RUSSIAN MFA SOUTH OSSETIA ENVOY ON KOKOITY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 002991 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/07/2018 TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR PHUM RS GG SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA SOUTH OSSETIA ENVOY ON KOKOITY, MONITORS, GENEVA Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells: Reasons 1.4 (b, d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In an October 7 meeting, MFA Envoy for South Ossetia Popov reiterated that Russia would meet its October 10 withdrawal deadline. Predicting difficulty in establishing the framework for the October 15 Geneva meeting, Popov described Russia's South Ossetian clients as "elated" by their victory and resistant to OSCE monitoring. He conceded widespread ethnic cleansing by the Kokoity regime, and reiterated Moscow's commitment to restoration of a multi-ethnic South Ossetia. Popov acknowledged that South Ossetia was a "great problem" for Russia and suggested that Kokoity's lock on political power was not permanent. Over time and with confidence building measures, Popov also suggested a gradual 'lifting of political boundaries' between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but reiterated that as long as Saakashvili was in power there would be no reconciliation. End Summary -------------- Security Handover -------------- ¶2. (C) In an October 7 meeting, MFA Special Envoy for South Ossetia Yuriy Popov maintained that overall security in the territory was improving, but predicted that the situation would degrade temporarily during the hand-off to EU forces. Negotiations were underway between Russian and EU forces on the ground, in order to arrive at "plausible standard operating procedures." Popov underscored that he was "absolutely positive" Russia would withdraw its forces from Georgia proper by the October 10 deadline, despite the October 3 terrorist attack. Following the withdrawal from the security zone, Russians would man some posts within South Ossetia, as part of its responsibility as the "guarantor" of security, with additional steps taken to ensure the Akhalgori region. -------------- Recalcitrant Ossetians: Geneva, OSCE, HR -------------- ¶3. (C) Popov, who had just returned from a week in North Ossetia where he held meetings with the South Ossetian "FM," predicted that the Geneva conference would "not come easily," given the different visions of what the process represented. (Note: At the time, EU Morel was negotiating modalities with DFM Karasin.) Popov stressed that "Presidents" Kokoity and Bagapsh could not be bypassed, and argued that proposing the participation of Georgia's South Ossetian leader Sanokoyev would lead to Tskhinvali's boycott, as it had within the earlier JCC format. Popov denied that Russia could dictate to its clients, responding "we haven't even managed to secure the return of the eight OSCE monitors." The South Ossetians, he argued, had yet to overcome their elation and "fancy themselves sovereign, independent leaders, who cannot be pushed around -- even by Moscow." ¶4. (C) Popov maintained that DFM Karasin's message to Kokoity was that if South Ossetia wanted respectability it needed to sober up and behave in a civilized fashion, agreeing to cooperate with international organizations, including the OSCE. To Kokoity, the OSCE was a "hostile" organization, with reports and statements by OSCE Mission HOM Hakala understandably presenting an "ambiguous" picture, since the monitors did not have access to South Ossetia and were relying mostly on ethnic Georgian witnesses. Saying he was "quite certain" Russia would bring the South Ossetians around, Popov suggested that a compromise akin to the UNOMIG rollover would need to be found that "cosmetically" changed the name of the mission and provided cover for Kokoity to stand down. ¶5. (C) Popov did not attempt to minimize the extent of ethnic cleansing conducted by South Ossetians. "It is a typical post-war situation," he justified, with looting, anti-Georgian sentiment, and feelings of revenge thriving in a culture that prides itself on bloodfeud. The northern ethnic-Georgian enclaves "no longer exist," with practically the entire population dispersed. The South Ossetians, he confirmed, destroyed "everything" there and it would take time to establish a minimum level of security for the return of "refugees." The eastern enclaves around Akhalgori were better, because there was more of a tradition of co-existence. Popov noted that Russia's ability to extend greater protection to the eastern enclaves was complicated by the absence of a road from Tskhinvali that did not traverse Georgia proper. Russia continued to impress upon Kokoity the need to preserve and rebuild a multiethnic society, but with a stylized shrug Popov suggested that much of that message continued to fall on deaf ears. Popov pushed back against MOSCOW 00002991 002 OF 002 the possibility of international monitors playing an expanded role, stressing that Russia recognized Tskhinvali's control over the territory. -------------- -------------- Nothing is Permanent, Including Political Divisions -------------- -------------- ¶6. (C) At the same time, Popov suggested that Kokoity may be running out his Russia leash, noting without amplification that "nothing is permanent," "Kokoity is not forever" and there are "no Presidents for life in South Ossetia." South Ossetia, he conceded, had become a "great problem" for Russia. Although he immediately caveated his statement with a defense of why Russia was forced to extend diplomatic recognition after its redlines had been breached, Popov admitted the territory was economically insolvent and politically incoherent. Russia did not "need" South Ossetia, and should not consider its annexation. North Ossetia looked with condescension on its southern compatriots, who were less educated, less affluent, and descendants of "lesser" clans. Political rivalry outstripped ethnic loyalty between the north and south. ¶7. (C) Straying further from GOR talking points, Popov suggested that the "generational" answer was for economic reconciliation to gradually "lift political boundaries," leading to a de facto restoration of Georgian territorial integrity. Once animosities declined, initiatives such as free economic zones could begin to restore confidence between Georgia, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Popov agreed that the Geneva meeting should identify "long-term" projects that would lead to increased contact between the territories and Georgia. However, Popov evinced no flexibility on Saakashvili, who he maintained was "unacceptable" to the South Ossetians, Abkhaz, and Russians. Hatred for Saakashvili would prevent any forward movement on the international track, he predicted, reiterating his characterization of Saakashvili as a "puppet, madman, and liar." ¶8. (C) Pushed on the basing of Russian troops, Popov immediately interjected "they are not permanent either," but noted that statements from the Georgian leadership undercut Saakashvili's no use of force pledge. While the EU bore responsibility for the security, Russia was disturbed by reports that the U.S. or NATO planned to re-arm Saakashvili. RUBIN