OLMERT PRESSES RUSSIA TO DO MORE ON IRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 003026 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/10/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR IR IS SY RS SUBJECT: OLMERT PRESSES RUSSIA TO DO MORE ON IRAN REF: MOSCOW 3011 Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells for reasons 1.4 (b/d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Israeli PM Olmert's October 6-7 meetings with Medvedev and Lavrov covered a range of issues, and do not appear to have been arranged to head off an imminent Russian sale of S-300 missiles to Iran, despite press reports to the contrary. Olmert pressed Russia to do more on Iran, including on arms sales, but without specifically mentioning the S-300s. Medvedev and Lavrov responded that they understood Israeli concerns regarding the Iranian nuclear program and weapons sales. Lavrov told Olmert that the U.S. needed to be more flexible on Iran, and should be willing to deal directly with Tehran. The FM also criticized the U.S. for its "failed" policies in the Middle East, and said Russia did not expect any progress on the MEPP. Lavrov said that he did not believe the Syrians knew what was necessary to make peace with Israel, and thought that Assad's ultimate goal was to improve relations with the U.S. The GOR has been relatively quiet regarding Olmert's trip, and did not address reports of potential missile sales to Iran until the MFA spokesman said on October 9 that Russia would not sell destabilizing weapons to countries in troublesome regions. End summary. Olmert's Trip Was Not All About Iran -------------- ¶2. (C) Israeli DCM Yuval Fuchs told us on October 10 that PM Olmert used his October 6 dinner with FM Lavrov and October 7 meeting with Medvedev as opportunities to reiterate Israeli concern over Iran, but that this was not the sole reason for the visit. Both sides had hoped the trip would occur during the summer as a means to continue the regular conversation between Russian and Israeli officials on regional and bilateral issues, but that scheduling difficulties, then the Georgian crisis and Olmert's domestic troubles, interfered. Fuchs commented that the dinner with Lavrov was a relatively informal affair, during which the Russian FM appeared not to miss an opportunity to criticize the U.S. The meeting with Medvedev was more formal, and the President's comments more restrained. ¶3. (C) On Iran, Olmert told both Medvedev and Lavrov that Russia could and should do more to reign in Tehran if it did not want tensions in the region to rise. Lavrov responded that Russia's "influence with Iran is smaller than Washington's is with Tbilisi," and that Iran had "regional cards to play" through its influence in Iraq, Lebanon and Gaza. Both Medvedev and Lavrov stressed that Russia did not want to see a nuclear Iran, and said that they had told Ahmadinijead that his threats to Israel were unacceptable. According to Fuchs, Olmert did not specifically bring up the potential sale of S-300 missiles to Iran, but instead alluded to arms sales in the larger context of Russia doing more on Iran. Both Medvedev and Lavrov made clear that they understood Israeli concerns regarding Iran's nuclear program and the sale of potentially destabilizing weapons. ¶4. (C) Lavrov told Olmert that P5 1 efforts to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons would only succeed if the U.S. became serious about dealing with Iran directly. He said that the U.S. needed to show the same flexibility with Iran that it did with North Korea, adding that if the U.S. had done so several years ago, things "would not have gone so far." Middle East Peace Process and Syria -------------- ¶5. (C) When discussing the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP), Fuchs said that Lavrov remarked that the U.S. had "failed" in the region through its actions in Iraq and Afghanistan and in its inability to further the MEPP. The GOR did not expect progress in the next few months. ¶6. (C) On Syria, Olmert made it clear to Medvedev and Lavrov that Assad must decide if he wanted Syria to remain a pariah state or do what was necessary to make peace with Israel. Lavrov said that while he was sure Syria no longer had hostile intentions toward Israel, he was not sure that Assad knew what was necessary to make peace with its neighbor. The FM believed that Assad's main goal was to improve relations with the U.S., and that the Syrian President understood that the "road to Washington is through Israel." When Olmert mentioned Israeli concerns about Russian arms sales to Syria, including weapons that end up with Hizbollah, Lavrov responded that Russian actions in this regard were "transparent" and that the GOR would not do anything to change the balance of power in the region or put Israel in MOSCOW 00003026 002 OF 002 danger. ¶7. (C) Both Medvedev and Lavrov expressed appreciation for Olmert's candid remarks regarding the need for Israel to end its presence in the occupied territories. Lavrov stressed the necessity of Egypt continuing to mediate negotiations between Fatah and Hamas, and said that he hoped PA President Abbas would able to remain in office despite the fact that the end of his term was approaching. The GOR's proposed Moscow Middle East conference was not discussed, most likely because the Russians understood that the time for it was not right, in Fuchs' estimation. MFA: Russia Will Not Sell Missiles to Troubled Regions -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) The GOR has been relatively quiet about Olmert's visit, despite rampant speculation in the press the trip was precipitated by a GOR decision to provide S-300 missiles or other advanced weapons to Iran. Some media outlets went so far as to predict that Russia would sell Iran S-300s in order to prevent an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear sites. MFA spokesman Andrei Nesterenko finally addressed the issue when he said on October 9 that Russia would not sell advanced weapons to countries in troubled regions (reftel). RUBIN