RUSSIAN MFA SOUTH OSSETIA ENVOY ON KOKOITY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002991

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM RS GG
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA SOUTH OSSETIA ENVOY ON KOKOITY,
MONITORS, GENEVA

Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: Reasons 1.4 (b, d).


1. (C) Summary: In an October 7 meeting, MFA Envoy for
South Ossetia Popov reiterated that Russia would meet its
October 10 withdrawal deadline. Predicting difficulty in
establishing the framework for the October 15 Geneva meeting,
Popov described Russia's South Ossetian clients as "elated"
by their victory and resistant to OSCE monitoring. He
conceded widespread ethnic cleansing by the Kokoity regime,
and reiterated Moscow's commitment to restoration of a
multi-ethnic South Ossetia. Popov acknowledged that South
Ossetia was a "great problem" for Russia and suggested that
Kokoity's lock on political power was not permanent. Over
time and with confidence building measures, Popov also
suggested a gradual 'lifting of political boundaries' between
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but reiterated that as
long as Saakashvili was in power there would be no
reconciliation. End Summary

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Security Handover
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2. (C) In an October 7 meeting, MFA Special Envoy for South
Ossetia Yuriy Popov maintained that overall security in the
territory was improving, but predicted that the situation
would degrade temporarily during the hand-off to EU forces.
Negotiations were underway between Russian and EU forces on
the ground, in order to arrive at "plausible standard
operating procedures." Popov underscored that he was
"absolutely positive" Russia would withdraw its forces from
Georgia proper by the October 10 deadline, despite the
October 3 terrorist attack. Following the withdrawal from
the security zone, Russians would man some posts within South
Ossetia, as part of its responsibility as the "guarantor" of
security, with additional steps taken to ensure the Akhalgori
region.

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Recalcitrant Ossetians: Geneva, OSCE, HR
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3. (C) Popov, who had just returned from a week in North
Ossetia where he held meetings with the South Ossetian "FM,"
predicted that the Geneva conference would "not come easily,"
given the different visions of what the process represented.
(Note: At the time, EU Morel was negotiating modalities with
DFM Karasin.) Popov stressed that "Presidents" Kokoity and
Bagapsh could not be bypassed, and argued that proposing the
participation of Georgia's South Ossetian leader Sanokoyev
would lead to Tskhinvali's boycott, as it had within the
earlier JCC format. Popov denied that Russia could dictate
to its clients, responding "we haven't even managed to secure
the return of the eight OSCE monitors." The South Ossetians,
he argued, had yet to overcome their elation and "fancy
themselves sovereign, independent leaders, who cannot be
pushed around -- even by Moscow."


4. (C) Popov maintained that DFM Karasin's message to
Kokoity was that if South Ossetia wanted respectability it
needed to sober up and behave in a civilized fashion,
agreeing to cooperate with international organizations,
including the OSCE. To Kokoity, the OSCE was a "hostile"
organization, with reports and statements by OSCE Mission HOM
Hakala understandably presenting an "ambiguous" picture,
since the monitors did not have access to South Ossetia and
were relying mostly on ethnic Georgian witnesses. Saying he
was "quite certain" Russia would bring the South Ossetians
around, Popov suggested that a compromise akin to the UNOMIG
rollover would need to be found that "cosmetically" changed
the name of the mission and provided cover for Kokoity to
stand down.


5. (C) Popov did not attempt to minimize the extent of
ethnic cleansing conducted by South Ossetians. "It is a
typical post-war situation," he justified, with looting,
anti-Georgian sentiment, and feelings of revenge thriving in
a culture that prides itself on bloodfeud. The northern
ethnic-Georgian enclaves "no longer exist," with practically
the entire population dispersed. The South Ossetians, he
confirmed, destroyed "everything" there and it would take
time to establish a minimum level of security for the return
of "refugees." The eastern enclaves around Akhalgori were
better, because there was more of a tradition of
co-existence. Popov noted that Russia's ability to extend
greater protection to the eastern enclaves was complicated by
the absence of a road from Tskhinvali that did not traverse
Georgia proper. Russia continued to impress upon Kokoity the
need to preserve and rebuild a multiethnic society, but with
a stylized shrug Popov suggested that much of that message
continued to fall on deaf ears. Popov pushed back against

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the possibility of international monitors playing an expanded
role, stressing that Russia recognized Tskhinvali's control
over the territory.

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Nothing is Permanent, Including Political Divisions
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6. (C) At the same time, Popov suggested that Kokoity may
be running out his Russia leash, noting without amplification
that "nothing is permanent," "Kokoity is not forever" and
there are "no Presidents for life in South Ossetia." South
Ossetia, he conceded, had become a "great problem" for
Russia. Although he immediately caveated his statement with
a defense of why Russia was forced to extend diplomatic
recognition after its redlines had been breached, Popov
admitted the territory was economically insolvent and
politically incoherent. Russia did not "need" South Ossetia,
and should not consider its annexation. North Ossetia looked
with condescension on its southern compatriots, who were less
educated, less affluent, and descendants of "lesser" clans.
Political rivalry outstripped ethnic loyalty between the
north and south.


7. (C) Straying further from GOR talking points, Popov
suggested that the "generational" answer was for economic
reconciliation to gradually "lift political boundaries,"
leading to a de facto restoration of Georgian territorial
integrity. Once animosities declined, initiatives such as
free economic zones could begin to restore confidence between
Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Popov agreed that the
Geneva meeting should identify "long-term" projects that
would lead to increased contact between the territories and
Georgia. However, Popov evinced no flexibility on
Saakashvili, who he maintained was "unacceptable" to the
South Ossetians, Abkhaz, and Russians. Hatred for
Saakashvili would prevent any forward movement on the
international track, he predicted, reiterating his
characterization of Saakashvili as a "puppet, madman, and
liar."


8. (C) Pushed on the basing of Russian troops, Popov
immediately interjected "they are not permanent either," but
noted that statements from the Georgian leadership undercut
Saakashvili's no use of force pledge. While the EU bore
responsibility for the security, Russia was disturbed by
reports that the U.S. or NATO planned to re-arm Saakashvili.

RUBIN