavrov said the EU observers, "as
MOSCOW 00003114 002 OF 002
guarantors of the non-use of force against South Ossetia and
Abkhazia," should work more actively to prevent "acts of
provocation from Georgia.") Grigoriev said the GOR wanted to
discuss these issues, as well as coordination of all the
different peacekeeping and monitoring missions in the area,
with the EU.
6. (C) As to format, the GOR had told Morel that if the
Georgian participants were characterized as representatives
of a state, the Abkhaz and South Ossetians should be too.
This would solve another issue with the October 15 meeting;
the participation of the "Abkhaz and South Ossetian
representatives in exile." If all three participated as
independent "states," Georgia could include in its delegation
whomever it wished. In response to our question how this was
possible, given that none of the other participants had
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as "states," Grigoriev
admitted he did not know. He said the GOR would nonetheless
continue to work with the two regions' leaders to make their
approach "more balanced." But Russia expected Georgia also
to take steps to compromise, e.g., by not including "Georgian
exiles" in their delegations. Russia accepted that, given
the break-down of the October 15 meeting, the series of talks
might not conclude before the end of the year.
7. (C) When asked about press reports on Russia's call for an
arms embargo on Georgia, Grigoriev said Russia had some
proposals on the non-militarization of Georgia, which it
intended to raise in Geneva.
Return of Refugees/IDPs
--------------
8. (C) Agreeing that one of the working groups should address
refugee/IDP return, Grigoriev said he had received reports
that about 300 ethnic Georgians had returned to their homes
in the Kodori region in Abkhazia. In South Ossetia, there
were some ethnic Georgians returning to their villages, but
it was a problem because there was no functioning government
in South Ossetia to assist with refugee returns. The GOR,
Grigoriev said, had tried to persuade the South Ossetian
leaders to accept international aid and refugee agencies'
assistance, including that coming in from the Georgian as
well as the Russian sides. But, they would only accept aid
targeted for Abkhazia and South Ossetia, not assistance that
was designated as "aid for Georgia."
BEYRLE