NEXT STEPS IN MILITARY'S MODERNIZATION: PERSONNEL

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 003092 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018 TAGS: MARR MCAP PGOV RS SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN MILITARY'S MODERNIZATION: PERSONNEL AND STRUCTURAL CHANGES REF: A. MOSCOW 2571 ¶B. MOSCOW 2977 Classified By: Ambassador John R. Beyrle for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. The MOD plans to reduce the size of the General Staff and MOD Central Apparatus by two-thirds by 2012, a measure that military analysts have championed for years, but political leaders were reluctant to take until the war in Georgia gave them the political capital they could use to compel changes. Russian Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov also announced that the MOD would cut the commissioned officer core in half and eliminate several military units in order for the Army to maintain a permanent state of readiness. Finally, in an implicit acknowledgement of the military's limitations and disorganization during its Georgian campaign (reftel A),Russia will restructure and streamline its chain of command. The cuts and reforms, however, may not achieve the Kremlin's goal to give commanders on the ground more decision-making authority, but instead negatively affect training and preparedness. With the weight of the Kremlin behind the MOD's decisions - they will soon become a directive under a presidential order - Russia appears to be getting serious about turning its bloated army of days past into a smaller, better organized, modern military. However, it is questionable whether the MOD can hit its targets by 2012. End Summary. -------------- -------------- Major Personnel Reductions at Top Levels Forthcoming -------------- -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In an attempt to restructure the Russian military along "global norms," Defense Minister Serdyukov introduced major personnel reforms that will soon be codified in a presidential directive (ukaz). Serdyukov finally delivered on promises to reduce the ranks of the MOD Central Apparatus and the all-encompassing Russian General Staff, the bureaucratic organ that dominates all aspects of military planning and operations. Originally planned for 2016, two-thirds of the Central Apparatus and General Staff will now be eliminated (dropping from 10,500 to 3,500 staff) by 2012, including reductions in the most prominent offices - the Main Operations Directorate, Main Organization-Mobilization Directorate, and Main Intelligence Directorate. Of these cuts, the number of generals will be reduced from 1100 to 900, or one per every battalion, although Serdyukov was quick to point out that generals would not be fired, but retired at the end of their service. ¶3. (C) In addition to reductions at the highest ranks, the MOD plans to cut the commissioned officer core (majors to colonels) from 355,000 to 150,000, while increasing the number of junior officers - lieutenants and senior lieutenants - from 50,000 to 60,000. Serdyukov justified his decision on three grounds. First, in comparison with international standards, Russia's army is too top-heavy. According to Serdyukov, officers should constitute no more than 20 percent of a country's military; by contrast, Russia's 355,000 officers currently account for 32 percent of the Armed Forces. Second, in order to maintain an Army of permanent readiness as ordered by President Medvedev (ref B), Russia needs to eliminate several sparingly used units and, correspondingly, the positions of officers leading those units. Russia's ground forces face the most severe cuts. In comparison to the Air Force and Navy, which will only be reduced by 50 percent, and strategic missile troops, airborne troops, and space forces, which will remain largely intact, Russia's ground forces will be reduced from 1890 to 172 units. Finally, the cuts might allow the MOD to raise officers' salaries. By 2012, lieutenants stand to earn no less than approximately $2,600 (RUR 70,000) a month. ¶4. (C) This d!Lo Council criticized the General Staff's involvement in administrative and organizational tasks, such as preparing mobilization and conscription measures, and suggested it should confine itself to analysis and planning. Aleksandr Golts agreed, calling the General Staff an antiquated bureaucratic body that duplicated functions conducted in other parts of the MOD. Although he backed cuts to the General Staff, he emphasized that reductions qua reductions would not lead to any meaningful changes (he also suggested that in three years time, Serdyukov may no longer be the Defense Minister and the generals might remain in their jobs). Instead, Golts recommended that Serdyukov limit the General Staff to strategic planning and strip it of all operational functions ("this would be the beginning of big reforms"). Viktor and Dmitriy Litovkin - Deputy Editor of the Independent Military Review and Izvestia reporter respectively - claimed that despite the General Staff's longstanding resistance to any encroachment on its turf, Serdyukov's reforms would proceed without a bureaucratic fight. Even Golts, in spite of his skepticism, acknowledged that the military's influence in politics has greatly diminished, and the generals would not be able to oppose the Kremlin. -------------- Ossetia, in which superior air power turned out to be more effective than bulky divisions of ground forces. -------------- -- Reforms Sound Good in Theory, but in Reality... -------------- -- ¶5. (C) Several experts welcomed the planned reductions to the commissioned officer core, but questioned whether the MOD had carefully planned the reforms or had the political will to implement them fully. Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Weekly Journal Aleksandr Golts praised the decision to cut down the number of officers, but noted that the MOD was turning the lives of thousands of soldiers upside down and did not have a plan to help them. By Serdyukov's own admission, approximately 117,000 officers will be fired over the next three years. Serdyukov stated that the MOD would appoint many fired soldiers to civilian positions within the Armed Forces, but Golts doubted that the MOD would keep its word. He speculated that Serdyukov would not announce further details, because firing the officers could become a politically charged issue. An article on the reforms in Moskovskiy Komsomolets also claimed that, "many military experts strongly doubt that (the MOD) will find many enthusiasts (to take these positions)." ¶6. (C) Experts also expressed hope that the role of commissioned officers would change as a result of the reductions, but the MOD has not indicated that change is imminent. Currently, commissioned officers not only hold responsibility for leading attacks on the battlefield, but also supervise their subordinates' daily activity. RIA Novosti military analyst Ilya Kramnik argued that non-commissioned officers (NCO) should be given more responsibility for training and managing low-ranking conscripts. He noted that, "in the Russian military too many commissioned officers perform tasks that, in the U.S. military, NCOs perform." Retired General Vladimir Dvorkin, now affiliated with the Carnegie Center in Moscow, agreed that the structure of Russia's army should be similar to that of the United States, with fewer officers and a strengthened corps of NCOs. However, the MOD has not announced whether it will add additional soldiers to the NCO ranks, and has struggled to attract contract soldiers to train and supervise draftees. There is also a concern that implementing drastic personnel changes too quickly could impact the military's preparedness, especially if all units are supposed to be in a permanent state of readiness. Aleksandr Sharavin, Director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, commented that cutting the officer core quickly without replacing them with trained professional sergeants (NCOs) could diminish the Army's combat effectiveness. Retired General Leonid Ivashov argued that Russia's plans to modernize its weaponry required trained commissioned officers to handle sophisticated hardware. ¶7. (C) Regarding the General Staff, experts generally supported Serdyukov's decision to cut the ranks by two-thirds (aside from hardliner Ivashov, who claimed that Serdyukov was an inexperienced civilian crippling the Army by eliminating the most senior and competent in the MOD). Vitaliy Shlykov of the MOD's Public Council criticized the General Staff's involvement in administrative and organizational tasks, such as preparing mobilization and conscription measures, and suggested it should confine itself to analysis and planning. Aleksandr Golts agreed, calling the General Staff an antiquated bureaucratic body that duplicated functions conducted in other parts of the MOD. Although he backed cuts to the General Staff, he emphasized that reductions qua reductions would not lead to any meaningful changes (he also suggested that in three years time, Serdyukov may no longer be the Defense Minister and the generals might remain in their jobs). Instead, Golts recommended that Serdyukov limit the General Staff to strategic planning and strip it of all operational functions ("this would be the beginning of big reforms"). Viktor and Dmitriy Litovkin - Deputy Editor of the Independent Military Review and Izvestia reporter respectively - claimed that despite the General Staff's longstanding resistance to any encroachment on its turf, Serdyukov's reforms would proceed without a bureaucratic fight. Even Golts, in spite of his skepticism, acknowledged that the military's influence in politics has greatly diminished, and the generals would not be able to oppose the Kremlin. -------------- Reorganizing the Chain of Command -------------- ¶8. (C) The structure of the military's chain of command, which faced deep scrutiny by experts and officials in the aftermath of Russia's Georgia campaign, will undergo significant changes. Currently, the Russians have the following hierarchy: military district, army, division, regiment. They will switch to a more streamlined system: military district, operational command, brigade. The MOD also plans to cut staffing levels at all military operational command and control bodies from 11,300 to 5,000. Although Serdyukov did not reference the military's deficiencies during the Georgia campaign, several press reports and experts like Viktor Litovkin, Vladimir Dvorkin, and Aleksandr Golts claimed the war in Georgia revealed the need for reorganization. The cumbersome chain of command led to delays in responding to Georgian fire, caused unnecessary and avoidable losses of life and equipment, and prevented the different services from working in tandem. Hypothetically, Serdyukov's proposed restructuring could enable commanders of smaller brigades, instead of larger divisions, to react to events more quickly and coordinate more effectively through the operational command. ¶9. (C) Golts called the reorganization a step in the right direction, but was not optimistic that it would produce positive results. A champion of a joint command for years, he told us that, "the creation of an operative command was very intelligent, but it will not resemble the U.S. strategic command." He also questioned why the MOD decided to keep military districts and did not think the MOD knew how it would divide responsibility between the districts and the operative commands. Although Golts hoped the more streamlined chain of command would offer commanders on the ground greater independence and enable them to react to events more quickly and decisively, he doubted the changes would produce this effect. As he noted, "it is not in Russian tradition to obey the orders of lower-ranked officers, even if they are commanding officers." In other words, the military districts and Moscow will still call the shots. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Having taken the initiative to initiate reforms discussed for years by his predecessors, Serdyukov capitalized on the Russian leadership's heightened attention to military deficiencies in the aftermath of the war in Georgia. What remains uncertain is whether he, or a potential successor, will be able to implement the reforms, let alone by 2012. Moreover, Serdyukov himself has yet to clarify how the MOD will implement the reforms or how it will mitigate some of their potential consequences (such as what to do with the 117,000 officers who will be discharged against their will in the next three years, or how the new chain of command will actually operate in practice). As Former Chief of the General Staff Yuriy Baluevskiy astutely observed, "Military reform continues and will last indefinitely." Serdyukov's proposals may be just another brick in the road. BEYRLE