HFAC CHAIRMAN BERMAN MEETS FM LAVROV: U.S., IRAN,

UNCLAS MOSCOW 003059 SENSITIVE SIPDIS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL PGOV KNDP PTER OREP RS GG IZ IR SUBJECT: HFAC CHAIRMAN BERMAN MEETS FM LAVROV: U.S., IRAN, S-300S, AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN, SECURITY ¶1. (SBU) Summary: In an October 14 meeting with HFAC Chairman Berman and the Ambassador, FM Lavrov argued against holding U.S.-Russian relations hostage to ideology and politics, reaffirming the Sochi Declaration commitments. He pushed hard for continued diplomacy with Iran, criticizing unilateral U.S. sanctions as "spoilers," warning with respect to Israel that any use of force would be catastrophic, and confirming that no decision had been made on a S-300 transfer. Lavrov proposed increased information-sharing on Pakistan, and a CSTO/NATO division of labor in counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan. He stressed that Medvedev's proposed European defense treaty was not aimed at replacing existing institutions, but addressed the shortfalls of NATO-Russia Council and other architecture that did not provide for "indivisible" security. Saying Russia did not prefer to extend START, Lavrov reprised Russian complaints on U.S. negotiations over post-START, missile defense, and CFE. Given Russian concern over U.S. intentions, Lavrov underscored the need for arms control and further confidence building measures. End Summary U.S.-Russian Relations Hostage to Ideology -------------- ¶2. (SBU) In an October 14 meeting with HFAC Chairman Howard Berman (D, CA),HFAC staff, and the Ambassador, FM Lavrov welcomed regular parliamentary consultations as an important element of the bilateral relationship. In response to Chairman Berman's assessment that Russia was an indispensable partner, whose significance had been overshadowed by the post-9/11 focus in U.S. foreign policy, Lavrov commented that Russia's absence from domestic U.S. political debates had not necessarily been bad, but acknowledged that the circumstances driving renewed U.S. attention were not favorable. Russia, he stressed, had welcomed the April 2008 Sochi Declaration as an important legacy of President Bush and Putin, with its emphasis on mutual respect, mutual interests, and commitment to minimizing differences and searching for common solutions. Lavrov underscored the scope of the U.S.-Russia interests, with issues of strategic balance (post-START, nonproliferation, WMD) and regional stability (Iran, DPRK, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the Middle East) crowding the agenda. U.S.-Russian cooperation, he argued, should not be "hostage to politicized and ideologized issues." Iran: Russia Prepared to Cooperate Diplomatically -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) Saying he fully shared Chairman Berman's concern over Iran, Lavrov agreed that a more effective international coalition was required, but disagreed on whether Iran was intent on acquiring nuclear weapons, versus mastering the nuclear fuel cycle. Lavrov argued that unilateral U.S. sanctions had undercut P5 1 diplomatic efforts, which should remain focused on supporting the IAEA presence in Iran and its resolution of outstanding questions related to the Iranian nuclear program. Reaffirming Russian support for a two-track approach, with incentives for Iran to negotiate coupled with UNSCR sanctions to increase pressure on the Iranian leadership to respond, Lavrov complained that U.S. actions constituted "spoilers" that gave Iran a pretext to walk away from the table. The U.S. continued to send a mixed message, allowing Iran to conclude that its real goal was the isolation and overthrow of the Iranian leadership. Chairman Berman underscored Iran's failure to answer outstanding IAEA questions and the NIE's evidence of a nuclear program in existence until 2003. Once Congress was confident that an effective international strategy was in place, Chairman Berman stressed, there would be no need for unilateral measures; instead, Iran appeared to be playing for time. ¶4. (SBU) Referencing a "Financial Times" article, Lavrov expressed concern over rumors that the U.S. and UK were building a coalition of countries to adopt stronger sanctions in the energy and industrial sectors, in an effort to circumvent Russian and Chinese interest in a more gradual process. Lavrov commented that the U.S. needed to decide whether it sought to circumvent Russia, or seek to work with it collectively; it could not do both. Russian policy, he stressed, was not a function of pique over U.S. actions to isolate Russia after the Georgia crisis or in response to the U.S. cancellation of military exercises; rather, Russia remained opposed to Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb. Russia saw no reason for precipitate action based on the last IAEA report, and believed diplomacy had not run its course. Lavrov added that the outstanding IAEA questions were derived from U.S. intelligence, which other analysts had found unpersuasive in 2005; while Russia took U.S. allegations seriously, the inability to provide originals of the documents allowed Iran to disclaim ownership or culpability. Lavrov conceded that the Iranians were frustrating, calling them tough and cagey negotiators, but reiterated Russian support for the IAEA-led process. ¶5. (SBU) Asserting that Iran had been on the verge of coming back to the bargaining table in August, Lavrov said Saakashvili gave Tehran a perfect gift. The Iranians hardened their position, waiting to see if Russia would split with Europe, or reduce pressure on Iran in "revenge" for European and U.S. criticism of Russian actions in Georgia. In order to prevent that miscalculation, Lavrov said it was Russia's idea for a UNSC resolution at UNGA. Lavrov said Russia would remain absolutely clear about its strategic goal of denying Iran a nuclear weapon, but acknowledged that tactical differences would remain on how to move forward. Russia did not want "a degeneration into a repeat of Iraq" and, referencing on-going discussions between PM Olmert and Washington, warned that any use of force would be "catastrophic." Gulf states, he noted, feared an Iran with a nuclear bomb, and an Iran bombed. ¶6. (SBU) In response to Chairman Berman's push for tougher sanctions as the best option, Lavrov warned that the international community risked losing the IAEA "eyes and ears" on the ground. While the number of centrifuges were increasing, they were not increasing as quickly as Iran had the capacity, nor were they running at optimal speed. Some flexibility on the part of the U.S. would help call Iran's bluff; the U.S. should demonstrate the same creativity that it had evinced with the DPRK (even at the risk of "driving Japan crazy and provoking public criticism"). The lesson Iran learned is that it needed a nuclear bomb to be treated respectfully by the U.S. The issues with Iran were so complex, Lavrov complained, that it was hard to explain to the layman; for instance, while Iran had not signed an Additional Protocol, it was not mandatory and in certain instances Iran had exceeded AP requirements. Iran: S-300 Sales -------------- ¶7. (SBU) In response to Chairman Berman's strong concern over the possibility of a Russian transfer of S-300s to Iran, Lavrov stated carefully that Russia would consider any arms transfer on the basis of full transparency, full compliance with its international commitments, and in accordance with Russian export controls, which strictly regulated against any transfer that could have a destabilizing regional effect. The S-300s were a defensive system, albeit "efficient." Lavrov confirmed that no decision had been made. In a dig at U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, Lavrov offered that there should be a "pause" to think about arms sales in the broader context. Russia did not seek the militarization of foreign policy and did not need a new arms race. Mutual agreement and mutual restraint were the best tools for establishing parity, although Lavrov noted the economically beneficial side-effects of military investments. Afghanistan/Pakistan: More, not less, cooperation required -------------- -------------- ¶8. (SBU) Lavrov commented that Russia wanted international security forces, with NATO as its backbone, to succeed in Afghanistan. Key to the effort would be combating the narcotics trade, and Lavrov complained about the unwillingness of NATO forces to strengthen their anti-trafficking mandate. NATO members were reluctant to expand their mandate, he charged, because it was dangerous work. Russia was directly affected by the increasing flows of narcotics through Central Asia and Russia to Europe; increasingly, Russia was a recipient, as well as a transit, state. Lavrov reviewed Russian efforts to collaborate with Central Asian countries, in concert with NATO efforts inside Afghanistan (alluding to, but not spelling out, a division of labor between CSTO and NATO),and regretted that NATO had not responded institutionally, although individual countries participated in CSTO's Operation Channel. ¶9. (SBU) Commenting that Afghanistan had to be considered in tandem with Pakistan, Lavrov noted Russian efforts as G8 chair to include Afghanistan and Pakistan in a dialogue. While Japan had not continued the initiative, Lavrov argued that it was something the G8 should consider. Lavrov stressed that Russia wanted to better understand the U.S. strategy towards Pakistan, as well as its assessment of the country's stability, leadership, and divisions within the military and intelligence communities. Whether in existing dialogue formats (e.g., CTWG or intel channels) there needed to be better coordination. Lavrov argued that current tensions should not get in the way of collective efforts to address challenges like Pakistan. Security: European, NATO, post-START, MD, CFE -------------- ¶10. (SBU) Paraphrasing Secretary Paulson's remarks on the financial crisis, Lavrov stressed that no country should secure itself at the expense of others, noting this was the overriding theme of President Medvedev's October 8 Evian speech. Lavrov evinced frustration over western interpretations of Medvedev's call for a new European security treaty. Medvedev, he stressed, did not seek to undermine or replace any existing Euro-Atlantic institution, whether NATO, OSCE, or the EU, nor did Russia seek to exclude the U.S. and Canada from this security discussion. Instead, Russia sought a comprehensive review of Euro-Atlantic security, with all of the member states and representatives of the European and post-Soviet organizations (e.g. CSTO, CIS). The principles of NATO and OSCE were sound, he added later, but were not working. NATO had failed to uphold the indivisibility of security, with the NATO-Russia Council having evolved into 26 versus one. While Russia had no ready-made solutions, it wanted to discuss specifics. What Putin had expressed emotionally in Munich in February 2007, Medvedev had expressed diplomatically. ¶11. (SBU) Lavrov highlighted the uncertain fate of post-START, arguing that the U.S. had not met its commitment under the Sochi Declaration to intensify a dialogue on a successor arms control regime. While Russia continued to wait for a U.S. paper, first promised in October 2007, the U.S. position remained unyielding: no limits, except on operationally deployed warheads; unlimited stockpiles and launchers; and the introduction of non-nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems. While it was unrealistic to expect any breakthrough in the remaining weeks of the Administration, Lavrov did not evince interest in an extension of the START treaty. Saying that he had doubts about the feasibility of an extension, Lavrov said Russia preferred to use the time remaining to negotiate differences in approach. Acknowledging the challenges facing a new administration in confirming key officials, Lavrov nonetheless said that Russia "very strongly preferred to write something new" and noted there was "no lack of inputs" from former officials and the arms control community. ¶12. (SBU) On missile defense, Lavrov expressed regret that the U.S. was moving forward with implementation, while promises to Russia were "hanging." Lavrov said Russia continued to wait for answers to its questions presented in August, and criticized the U.S. for walking back the proposal of a "permanent presence" by Russian liaison officers at the Czech and Polish sites, which was first presented during the October 2007 2 2 meeting. Russia had been told to talk directly with the Poles and Czechs, who offered "occasional visits" on a "reciprocal" basis. Questioning the concept of reciprocity, Lavrov termed the debate "a mess." ¶13. (SBU) Lavrov also complained that "interesting proposals" on CFE, first presented in 2007, were "modified and backtracked." While the U.S. sought to keep CFE in bilateral negotiating channels, Lavrov questioned the halt in discussions post-Georgia; while Russian troops stationed in South Ossetia and Abkhazia made the negotiations "more complicated," real discussions were required. In the current security environment, Russia could not ignore new "bases" in Romania and Bulgaria or the presence of the U.S. navy in the Black Sea. In response to Chairman Berman's questioning of Russian threat assessments, Lavrov insisted that the Russian military "should be fired" if they didn't take NATO's expansion and U.S. unilateral actions seriously. "Not for nothing" had CBMs and arms control regimes been developed in the past. Lavrov emphasized that U.S. actions were viewed as threatening, pointing to "some in D.C." who sought to modify the Montreaux Convention in order to drop limits on the access of non-littoral states. "Non-confidence is building up," he argued, adding that Russian concerns over U.S. arms sales to Georgia had been brushed aside, with the Secretary undertaking that any use of force by Saakashvili would negate Georgia's NATO aspirations. ¶14. (SBU) The delegation cleared this message. BEYRLE NNNN End Cable Text