GOR STILL SEEKS SOLUTION TO MD CONUNDRUM

C O N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 002975 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/05/2018 TAGS: PGOV PREL MCAP MNUC RS SUBJECT: GOR STILL SEEKS SOLUTION TO MD CONUNDRUM Classified By: Political M/C Alice G. Wells. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In the wake of the Georgia conflict, Russian officials have stepped up their verbal assaults on U.S. missile defense (MD) systems in Poland and the Czech Republic, with Medvedev reiterating the need for Russia to strengthen its nuclear deterrent. As if to underscore this point, the GOR hailed the October 1 launch of an RS-20B ICBM as proof that its missiles were still combat-ready. Deputy Security Council Secretary Yuriy Baluyevskiy went on the verbal offensive, asserting once again that U.S. MD plans posed a direct threat to Russia. In a September 26 statement, the MFA charged bad faith in MD negotiations, rejecting "reciprocity" in site visits and asking why the U.S. made an offer of "permanent presence" that it could not deliver on. FM Lavrov, while calling for another "2 Plus 2" session, complained that the GOR had not yet received revised U.S. transparency and confidence-building (TCBM) proposals regarding MD, nor the requested information regarding post-START plans. Local experts maintain that U.S. MD plans are seen as a serious threat and a catalyst for the latest round of military reforms following Russian forces' performance in Georgia. While Russia will continue to exploit MD as a wedge issue with the Europeans, DFM Ryabkov has emphasized his readiness to continue the dialogue with U/S Rood, contingent upon receipt of the U.S. papers. End Summary. -------------- Medvedev Seeks Stronger Nuclear Deterrent -------------- ¶2. (U) On September 30 Medvedev repeated his call (first made in Orenburg on September 26) to strengthen Russia's nuclear deterrent by 2020 and to create an integrated system of air space defense (septel). He said this would be in conjunction with an overhaul of Russia's "entire military organization," and was needed to maintain the military's effectiveness. ¶3. (SBU) As if to underscore the importance Medvedev attached to Russia's nuclear deterrent, the Commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops, Colonel-General Nikolay Solovtsov, announced on October 1 that Russia successfully launched an RS-20B ICBM from the Dombarovskiy missile launch site in Orenburg Region. Though the rocket was used to put Thailand's Theos earth observation satellite into orbit, Solovtsov said that the launch confirmed the possibility that this type of missile could still be used for combat duty. -------------- Baluyevskiy Says U.S. Planning To Attack -------------- ¶4. (U) Deputy Secretary of the Russian National Security Council Yuriy Baluyevskiy announced on September 29 that the "anti-Russian potential" of the MD system was "obvious" and the threat posed to Russia would only grow. He asserted that the U.S. regarded Russia as a "potential enemy" and that, if the U.S. was really concerned about Iranian missile attacks, it would have cooperated with Russia by using the Qabala radar station in Azerbaijan. Baluyevskiy also warned against engaging in another costly arms race with the U.S., noting that Russia must secure itself, but not by spending "more than we can afford on weapons." -------------- Reciprocity Seen As Threat -------------- ¶5. (U) On September 26, the MFA dismissed the idea of "bargaining" over Polish and Czech military access to Russian military facilities, in exchange for providing the Russian military access to MD sites in those two countries. The MFA took issue with the term "reciprocity," arguing that, in addition to aiming an MD system at Russia, the U.S. and its allies wanted access to Russian strategic missile sites. Stressing that both ideas threatened Russia's interests, the MFA reiterated "that the BMD site technologically will be able to intercept Russian intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) is no longer contested by the American side itself." The MFA termed it "absurd" to suggest that Russia should negotiate bilaterally with Poland and the Czech Republic for access, and criticized the U.S. for proposing a permanent presence without clearing it with its partners. The statement concluded that the U.S. exhibited an "unwillingness to conduct a professional dialogue." -------------- Lavrov Wants MD Papers -------------- ¶6. (U) While calling for another round of "2 Plus 2" talks with the U.S. on security issues, FM Lavrov maintained the drumbeat of criticism, complaining on October 6 that the U.S. had not provided the GOR with promised revisions of MD TCBMs (initially proposed during the "2 Plus 2" talks in March), nor proposals "concerning dialogue on controlling strategic offensive arms" (i.e., post-START). Lavrov stressed that the GOR had not received answers to its questions regarding plans for the proposed third MD deployment area, despite his having raised the issue during his meeting with the Secretary in New York. -------------- -------------- Experts Say Proposed Military Build-Up Response To MD -------------- -------------- ¶7. (C) Local experts maintain that U.S. plans to establish MD facilities in Poland and the Czech Republic are driving current Russian thinking on military modernization. The experts argue the conflict in South Ossetia highlighted the limitations of Russia's ground forces, which has been immune to short-term fixes. As a result, Russia's near-term security will continue to depend foremost on its nuclear deterrent. According to the Head of the Heritage Foundation in Moscow Yevgeniy Volk, signing MD agreements with Poland and the Czech Republic was a "game changer." No longer was the threat of MD purely theoretical, but now was enshrined in international agreements and required a tangible response. ¶8. (U) Former Chief of Staff of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces Colonel-General Viktor Yesin argued that Medvedev's decision to strengthen Russia's nuclear deterrent by 2020 was directly related to U.S. plans to deploy an MD system by then. According to Yesin, Medvedev's statement implied that Russia would have new missile systems that should be capable of penetrating any MD system. Yesin said that Russia's nuclear deterrent was adequate for now, but needed to be upgraded to defend against any future threats. (Comment: Yesin's spin was likely also intended as justification for channeling a larger percentage of the defense budget to strategic rocket force modernization and procurement.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) Russia will continue to allege U.S. delay and lack of good faith in post-START and MD discussions as a wedge issue to use with the Europeans. While DFM Ryabkov has conditioned the scheduling of the next meeting with U/S Rood on receipt of the U.S. proposals on post-START and MD, he has also underscored his interest in continuing this dialogue. RUBIN